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Truth and Judgment 
 
Jeremy J. Kelly 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
I examine the difficulties that several philosophers of language are liable to encounter in 
their attempts to provide an account of the connection between truth and assertion. I then 
attempt to provide an account of this connection. The analysis is concerned chiefly with 
difficulties which consist in elucidating the conceptual connection between truth and 
assertion in a way that respects certain linguistic intuitions while at the same time 
rendering the concept of truth amenable to a semantic interpretation. The proposed view 
suggests one way in which we might go about meeting the theoretical demands implicit 
in addressing this concern, among others, demonstrating the extent to which a theory of 
truth should be regarded as belonging to the province of epistemology. Insofar as 
semantical considerations figure into such a theory, a more systematic investigation of 
the interface between epistemology and natural language semantics is recommended. The 
solution to many problems at this interface, I argue, lay in an analysis of judgment.   
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Preface 
 
 
In what follows, I argue for an epistemic view of truth that involves an analysis of 
the conceptual relations between truth and judgment. On this analysis I propose a view 
that might be taken as a basis for a theory of logical form – a basis from which the 
problem of propositional unity may be treated among other kindred problems. The view 
is also intended to provide an epistemological basis from which we may address a 
concern which sometimes takes the form of an objection to Tarski-style disquotational 
theories of truth. The concern is that these theories do not tell us what it is that definitions 
of truth for interpreted languages have in common. The upshot of the analysis is the 
suggestion that our ordinary use of the concept of truth is an act that is explainable under 
a theory of truth which has something to say about the point of that use.  
The proposed view suggests one way in which we might go about meeting the 
theoretical demands implicit in addressing this concern, demonstrating the extent to 
which a theory of truth is, in a broad sense, an epistemological enterprise. I attempt to 
show how this is so in the final chapter of the dissertation, where I offer an 
epistemological treatment of some problems that are customarily understood to be the 
province of philosophy of language. The claim that a theory of truth should be conceived 
more as an epistemological undertaking than otherwise is a point that may be admitted 
without prejudice to the contention that solutions to many of the traditional problems 
surrounding the problem of truth depend crucially upon considerations having to do with 
2 
 
logical grammar. In view of these considerations I have set out to examine several of 
those traditional problems that are now central to many recent studies in the philosophy 
of language and natural language semantics. These problems concern propositional unity, 
predication, several issues raised by the notion of truth-makers, and the problem of what 
has come recently to be known as ‘Moore’s paradox’. 
 It is customary to construe the boundaries between epistemology and semantics 
as being sharply distinct, a tendency among some analytic philosophers that has perhaps 
had more undesirable consequences than would be the case were the interface between 
these two fields more carefully and systematically explored. The bridge that links these 
two domains of philosophical inquiry is one that should aim at a kind of conceptual 
elucidation, the business of which, so I argue, it is the business of a theory of assertion to 
provide.  
The aim of the first chapter is chiefly diagnostic. I examine the difficulties that 
philosophers of language are liable to encounter in their attempts to provide an account of 
the connection between truth and assertion. Where there is work being done to provide an 
account of this connection, the difficulties consist in elucidating the conceptual 
connection between truth and assertion in a way that respects certain linguistic intuitions 
while at the same time rendering the concept of truth amenable to a semantic 
interpretation. Such difficulties, I argue, have their origins very early in developments in 
analysis and the philosophy of language, and in the work of Gottlob Frege, in particular. 
 The second and third chapters are concerned with certain semantical 
considerations in Frege’s work. In this discussion I aim to provide an analysis of Frege’s 
theory of functions, and in particular Frege’s treatment of identity in terms of functions 
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and values. I argue that some standard ways of treating sentences have, in fact, emerged 
from Frege’s function-theoretic analysis and have had far-reaching implications with 
respect to the way in which the nature of judgment has come to be understood within the 
mainstream of philosophy of language. 
 From the point of view of judgment, the manner in which sentences are treated in 
Frege’s semantics has had, in turn, further undesirable consequences, in particular his 
identification of the semantic role of indicative sentences with that of names and referring 
singular terms. The second and third chapters are in the main an endeavor to trace these 
consequences from Frege’s later semantical views back to his theory of functions – i.e. 
what I regard as the source of the problem. 
 I there examine two widely accepted interpretations of Frege’s views on assertion 
as they arise out of his later semantical views and theory of functions. After showing how 
these accounts are connected with Frege’s theory of functions, I then attempt to show that 
the locus of what is problematic in these accounts is a theoretical consequence of 
construing sentences as names. Because of this fact, I suggest, the interpretations of 
Frege’s theory of assertion have supported what I take to be radically non-epistemic 
conceptions of truth. Such non-epistemic conceptions have won many adherents over the 
course of a century thanks to Frege’s influence and have come into especial prominence 
since Tarski’s article “The semantic conception of truth” in 1944. 
 Further developments of Frege’s ideas, as they appear in Russell’s early 
philosophy (1903), and later as they appear in the work of Alonzo Church (1951), have 
tended to support the two widely accepted interpretations of assertion. Russell’s own 
influential view of assertion is then examined, first in its relation to Frege’s view, and 
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then later in relation to the views of John Dewey (1938). The concept of truth is primarily 
epistemic, on Dewey’s view. In his Logic, he argues for in his Logic a more useful 
distinction between sentences and propositions on the basis of which he is then able to 
maintain the connection between truth and inquiry – twin notions that become divorced 
in the somewhat platonistically oriented views of Frege and Russell.  
The fourth and fifth chapters are in large part a discussion of some traditional 
theories of truth. I begin with the reception of Frege’s theories of judgment and reference 
via Russell’s early philosophy (1903). There I argue that via Russell’s interpretation of 
Frege and Frege’s peculiar brand of realism may be seen to effectively rehabilitate the old 
problem of propositional unity. In order to show this, I attempt first an examination of 
Russellian propositions and then discuss Austin’s “purified” correspondence theory of 
truth in relation to Strawson’s ‘performative-redundancy’ view. I then argue that the 
difficulties attending to traditional accounts of facts, specifically to their role as truth-
makers, derive from those aspects of Frege’s realism which were investigated in the first 
chapter and which were there taken to be a consequence of his theory of judgment. The 
difficulties derive also from Russell’s early ‘absolute realism’, for different, but closely 
related, reasons. 
 In chapters six and seven a distinction between primary and secondary concept of 
truth-value is introduced in connection with Strawson’s “performative-redundancy” view. 
I introduce on the basis of this distinction the concept of point of view which, an 
epistemic notion of truth argued in Wiredu (1975) This concept relativizes primary and 
secondary occurrences of truth-value to assertions in a manner that avoids some of the 
pitfalls commonly associated with truth-relativism. It is further argued that the 
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employment of the concept of point of view affords a solution to ‘Moore’s paradox’. The 
significance of the notion, and its application in treating this so-called paradox, lies less 
in the results of the application and more in its general implications for the theory of 
truth. I suggest that what is philosophically significant about ‘Moore’s paradox’ is that its 
solution confronts us with those implications in a way that discloses the necessity of 
approaching the theory of truth as an analysis of the way truth and assertion are related.  
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Chapter I: Frege’s Theory of Functions 
 
 
 Among the first expressions that Frege uses in ‘Function and Concept’ to name a 
mathematical function, (1) ‘2x³ + x’ is presented as an example of what “people who use 
the word ‘function’ ordinarily have in mind.” (Frege 1891, 24).What distinguishes (1) 
from other expressions which do not name functions is, inter alia, that (1) “indefinitely 
indicates a number.” As such, (1) is incomplete. It is this incompleteness, which we have 
yet to adequately characterize, that is the essential property of all functions. What is 
instructive about the appearance of mathematical expressions such as (1) is that they 
reveal the manner in which certain linguistic expressions possessing similar syntactic 
form exhibit a similar functionality. It is suggested in a careful study by Rulon Wells that 
the capacity of mathematical expressions to exhibit functionality in just this way is in 
large measure a consequence of the “method of generalization,” (henceforth MG) one 
among several commitments which underwrite the programmatic aims of early Logicism. 
According to Wells, MG was a technique that had allowed Frege to explain concepts and 
relations as a species of function, a technique without which Frege would not have 
arrived at a functional definition of concepts.  
  It is interesting to note that the notions of function and concept are not (typically) 
discussed in connection with the more familiar stable of semantic notions that recent  
philosophers of language have inherited from Frege. This much was recognized as early 
as 1951. As R. S. Wells observes, “in spite of the current interest in Frege, the basic 
distinction between Function and Object, his basic distinction, has received scant 
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attention, the reason being that it is not so directly relevant as the notion of sense, 
denotation, sense, proposition, and truth-value to the semantic problems with which 
discussions of Frege have been most concerned.”1 
 There are two general points about MG that are worth making: historically, it may 
be seen as an example of “cultural lag”.2 With respect to semantics, the method turned 
out to be, in Wells’ phrase, “too productive,” since it yielded “some products one would 
sooner not have had.” Wells does not mention Frege’s treatment of identity in connection 
with this – as Wells otherwise puts it – “uncontrolled method of discovery.” It is my 
contention that the problem of identity is for Frege is a consequence of this 
“uncontrolled” application of MG. The identity problem is in some sense independent of 
the complications that the MG reveals with respect to his theory of sense and the problem 
of cognitive significance. I argue, however, that the latter complications stem largely 
from the former. The specific treatment that identity receives in “On Sense and 
Reference” is the principal example of the MG principle yielding those sorts of results 
one would sooner not have had. Wells explains MG as follows: 
 
[Before] Frege it would have been said that some but not 
all things that have a meaning additional to their sense have 
a denotation. Names (noun phrases) have denotation but 
not truth; propositions have truth but not denotation. By 
generalizing the concept of denotation to subsume truth as 
a variety, Frege makes exceptionless, and therefore 
completely regular, the proposition “All objective meaning 
other than sense is denotation” (Wells 1951, 395) 
 
An instance of this is seen (on p.31) where Frege analyzes the sentence ‘Caesar 
conquered Gaul’ into the two parts, ‘Caesar’ and ‘conquered Gaul’, where the latter is 
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said to express a one-place function and the former the argument for the function. In the 
passage that immediately follows, we find the following linguistic analogue:  
 
         ‘____ conquered Gaul’ 
 
It is said that a “complete sense” is obtained when the empty place is filled up with a 
proper name. Frege then goes on to introduce other kinds of mathematical expression, 
also said to name functions but differing from other designating expressions (explain) 
insofar as they contain the signs for equality, inequality, etc. (‘=’, ‘>,’ and ‘<’). As an 
instance of Frege’s MG all of this perhaps familiar, if not uncontroversial.  
What follows these examples is a passage in which Frege reflects on the ways in 
which the meaning of the word ‘function’ has been “stretched by the progress of 
science,” and the ways in which he believes himself to have contributed to its so-called 
stretching. I suggest that the function-theoretic treatment of concepts advanced within the 
first four pages of ‘Function and Concept’ (see also Grundgesetze for a parallel 
discussion) may be seen to generate several difficulties in light of Frege’s theory of 
assertion. Moreover, it is suggested that the crux of Frege’s difficulties lay in his first 
attempts to extend the function-theoretic account so as to include the concepts of equality 
and inequality. 
 
In the first place, the field of mathematical operations that 
serve for constructing functions has been extended. Besides 
addition, multiplication, exponentiation, and their 
converses, the various means of transition to the limit have 
been introduced – to be sure, people have not always been 
clearly aware that they were thus adopting something 
essentially new…Secondly, the field of possible arguments 
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and values for functions has been extended by the 
admission of complex numbers…In both directions I go 
still further. I begin by adding to the signs +, -, etc., which 
serve for constructing a functional expression, also signs 
such as =, >, <, so that I can speak, e.g., of the function x² = 
1, where x takes the place of the argument as before. The 
first question that arises here is what the values of this 
function are for different arguments. (Frege 1892, 28) 
  
We then find the following examples of the function x² = 1 having been 
completed by the successive replacement of x with arguments -1, 0, 1, and 2: 
   
(2)   (-1)² = 1 
       0² = 1 
       1² = 1 
       2² = 1 
 
It is evident in this passage that Frege finds it unnecessary to further comment upon the 
difference between expressions containing ‘=’ and expressions which do not (such as (1)) 
once the examples are introduced.3 In light of this fact, it may be suggested that such a 
difference is inessential the theory of functions and its intended application; but I suggest 
that failure to acknowledge the import of the difference is responsible for much of the 
subsequent and widespread incomprehension of Frege’s theory of assertion among his 
most prominent interpreters. The suggestion should be unsurprising given what scant 
attention Frege gives to the concept of judgment in the early Begriffsschrift.  
  One way to get at this difference is to raise the question of whether or not there is 
a unique kind of incompleteness that characterizes functions, a question which Frege 
seems not to have considered in the earlier work on the subject.4 The suggestion is that in 
discovering there to be an ambiguity in the notion of incompleteness (in the grammatical 
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sense) we are then in a better position to see how it is useful to distinguish between the 
two types of expression used to name functions. Further, this difference may be seen to 
have some interesting implications for Frege’s semantic theory in general, which I 
discuss in a later section. Let us look at the following two expressions of distinct 
functions: 
 
   (i)  x(x – 2) 
   
(ii)   x > 0 
 
Given ‘2’ as the argument in (i) we obtain ‘0’ as the value of the function. This may be 
expressed by the following sentence: 
 
   (i*)  ‘2² - 4 = 0 
 
However, if for (ii) we take ‘1’ as the argument, then, given that the value yielded by the 
function is not a number, the value must be one of the two truth values. A not 
uninteresting question at this point is – how is this best to be expressed? It may be 
thought that we could write, 
 
   (ii*)   1 > 0 
 
We know this to be incorrect on Frege’s view since it fails to express the idea that the 
function yields a truth-value (in this case, ‘the True’), even though we know the 
expression to be correct just insofar as it is syntactically complete (This is expressed by 
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the declarative sentence: ‘One is greater than zero.’).  Therefore, the occurrence of ‘1’ in 
(ii*) would seem to satisfy the function (ii) insofar as the resultant expression becomes 
thereby complete. Such an interpretation would also seem to be a consequence of what 
Frege has given as a definition of a function in general (Begriff.;Grundgesetze). Rather, 
we might express the same idea without loss of clarity by introducing the following 
phraseology:  
    
(ii**) ‘1 > 0 has the value ‘the True’, 
 
where – if (ii**) is to avail us in drawing the analogy between (1*) and (ii*) – we are to 
infer that “has the value” and “indicates” are to be read in a way analogous to the way in 
which “=” is read in (i*). But if this is correct, then to say that “‘2(2 – 2) = 0’ indicates 
‘the True’” amounts to saying that the sentence indicates a truth-value once the value for 
the function –  given ‘2’ as argument – has already obtained. That is, in this instance ‘the 
True’ in (i) is indicated once the numerical value ‘0’ is yielded for the function (given ‘2’ 
as argument). I have here attempted to express a point made by Frege in a different way, 
stressing how the treatment of mathematical equality gives rise to the semantical 
categories of Frege’s system. Frege claims: 
 
I now say: the value of our function is a truth-value and 
distinguish between the truth-values of what is true and 
what is false. I call the first, for short, the True; and the 
second, the False. Consequently, e.g., what ‘2² = 4’ means 
is the True as, say, ‘2²’ means 4. And ‘2² = 1’ means the 
False. (Frege 1891, 28-29) 
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However, we may easily see that this is not true of (ii): given that ‘1 > 0’ is the 
result of having completed the function expressed by ‘x > 0’, there is good reason, prima 
facie, not to proceed to explicitly name the value for the function of the argument ‘1’, 
(viz. ‘the True’) in the way that Frege has done. To give a name for the value in this way 
suggests that the function is in further need of completion. This is suggested because the 
syntactical element (here recognized only implicitly) that is contained in the meaning of 
the sign ‘>’ is articulated in (i*) by what we understand to be expressed by the functional 
expression ‘= 0’ – ‘is 0’ – which forms the expression in (i) given ‘2’ as the argument. It 
is useful, then, to observe that in (i*), ‘=’ is a sign used in and for the construction of the 
complete expression. An expression containing two argument places, together with the 
relation-expression ‘is greater than’ is syntactically of the same form as is any expression 
containing those arguments together with the function expressed by the words “is,” “is 
the same as” and “is identical to.” This much is evident given the finite form of the 
principal verb, “to be”. The point of exhibiting syntactical completeness, however, may 
be generalized to apply to the occurrence of the principal finite verb in any declarative 
sentence. In the use of the terms “syntactical element” and “syntactical completeness” 
throughout, what is intended is a sense of an element or feature of language that is not 
wholly destitute of semantic significance. As concerns sentential structure, this element is 
to be taken as something that is essential to the rules of sentence formation for an 
interpreted language; it therefore pertains too in specific ways to specific rules governing 
semantic composition. It is assumed throughout the discussion that the notion of structure 
as pertains to sentences is not something conceptually prior to certain semantic concepts; 
considerations as to structure in this sense are not taken necessarily to be something that 
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should be wholly abstracted from semantic investigations into natural language.5 The 
concept of linguistic meaning is, rather, assumed to be prior in some sense, but pursuing 
the question of precisely in what this priority consists would lead us too far astray from 
the subject of discussion.   
 An obvious consequence of all these considerations as to logical composition is 
the very plausible sense in which functions may be characterized as being made complete 
(saturated) regardless of what numbers are determined as arguments for them, and 
therefore regardless of the senses of the sentences that obtain as a result of completing the 
function. A very similar point is made by K. Wiredu’s “Truth as a Logical Constant; with 
application to the Principle of Excluded Middle”:  
 
To assign a truth value to a function is not to say of it that it 
is true or is false, for, of course, it can be neither; it is 
merely to supply it with a truth claim. A correlative 
observation is this: The type of truth value that is involved 
when an assertion is said to be true or to be false is not 
exactly identical with the type of truth value that may be 
assigned to a truth function, though as we shall see, there is 
a very close relation between them (Wiredu 1975) 
 
We may note that not only is it the case that the completion of the function in (ii) 
occurs in virtue of designating ‘1’ as argument, as expressed in (ii*); and by parity of 
reasoning, the same kind of completion is just as easily rendered by designating ‘-1’ as 
the argument. Analogously, (i*) may be taken to be the result of having completed the 
function as expressed by (i).  
(Function)         ‘the capital of ξ’            ‘2ξ³ + ξ’ 
(Funct.+ argument)  ‘the capital of India’             ‘2(4)³ + (4)’ 
(Value)   ‘New Delhi’              ‘132’ 
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As a consequence of MG, ‘The capital of India’ indicates ‘New Delhi’ in the same way in 
which ‘2(4)³ + (4)’ indicates ‘132’. This is, as is evident by the explanations given in 
“Function and Concept,” the model on which extending the function is based. Frege’s 
extending the concept of function, and thereby the extending of the domain of values to 
include ‘=’, leads to the following parallel expressions:     
 
 
 ‘2 ξ³ + ξ = 132’    ‘____ is a man’  
 ‘2(4)³ + (4) = 132’ (‘4’ as argument)  ‘Socrates is a man’  
‘the True’     ‘the True’ 
    
 
Thus we have a doctrine according to which ‘Socrates is a man’ is a complex designation, 
given that ‘2(4)³ + (4) = 132’ is a complex designation6. If we have followed Frege’s 
reasoning this far, then we are led without too much difficulty to the related doctrine that 
‘the True’ and ‘the False’ are logical objects designated by sentences qua complete 
designating expressions. We find arguments in support of this doctrine in, e.g., “Function 
and Concept” (Frege 1891). A sentence is not incomplete; therefore the sense expressed 
by a sentence is an object. This conclusion is also consistent with other of Frege’s 
methodological principles.  
 Howard Jackson  reports, having studied one of Frege’s unpublished papers of 
1891-1892, that Frege argues “that the sense of an expression is an object, and since, for 
Frege, objects and concepts are in every case to be distinguished (a distinction made 
consistently throughout his writings), the sense of an expression is never to be confused 
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with a concept.”7  A fortiori what is denoted by the sense of a sentence is complete. Since 
the denotation of the sense of a sentence is one of the two truth-values and since whatever 
is complete is, by definition, an object, truth-values are therefore themselves objects; as 
such they belong to the realm of reference.  
 The results of apply the method of generalization as Frege has done reveals an 
ambiguity in Frege’s explanation of how values, in general, obtain. In “Function and 
Concept” Frege states that “the value of our function is a truth-value,” where the sense 
here of “value yielded” (given an argument for the function) is indistinguishable from the 
sense in which the expression ‘1>0’ names a truth-value (in this case, ‘the True’). 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II:  The Relation of the Theory of Functions to the Theory of Assertion 
 
 There is a philosophically interesting consequence of Frege’s strategy of first 
extending the concept of function to include identity, and then extending (on this basis) 
his functional analysis, already applied to nominalized sentences, so as to include the 
copulative sense of ‘is’. This consequence is uncontroversial and is articulated succinctly 
by Frege himself in Grundgesetze:  
 
….I do not mean to assert anything if I merely write down 
an equation, but that I merely designate a truth-value, just 
as I do not assert anything if I merely write down ‘2²’, but 
merely designate a number. (M. Furth (trans.) 1964)   
 
The concept of ‘2²’ as a naming expression is generalized to include sentences, 
e.g. ‘2² = 4’. 
I wish to examine now some further implications of Frege’s thesis that sentences 
are entities of the same logical type as singular terms. This identification of sentences 
with singular terms, which was seen in the last chapter to be a direct consequence of 
Frege’s methodology (in particular, MG) would seem to have, in turn, some undesirable 
theoretical consequences with respect to Frege’s understanding of the nature of assertion.  
According to V. H. Dudman, a noted Frege scholar, there are two prominent 
interpretations of Frege’s judgment-stroke – one attributed to Max Black and the other to 
P. T. Geach. Although upon investigation it becomes apparent that the Begriffsschrift 
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account accords with neither interpretation, the extent to which the later Frege (e.g. of 
Grundgesetze) was committed to one interpretation or the other is patently unclear. Thus, 
where Frege’s theory of assertion as it occurs in the context of the later semantic theory 
of Grundegesetzse (and in “Function and Concept”) is not met with incomprehension, it 
is recognized by many philosophers of language to be problematic. 
 In what follows I try to give some indication of just how problematic that theory 
is. On Black’s account, the assertion sign, ‘⊢’ was introduced to convert a mere 
(complex) designation to a non-designation.8 Such a conversion then would allow Frege 
to “restore to the propositional sign its truth-claiming aspect.” V. H. Dudman looks to the 
following passage in “Function and Concept” in an effort to marshal textual support for 
this interpretation:  
…[According] to the Black version asserted sentences are 
not names at all: the judgment stroke “does not serve, in 
conjunction with other signs, to designate an object, ‘⊢2 + 
3 = 5’ does not designate anything; it asserts something.”9 
 
Unlike Black, however, Dudman reckons the view expressed here to have already fallen 
into serious error. Dudman goes on, now echoing a point made by Furth in an earlier 
quoted passage10:   
In that passage Frege is surely over-reaching. What he 
ought to say is rather that ‘⊢2 + 3 = 5’ does not just 
express a thought and designate a truth-value, for “over and 
above this is the acknowledgment that the truth-value is the 
true. (Dudman 1975) 
 
On the proposed amendment, Dudman recommends a view that had in fact been 
maintained by Alonzo Church. In his Introduction to Mathematical Logic (1951) it is 
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maintained that sentences are still names – whether asserted or not – though they are said 
to differ from other naming expressions in their use. Church gives the following 
justification for his construing sentences in this way: 
[We] shall require variables for which sentences may be 
substituted, forms which become sentences upon replacing 
their free variables by appropriate constants, and associated 
functions of such forms – things which, on the theory of 
sentences as names, fit naturally into their proper place in 
the scheme set forth in §§ 02-03. …[Granted] that 
sentences are names, we go on, in the light of the 
discussion in §01, to consider the denotation and the sense 
of sentences. (Church 1951, 24)  
 
I cite this passage, in part because it lays out an (alleged) justification for the ‘theory of 
sentences as names’. This justification figures into an explanation that I give later as to 
why Frege’s theory of truth, despite all its metaphysical appurtenances, has nonetheless 
had a strong influence among subsequent philosophers of language. The passage is of 
further interest to us since it immediately follows a passage that contains both what is 
later argued to be the lynchpin of Frege’s theory of meaning, and the source of many 
metaphysical and linguistic muddles – not the least important of which I discuss in 
Chapter VI, “Moore’s Paradox and the Logic of Assertion.” The preceding passage is as 
follows: 
This [account of sentence meaning] seems unnatural at first 
sight, because the most conspicuous use of sentences (and 
indeed the one by which we have just identified or 
described them) is not barely to name something but to 
make an assertion. Nevertheless it is possible to regard 
sentences as names by distinguishing between the assertive 
use of a sentence on the one hand, and its non-assertive use, 
on the other hand, as a name and a constituent of a longer 
sentence (just as other names are used). Even when a 
sentence is simply asserted, we shall hold that it is still a 
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name, though used in a way not possible for other names. 
(Church 1951, 24) 
 
This assumption leads us to the central notion underlying Frege’s theory of sense: 
The sense of a sentence may be described as that which is 
grasped when one understands the sentence, or as that 
which two sentences in different languages must have in 
common in order to be correct translations each of the 
other. As in the case of names generally, it is possible to 
grasp the sense of a sentence without therefore necessarily 
having knowledge of its denotation (truth-value) otherwise 
than as determined by this sense. In particular, though the 
sense is grasped, it may sometimes remain unknown 
whether the denotation is truth. (Church 1951, 26) 
 
The possibility of grasping the sense of a sentence without knowing whether the 
denotation is truth (or falsehood) in the way Church describes implies that one may 
recognize the thought expressed by the sentence to be correct (while at the same time not 
knowing its denotation. The failure here to represent senses in a grammatically 
perspicuous fashion leads ultimately to a kind of skepticism with respect to truth – 
makingd the property of truth epistemologically inaccessible. Truth-skepticism, however, 
is not so much entailed by Frege’s notion of sense in itself as it is by Frege’s manner of 
grammatically representing it. The sense-reference distinction as typically construed, 
therefore, might plausibly be seen as spurious. What we should want to preserve in this 
distinction is the idea that an assertion and a proposition share a conceptual content; 
however, as I suggest in what follows, we should want to avoid drawing the distinction in 
precisely the way Frege and others have done. This commonality is what Frege expressed 
in his own way by claiming that sense determines reference, and the manner in which 
Frege draws the sense-reference distinction achieves this much. But the signinficance of 
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how it is drawn is crucial to understanding it. As we will see, a good deal hangs upon the 
way it is drawn.  
  The argument that Dudman presents in favor of this interpretation (which he 
attributes to Geach) is at times difficult, but it mirrors in many respects the confusion into 
which Russell fell in his early (1903) treatment of assertion and so may warrant closer 
examination. I come to this later. 
 According to Dudman, Black’s view holds that the assertion sign was introduced 
as a consequence of Frege’s having recognized the “namehood” of sentences. It is 
understandable that this doctrine would then require the use of a sign which would restore 
to a propositional sign its “truth-claiming aspect” – particularly in light of the conceptual 
priority of this doctrine in Frege’s later semantic theory. For Black the necessity of 
introducing such a device is a consequence of Frege’s construal of sentences as complex 
designations. Let us calls this Frege’s ‘later doctrine’. This is essentially the conjunction 
of theses (a) an (c) introduced on p. iv, namely, that sentences (normally) have 
denotations and are of the same logical type as singular terms. On Black’s view, the 
namehood (its semantic role of naming) of a sentence ipso facto deprives it of its 
assertoric function. As Dudman observes in this connection, “to name is not to say.” I 
wish not to quarrel with this line of interpretation per se, but to underscore what it is that 
Dudman has so far correctly observed – viz., that this doctrine appears fully in 
Grundgesetze (Frege 1891). Thus, if the Black interpretation is at all plausible, we must 
be prepared to admit that Frege had two explanations for the introduction of the 
judgment-stroke. The sign was introduced in Begriffsschrift in 1879, a considerable time 
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before Frege provided a later and separate explanation of the judgment-stroke in 
Grundgesetze.and “Function and Concept” in 1891.  
 It will be useful to inquire as to whether the theory of functions, from which Frege 
derives the notion that sentences rather are complex names, is independent of Frege’s 
early theory of assertion. In an article entitled “Frege’s Judgment-Stroke” V. H. Dudman 
writes:  
What are used assertively and non-assertively are alike 
sentences, and, as sentences, already have their own verbs; 
those verbs are part of what are being used assertively or 
non-assertively, and what is used assertively on one 
occasion cannot be the same as what is used non-
assertively on another if they differ in respect of verb. 
(Dudman 1975, 155)  
 
The crucial – and suppressed – premise in this passage is this: when the grammatical 
rendering (the “grammatical expedient”) of  ‘― Δ’ is used to mention or indicate, then it 
cannot also be used to make an assertion. It cannot also be a “candidate for assertive 
use”.11 But I think that we are entitled to ask here why not. It is assumed that the 
declarative form ‘a is F’ is used both assertively and non-assertively; therefore we should 
recognize ‘is’ as “part of” what is used at one time assertively in ‘a is F’ another non-
assertively in ‘a is F’. On Dudman’s assumption, then, the grammatical difference 
expressed between the declarative form ‘a is F’ and the non-declarative ‘the circumstance 
that a is F’ is not sufficient to characterize the distinction marked by Frege’s use of the 
signs ‘― Δ’ and ‘⊢Δ’.  
  
 There is very little textual evidence in support of the interpretation according to 
which the assertion sign was conceived by Frege as merely an index of assertion. 
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Sometimes called the ‘Geach interpretation’, this reading of the assertion sign as a kind 
of index maintains that the addition of the vertical judgment-stroke to the (horizontal) 
content-stroke is intended not to affect the semantic role of the expression to which it 
attaches. Thus, the sign is not a device which serves as a grammatical functor from 
substantival phrases (or noun phrases) to declarative sentences. Nor is it a device that 
restores to complex designations an assertoric force that is otherwise vitiated simply in 
virtue of their naming function. It is a device which shows merely when a sentence is 
being used assertively rather than non-assertively. On this view there is no corresponding 
grammatical difference. Frege was simply mistaken to think that the judgment-stroke 
would alter semantic content in addition to serving as an index of assertion. The so-called 
index interpretation appears to be what Church has in mind when he distinguishes 
between “assertive use” and “non-assertive use” of a sentence.12 
The initial restriction on the use of the judgment-stroke is that put forth by Russell; and it 
seems that others, including those we have been discussing, have followed the 
prescription. On Russell’s view, it is only appropriate to prefix the judgment-stroke to 
expressions representing conceptual contents which are “in principle capable of being 
held true.” (Russell 1903, Appendix) Both the Geach-Dudman and Russell interpretations 
appear to be in agreement that falsehoods are not capable of being asserted in the same 
way in which truths are. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, Russell does not 
fail to see the implication that for this very reason error becomes impossible. In an effort 
to escape the implication, Russell claims that assertions whose conceptual contents are 
incapable of being held true are to be regarded as having a primarily psychological status. 
Russell was not the only one to regard assertions in this way. Several prominent 
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philosophers, chief among which are Church, Geach, and Dummett, have made the same 
move - even if they were blind to that troublesome implication.13  
 Dudman has no good reason to claim that2) Dudman is incorrect to say that there 
is no explanation of why the assertion sign is not needed in Begriffsschrift (unlike 
Grundgesetze and F&B) or to claim that, whatever Frege’s intentions were, §§ 2,3 of 
Begriffsschrift  “embody a readily understandable slip on Frege’s part.” There Frege is 
said to have been unmindful of the fact that assertoric force is suspended (“cancelled”) in 
truth-functional contexts. In light of what Frege actually says in these sections (2 and 3), 
this criticism is unjust. It is not obvious why it is incorrect to say that ‘the circumstance 
that unlike poles attract’ cannot “even be a candidate for assertive use,” and that because 
its semantic role is to name, it cannot be used to say. Further, it does not follow that even 
if “the circumstance that unlike poles attract” cannot be a candidate for assertive use, a 
declarative sentence cannot be used to both name and assert.   
Dudman’s argument at this point is puzzling: (1) If the vertical stroke is to be an 
index of assertion (in Geach’s sense), then we are left with no choice but to also assign to 
it the role of what Frege has called the ‘common predicate’ (that of a “verb”), “is true,” or 
what is the same, “is a fact.” This is the role it is said to have in §§ 2 and 3 of 
Begriffsschrift. (2) If the judgment stroke joins to an expression a common predicate 
upon an expression, then the judgment stroke cannot be merely an index of assertion – i.e. 
that is, a device to signify when a sentence is being used assertively and when it is being 
used non-assertively. Therefore, the judgment stroke cannot be taken as a kind of functor. 
Dudman observes that this is a consequence of assuming a definite description such as 
“the circumstance that unlike poles attract” to be an adequate rendering of an expression 
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‘A’ in ‘–A’. But Dudman thinks this is just why the Begriffsschrift account is mistaken, 
for Dudman maintains that the judgment-stroke “cannot be an index of assertion if it is a 
verb.”   
  The problematic assumption on which this argument rests may be located in the 
the following passage14:  
 
(A2) 
“What are used assertively and non-assertively are alike 
sentences, and, as sentences, already have their own verbs; 
those verbs are part of what are being used assertively or 
non-assertively”   
 
  Dudman then goes on to claim, “what is used assertively on one occasion cannot be the 
same as what is used non-assertively on another if they differ in respect of a verb.”  
 Appealing to an argument originating in Frege’s later writings, Dudman 
concludes that any sentence containing the universal predicate (the verb) is a sentence 
which itself may also be used non-assertively. 
 The confusion that emerges here – a confusion that appears also to underlie 
Russell’s difficulties concerning the nature of truth in (§§ 51-53) Principles of 
Mathematics – is one that can perhaps only be cleared up by suggesting yet another 
interpretation of the assertion sign.  
Assuming that the verb is part of what is being used (as part of a sentence) assertively on 
one occasion and non-assertively on another, it may be doubted whether we should 
therefore assume that which is to be used assertively and non-assertively must be a 
declarative sentence. We have as an example of what is to be used assertively and non-
assertively alike, “Unlike poles attract.”15 It may be argued that (i) the verb ‘is’, in 
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Russell’s example – ‘Caesar is dead’ – cannot be part of an expression used assertively if 
that expression (the declarative form) is also to be used non-assertively, for normally we 
do not say non-assertively ‘Caesar died’. 
 The foregoing points, arguably may be taken to support Dudman’s contention 
since it is compatible with the later doctrine that indicative sentences are proper names 
and as such are debarred from assertoric employment. Of course, Dudman’s contention 
that Frege’s rendering of ‘— A’ as “the circumstance that unlike poles attract” in order to 
display grammatically the occurrence of a possible content of judgment was an 
“understandable slip” on Frege’s part is also consistent with (i) above.16. The 
compatibility of these claims, it may be speculated, encouraged Dudman to think that he 
was on to something and therefore might be forgiven for justifying his interpretation on 
such slender textual grounds.  
 What support is thereby afforded the Geach interpretation seems to collapse given 
what I take to be another, very plausible interpretation of the assertion sign. This 
interpretation is perhaps closest in letter and spirit to §§ 2,3 of Begrifftsschrift. On this 
interpretation, Frege made no understandable slip and did not misrepresent his own 
intentions at all. Contrary to Dudman’s claim, Frege’s use of  
 
 (1) ‘the circumstance that unlike poles attract’ 
and  
 (2) ‘Unlike poles attract’ 
 
as linguistic expressions for which the following symbolic expressions stand, 
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 (1a)  —A  
 (2a)  ⊢ A 
 
,accomplishes just what it was intended to accomplish, namely, to show that (1) is the 
conceptual content of (2); and to show, therefore, that (2) shows (1) as having been 
asserted. Thus, what has come to be known as the common predicate (of Begriffsschrift) 
reading of the assertion sign is correct. But also correct is the contention that (I) the 
assertion sign is, in a sense, an index of assertion. However, it must be added that this 
contention is not merely incidental to the common predicate reading. That is, we should 
not therefore read the assertion sign as providing an index of assertion independently of, 
and in addition to, conferring the predicate upon the participial expression. To take it as 
such is to regard the introduction of the assertion sign as an unnecessary accretion to an 
already established theory of assertion.17   Rather, it is by virtue of our recognizing the 
presence of the common predicate that the assertion sign may then serve as an index of 
assertion.  
 We are required to take the assertion sign as a functor which yields 
transformations from noun-phrases to complete sentences. Though this functor is 
syntactic, one may argue that the transformation itself is not merely syntactic: it yields 
both a logical and semantic transformation from definite descriptions to complete 
sentences – i.e. from propositional contents to truth-values. There is, then, no reason to 
think that what is viewed assertively and non-assertively are alike sentences. Therefore, 
(A2) must be incorrect.18 
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 This reading contradicts what Dudman takes to be the prevailing interpretation of 
the assertion sign, and given our earlier gloss on his argument for this interpretation, we 
may be inclined to regard (I) as a reductio in favor of the prevailing view. This would be 
plausible were there not good reasons, as I suggested there are earlier, for rejecting 
Dudman’s key assumption. The assumption in question, it will be recalled, is that the 
judgment stroke cannot serve as an index of assertion if it is also to supply the verb – in 
these examples, the predicate ‘is true’, or ‘is a fact’. The reason is that sentences are the 
types of entity capable of being used both assertively and non-assertively. But as 
sentences, Dudman claims, they already contain verbs (A2). 
 On a closer examination of Dudman’s discussion we can begin to see where the 
confusion begins to set in. It would seem to be found the following paragraph, which 
immediately precedes his argument for his interpretation: 
 
Frege comes up with (1) “the circumstance that unlike 
poles attract” as being an expression satisfying the two 
conditions of (a) having the same conceptual content as (2) 
“Unlike poles attract,” and (b) lacking assertoric force.”  
(Dudman 1975)   
 
Witness that (1) is an expression which satisfies condition (a) – of having the same 
conceptual content as (2). This implies, of course, that there is some third thing 
(something like a proposition) which (1) and (2) share. But a not unreasonable question 
might arise as to what this thing could be and in what way it is to be expressed 
linguistically.  
 In sections 2 and 3 no such thing is implied, since Frege never makes the claims 
that are attributed to him by Dudman in the passage in question. A careful examination of 
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these sections will reveal that (1) “the circumstance that unlike poles attract” just is the 
conceptual content of (2), “Unlike poles attract.” It should then be noted that (1) is taken 
as an unsaturated expression which is converted to (2) upon having restored assertoric 
force. Once the judgment-stroke is seen in this light, we avoid the need to posit the 
semantic tertium quid to which the Geach-Dudman view must be committed; for, we 
cannot sensibly hold that (1) has the same conceptual content as (2) if (1) just is that 
conceptual content. 
I suggest that this reading is consistent with the spirit of Frege’s early theory of 
functions, as the horizontal (or content-stroke) would then be seen to, together with the 
expressions to which it is prefixed, express a function. Historically speaking, this is not 
without a more general significance since it affords some insight into the causes of 
Russell’s difficulties in the famous passage of §§51 and 52 of Principles. Before turning 
to this, we shall first have to substantiate the foregoing claims against Dudman’s 
argument and question the merits of the Geach interpretation, since it would seem that 
that interpretation is inconsistent with much of what is implied by the proposed 
interpretation – viz. that assertoric force alters the semantic role of the expression to 
which it applies.  
 
 Judgeable Content, Truth, and ‘Judging true’. The Geach interpretation is 
thought to be supported by several arguments appearing in discussions after 1891 (in 
1896, in two published essays on Peano’s system): the role of the judgment-stroke in the 
cited passages is taken by Dudman to be the role accorded to it in Begriffsschrifft, that is, 
as an index of assertion and not as a grammatical functor. I have argued that this is 
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mistaken, but it may explain in part the predominance of the Geach interpretation among 
various interpretations of Frege’s philosophy of language.19 
 Consistent with the proposed interpretation in §1 are the views expressed in 
several passages of Begriffsschrifft which may also be taken to support the Dudman-
Geach interpretation. In their interpretation of, for example, §7 of Begriffsschrifft, we 
begin what might appear to be a marked determination to divest Frege’s account of the 
judgment-stroke of its syntactical significance: 
 
If the judgment-stroke is absent then, here as elsewhere in 
the Begriffsschrifft, no judgment is passed.  
          ┬ A 
merely requires the formation of the idea that A does not 
take place, without expressing whether this idea is true 
(Geach 1965). 
 
Then later on, “Even in section 2 the account of the judgment stroke in terms of “the 
circumstance that” …is counterbalanced by a passage that supports Geach’s “index of 
assertion” interpretation: 
 
If the small vertical stroke at the left end of the horizontal 
one is omitted, then this is to transform the judgment into a 
mere combination of ideas concerning which the writer 
does not express whether he acknowledges its truth or not 
(Geach 1965). 
Though it is perhaps not so clear how section 7 is supposed to count as further evidence 
of the point that section 2 is alleged to have already made, we may nevertheless see that 
the oversight of the syntactical distinction here between a mere combination of ideas and 
judgment is encouraged by a somewhat biased understanding of Frege’s early theory of 
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judgment. This emerges most notably in the words, “concerning which the writer does 
not express whether he acknowledges its truth or not.” The author cites this as a passage 
(§2) which “counterbalances” the syntactical distinction contained in the preceding 
paragraph. But it does more than this: it betrays an insistence upon a wholly 
psychological conception of judgment according to which judgment amounts to nothing 
more than ‘veridical commitment.’  On this assumption we are led to the conclusion that 
the cited passage must countervail Frege’s discussion in §2 (Begriff.) in which the 
syntactic distinction is explicitly stated. However, once we drop this problematic 
assumption, whatever motivation we may have had for maintaining the Dudman-Geach 
interpretation is lost.  
 Supporters of the Geach view will perhaps not hesitate to point out that the force 
of the objection that I have raised depends upon the plausibility of taking the (above) 
quoted passages as meaning something other than what most Frege scholars have taken 
them to mean. Moreover, it would seem that pursuing the objection further would lead us 
into some rather thorny issues surrounding the nature of judgment more generally. The 
problem would then become the more general one of understanding what we do in our 
activity of passing judgment and how the relation of our notion of passing judgment – of 
expressing veridical commitment – is related to what we already take to be the objects 
that judgments are about. There may be no better entering wedge into this difficult 
problem than the remarks of several key passages in Frege’s later writings. 
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“Two components in that whose external form is a declarative sentence”:  
(i) The acknowledgement of truth                   
and 
(ii) The content that is acknowledged to be true:      
     
   (a) Thought (Der Gedanke) 
 (b) Truth-value     
                  
Frege explains that content is “split” into (a) thought and (b) truth-value, and this split 
emerges “as a consequence of distinguishing between sense and denotation of a sign.”20  
 Note that Frege construes an ‘acknowledgement of truth’ in such a way that 
implies that what was once a component given a semantic role in a theory of judgment is 
now a component which is left out of account. Seen in this light it then becomes apparent 
how such a lacuna led various interpreters to mistakenly construe “acknowledgement of 
truth” as synonymous with veridical commitment. The “acknowledgement of truth” 
ought to have meant the determination of the sign’s referent by the sense of the sign and 
not, as is implied by Frege, the further determination of a truth-value by the denotation. If 
we take the denotation itself to have a denotation, then we are forced to postulate ‘the 
True’ and ‘the False’ as logical objects.  With the above passage from Grundgesetze we 
have the following development of Frege’s views, outlined here diagrammatically:  
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Figure 1.  Components of a declarative sentence 
 
    
 
 
 
 
         
 
Frege’s suggestion in “Function and Concept” is that there is a need to maintain a clear 
“separation of the act from the subject-matter of judgment,” and to do this we should 
need to treat indicative sentences ‘5 > 4 ‘,  ‘1 + 3 = 5’, e.g., as proper names. Following 
Dudman’s suggestion, we may take this to be a non-sequitur, and rightly so: the 
separation of the act from subject-matter of judgment does not entail the thesis that 
declarative sentences are proper names. We may, in fact, press the point a bit further than 
Dudman has done and claim that not only is the namehood thesis of declarative sentences 
not entailed by a commitment to keep separate the act and content of judgment, it ought 
not be entailed by this commitment. More precisely, if the namehood thesis is entailed in 
the way Frege claims it is, then his separation of the act from the content of judgment 
must then be the wrong kind of separation. It would appear that what I take to be Frege’s 
Acknowledgment  
of truth 
Possible content  
of judgment 
   Thought   Truth-value 
Declarative           
sentence 
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mistake in this connection was overlooked by Russell who was chiefly instrumental in 
bringing Frege’s later semantic theory to light in anglo-american world of philosophy and 
therefore largely responsible for the received view of Frege’s theory. Thus, while the 
practice of treating declarative sentences as proper names has continued in semantic 
theory well after Grundgesetze, the initial reasons for adopting that practice was lost sight 
of. This is an important point bearing on conceptions of truth which I discuss later in 
further detail. Figure 2 Semantic Content: 
 
The relationships roughly pictured here, put forth explicitly in the previous passage 
(Grundgesetze), show that we are to take the thought of a sentence as having a 
denotation, in which case we must hold that a (non-defective) sentence denotes one of the 
two truth-values. This is a consequence of identifying the sense of a sentence with the 
thought expressed by the sentence. Given the view presented in Grundgesetze, according 
to which the thought as expressed by an indicative sentence inherits the structure as 
determined by assumed semantic principles of composition of the sense of the 
 Content 
  Possible content  
  of judgment 
     Sense  Reference 
   Thought Truth-value 
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corresponding sentence, a thought stands as a complete entity. The structure and the 
logical standing of the thought, if we are to analyze its structure in the context of Frege’s 
early view of assertion (Begriff.), exhibits this completeness by showing a ‘possible 
content of judgment’ as having been asserted; that is to say, as having been advanced as 
true. To speak of a content as having been advanced as true is simply to speak of an 
acknowledgement of truth (Begriff.) the grammatical representation of which, as we have 
seen, is the vertical-stroke.  
 Thus, if it is correct to assume that a truth-value obtains with the addition of 
assertoric force to the incomplete expression – which represents a ‘possible content of 
judgment’ – then we are said to be in possession of a truth value given the denotation of 
the sense of a sentence. This observation is supported when we attend to Frege’s 
discussion of the twin notions of designtation and denotation and how they are 
distinguished in section 2 of Grundgesestze :  
I say: the names “2² = 4” and “3 > 2” denote the same 
truth-value, which I call for short the True.  …Likewise, for 
me “3² = 4” and “1 > 2” denote the same truth-value, which 
I call for short the False, precisely as the name “2²” denotes 
the number four. Accordingly I call the number four the 
denotation of “4” and of “2²”, and I call the True the 
denotation of “3 > 2” (Frege 1891, 35) 
 
Immediately preceding these remarks, Frege writes:  
The expressions “0² = 4”, “1² = 4”, “2² = 4”, “3² = 4” are 
expressions some of true, some of false thoughts. I put this 
as follows: the value of the function ξ = 4 is either the 
truth-value of what is true or that of what is false.” (p. 35) 
(see also S&R) 
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The true thought “2² = 4” is expressed by designating; that is, the truth-value (here, the 
True) is designated independently of our asserting that 2² = 4. But here, by the very fact 
that we are dealing with sentences, simply because we are dealing with expressions 
involving equalities and inequalities, we are liable to be temporarily unmindful of the fact 
that such expressions are already complete (i.e. “saturated”) expressions and that 
inattention to their completeness has certain implications. One implication is the 
difficulty that Montgomery Further had drawn attention to in remarking that the notions 
of truth and falsehood "seem to be turning up twice over in the theory, once within the domain 
of individuals in the guise of the ‘logical objects’ the True and the False, and then again at a 
different level as success versus failure… of the act of asserting.”21 
   As complete, these expressions contain an occurrence of truth, unless they 
undergo an operation whereby they are divested of their assertoric force. Of course, Frege 
and others (viz. Russell and Geach) explicitly recognize that such an expression must be 
capable of being expressed without being thereby asserted. One consequence of this, 
however, is a very one-eyed preoccupation with the psychological aspects of assertion. 
This, in turn, would seem to be a consequence of several developments which, as it 
happens, span the whole of Frege’s work in semantic theory: firstly, extending the 
function-theoretic approach to include the notions of equality and inequality; secondly, 
the introduction of the sense/reference distinction; and thirdly, having lost sight of the 
fact that the internal structure of judgment “whose external form is a declarative 
sentence” carries with it (contains) an occurrence of truth given by the presence of 
assertoric force. It is the latter that is at odds with the syntactic interpretation of the 
judgment stroke.      
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 It would seem that the psychological sense of assertion may be maintained with or 
without the syntactic distinction: given the sentence ‘Unlike poles attract’ 
, we may say that we assert the sentence when we wish to recognize the truth of the 
sentence and that we hold the sentence in consideration when, e.g., we do not recognize 
its truth. However, it is assumed in the Begriffsschrift that we are to represent the 
relationship between (unasserted) judgeable content and truth-value as follows Figure 3 
Relation of semantic content to truth: 
 
 Content 
    
 Acknowledgement of truth 
 
                    Truth-value 
 
It is perhaps well known that this relationship grows more complicated Frege’s later 
work. Thus, in Grundgesetze we have the following (Figure4):  
37 
 
Figure 4 Two levels of truth 
                Sense 
                    
 
           
 
 
                Truth or Falsehood 
 
 
 
 
 
               
         The True   
 
 Problematically, the psychological sense of assertion according to which an 
assertion is merely an expression of veridical commitment (to the sense of a sentence) 
then prevails over the logical sense in the following passage from “Function and 
Concept”: 
 
If we write down an equation or inequality, e.g. 5 > 4, we 
ordinarily wish at the same time to express a judgment; in 
our example, we want to assert that 5 is greater than 4. 
According to the view I am presenting ‘5 > 4’  and ‘1 + 3 = 
5’ just give us expressions for truth-values, without making 
  Acknowledgement of truth 
  Acknowledgement of truth 
38 
 
any assertion… (Frege 1891; compare to passage in ‘On 
Herr Peano’s Begriffsschrift’, viz. “with ‘(2 > 3) = (7² = 0) 
a sense of strangeness is at first felt…for such a sign serves 
two distinct purposes…”)   
 
The words “we ordinarily wish at the same time to express a judgment” are instructive in 
that they imply that there are occasions on which we do not wish at the same time pass 
judgment, e.g., that 5 is greater than 4 when we simply write ‘5 > 4’. In case such as this 
we should have no need for a grammatical functor to express the content unasserted. It 
appears that the mind – upon having been given the sentence ‘5 > 4’ covertly supplies the 
affirmative judgment that ‘5’ is greater than ‘4’. In the case that we judge a content as 
false, this point is brought out more clearly: given the written sentence ‘1 + 3 = 5’, we 
seem to be engaged in what Frege calls expressing a supposition – or rather covertly (and 
simultaneously) – supplying a negative judgment which we may wish to say, following 
Frege, designates the truth-value ‘the False’. On Frege’s view, strictly speaking, this is 
not a judgment, since in inscribing the signs ‘1 + 3 = 5’, or in being presented with the 
sentence ‘1 + 3 = 5’, we may simultaneously suspend judgment as to its truth or 
falsehood. In such cases it is clear that we merely feign an expression of the (unasserted) 
judgeable content by assertive means. We are still apt to ask what exactly are we doing in 
suspending judgment in this way, suggesting the operation is perhaps more complicated. 
In the next chapter I argue that an understanding of assertion in terms of a veridical 
commitment to sentences, where force is now conferred, now suspended only 
psychologically, leads to serious puzzles. These are puzzles, however, that arise out of 
the prominence of Frege’s later views. They may be solved by appealing to the insights 
of his earlier Begriffschrifft. The prominence of his later views owes in large part to 
Russell’s interpretation of Frege’s work in PofM. Russell, and many who later fell under 
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his influence, seized on the psychological approach to assertion, thereby inheriting the 
puzzles and associated tangles concerning the nature of propositions and facts, and the 
definition of correspondence. In a certain sense, what is occurring implicitly in claiming 
that a sense has a denotation just is the passing of judgment – or, to adopt the language of 
Begriffsschrift, an “acknowledgement of truth” – a truth claim. It is now a simple matter 
to see why, given a psychological sense of assertion, Frege would vehemently deny that 
expressions standing for truth-values (i.e. what and how a given expression denotes a 
truth-value) are expressions of judgments.    
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Chapter III:  Frege and Russell on Assertion 
 
 
 In this chapter I advance a syntactical interpretation of Frege’s theory of assertion 
which derives from the views of Kwasi Wiredu (1975) and W. E. Johnson (1921).On this 
interpretation, the expressions 
(1) ‘The circumstance that unlike poles attract’ 
(2) ‘Unlike poles attract’ 
are to be taken as the grammatical forms of the symbolic expressions,  
(1a)  —A  
(2a)  ⊢ A 
It is then argued that Frege (of Begriffsschrift) accomplished what he intended to do, 
namely, to show that (1) is the conceptual content of (2) and that (2) shows (1) as having 
been asserted. The semantic role of expressions may be said to be altered by the addition 
of the (vertical) judgment-stroke in (2a) in such a way that requires us to either (i) convert 
the sentence to a complex noun phrase, or (ii) represent the alteration by converting the 
principal verb from its finite to its infinitive form. On the proposed interpretation, we may 
find a solution of the problem with which Russell struggled in Principles of Mathematics 
in finding an account of the difference between the finite and infinitive forms of verbs 
that will accord with an “ultimate notion of assertion.” (PofM) The second part of the 
discussion examines Russell’s problem in light of the proposed view. Suggested by this 
view is a conception of assertion as a primarily logical, rather than psychological notion. 
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Russell claims in Principles of Mathematics (1903) that grammar brings us closer 
to a correct logic than do the opinions of philosophers. In chapter IV of that book he sets 
out to treat the nature of assertion, propositions and the terms of grammar, prefacing his 
investigations with the remark, “in what follows, grammar, though not our master, will be 
taken as our guide.” (PM, §46) The remark is somewhat curious, since there is in so 
much of Russell’s early work (1903) more in common with the views of Frege and of 
other mathematically-oriented logicians (e.g. Cantor and Peano) than there is with the 
work of logicians whose conception of logic cleaves closely to the categories of 
traditional grammatical analysis. Here I have in mind the views of the early 20th century 
logician, W.E. Johnson, from whom Russell claims in the preface to Principles to have 
received “many useful hints.”  
 In what follows I advance a thesis several of the arguments pertaining to which 
are derived from a view of assertion advanced by Wiredu (1975).22 On the basis of this 
view I argue for a syntactic interpretation of Frege’s early theory of assertion according 
to which the two statements: 
(1) ‘the circumstance that unlike poles attract’ 
(2) ‘Unlike poles attract’ 
are formally expressible as 
(1a)  —A  
(2a)  ⊢ A 
In this construal of the vertical and horizontal strokes, as laid out in first section of 
Begriffsschrifft, Frege accomplishes what he intended to accomplish, namely, to show 
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that (1) is the conceptual content of (2) and that (2) shows (1) as having been asserted. 
This way of understanding the judgment stroke – what I will call, after D. A. Bell23, the 
syntactical interpretation – is in keeping with the common predicate view of the 
judgment-stroke of Frege’s early Begriffsschrift.24  On this interpretation, the semantic 
role of expressions may be said to be altered by the addition of the vertical stroke to the 
horizontal (content) stroke in (2a) in a way which requires us to either (i) convert the 
sentence to a complex noun phrase, or (ii) represent the alteration by converting the 
principal verb from its finite to its non-finite form (W. E. Johnson).25 In Frege’s own 
example (above) we have something like a transformation to a noun phrase with the use 
of indirect speech, but there are cases, as in Russell’s own example – ‘Caesar died’ – that 
may be treated in accordance with the second option (ii).   
So, in taking the following pair of expressions:   
(3) ‘Caesar’s being dead’ (or ‘Caesar’s death’) 
  (4) ‘Caesar died’   
we have a suitable grammatical expression of the previous distinction ((1a) and (2a)),  
(3a) ‘—A’  
(4a) ‘⊢ A’ 
Accordingly, the judgment-stroke is construed as an operator yielding 
transformations from incomplete functional expressions (typically descriptions) to 
complete expressions which standardly take the form of declarative sentences. This 
conception is founded on the assumption that the construal of the judgment-stroke is 
syntactical: the interpretation of ‘⊢’ as an operator derives chiefly from the notion of a 
grammatical functor from noun-phrases to declarative sentences.  
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 Recognition of this fact by interpreters of Frege’s Begriffsschrift, it seems, has 
not been forthcoming, and in many cases Frege’s own argument for the proposed account 
is outright dismissed.26 The evidence to support this claim abounds. But, leaving that 
aside, I shall point out that there are many who simply deny the logical significance of 
the syntactical interpretation, prominent among them are Michael Dummett, Peter Geach, 
Max Black and V. H. Dudman. I shall go on to spell out some implications of what I take 
to be a more tenable interpretation of the judgment-stroke.    
A supposed implication of the proposed interpretation is the apparent blurring of 
the programmatic separation of psychology and logic to which both Frege and Russell 
were strongly committed. But it will emerge shortly that if this is an implication of my 
view, then we ought, for the reasons adduced in favor it, reconsider the whether the 
logicist’s separation of psychology and logic should have ever been attempted in the first 
place.     
Given the plausibility of the syntactical interpretation, we can dispose of the 
difficulties that had plagued Russell in the early part of Principles of Mathematics. One 
of these problems was to account for the difference between the finite and non-finite 
forms of verbs that accords with what Russell curiously refers to as the “ultimate notion 
of assertion.”27 It is at this point in his discussion (§§51-53, PofM) that the guide of 
grammar affords him a way out of these difficulties. I will turn to briefly examine 
Russell’s problem in light of the suggested view of assertion.   
 The main argument in §52 of PofM holds that “every constituent of every 
proposition must, on pain of self-contradiction, be capable of being made a logical 
subject.” Russell goes on to say that “[By] transforming the verb, as it occurs in a 
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proposition, into a verbal noun, the whole proposition can be turned into a single logical 
subject, no longer asserted, and no longer containing in itself truth or falsehood.”28 What 
Russell finds puzzling about this possibility is that there is no ostensible difference 
between the proposition as asserted and the corresponding logical subject; or rather, if 
there is a difference, we seem unable to say what it could be. Thus, if we go on to ask 
what is asserted in the proposition ‘Caesar died’, we should say that the ‘The death of 
Caesar is asserted’, or simply, ‘Caesar’s death’. In this instance it would seem that it is 
‘Caesar’s death’ which is true or false. But it is equally obvious that truth and falsity 
cannot belong to a logical subject.  
Several commentators have thus summarized Russell’s argument and have further 
,so it would seem, admitted that it is valid. However, here I think we are entitled to ask 
how Russell arrives at the conclusion that ‘Caesar’s death’ is true. If we take the logical 
subject to be an incomplete entity, then while observing the distinction in (3) and (4), we 
should conclude that ‘Caesar’s death’ is not the sort of thing that could be true or false. 
We may say that ‘Caesar’s death’, as an expression grammatically equivalent to the 
participial expression, ‘Caesar’s being dead’, transforms to a declarative sentence once 
pressed into assertoric use. The complex that is expressed by the verbal noun ‘Caesar’s 
death’ is not the kind of entity (categorially) of which truth or falsity may be predicated. 
To think that it is predicable in this way would be, to borrow Ryle’s term, a ‘grammatical 
type mistake’. Sentences, relative to contexts of use, however, are the sorts of thing of 
which we predicate ‘is true’ or ‘is false’.29  
Double-aspect problems surface frequently in many of Russell’s writings from his 
early realist period, specifically in connection with his attempt to address the so-called 
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‘problem of complexes.’ We may put that problem in the form of a dilemma. It is 
assumed without question that we are capable of marking any distinction that is 
thinkable. There is a thinkable distinction between concepts (“as such”) – i.e. denoted as 
meanings and concepts denoted as terms. We might, following Nicholas Griffin, 
characterize the distinction in the following way: the concept ‘one’ denoted as meaning 
may  be symbolized as /a/, and the concept ‘one’ denoted as term may be symbolized as 
/A/.30 The former ‘one’, taken in its adjectival form, is to be understood as the concept 
qua meaning. The latter ‘one’, in its substantival form, is to be understood accordingly as 
the concept qua term. We should then expect the distinction to be at the very least 
stateable. However, Russell has shown that any attempt to state what the difference is, or 
even to state that there is a difference, lands us immediately in self-contradiction. On the 
other hand, if we take the concept denoted as meaning and the concept denoted as term to 
be one and the same concept – if /a / and /A/ are identical – then we are destined to be 
“enveloped in inextricable difficulties.” (The difficulty to which Russell is here alluding 
is Lewis Carroll’s regress objection) 
 The difference between /a/ and /A/ is therefore said to consist “solely in external 
relations.” This, according to the Russell of 1903, is a consequence of recognizing that 
the difference cannot be intrinsic to the nature of the terms, for in merely stating that /a/ 
differs from /A/, /a/ is eo ipso converted to /A/; hence the self-contradiction. We must 
then conclude that any proposition about the difference is necessarily false – and this is 
unacceptable for Russell. The problem remains: it is impossible to state the distinction 
with the needed precision, for we cannot hold that there is a concept denoted as meaning 
that is not also a concept denoted as term. Yet that there is a distinction is undeniable. 
46 
 
 We are told in PofM that the above contradiction is avoidable if we take the 
difference to be one that is not internal to the terms which constitute the proposition, but 
rather one that is external to them. The appeal to this distinction introduces a needless 
obscurity, but, perhaps more significantly, it is not patently obvious that we must not 
speak of the concept denoted as meaning and the concept denoted as term as one and the 
same concept. If we were prohibited from doing this in the manner in which Russell 
claims that we are, we should be immediately confronted with a double-aspect problem, 
and perhaps then forced into the position of maintaining that the crucial difference 
between the concepts consists solely in external relations. But since there is good reason, 
I think, to suppose that we may speak of the concept ‘as meaning’ and the concept ‘as 
term’ as the same concept, the “inextricable difficulties” into which we are led in not 
following Russell’s prescription are not such as to be otherwise inescapable.  
 When a ‘proposition proper’31 – a proposition expressed by a declarative sentence 
– occurs as the logical subject of another proposition, that proposition is unasserted on 
Russell’s view. But if Russell is right in saying that asserted propositions have an internal 
relation to truth, then we have the following difficulty. For Russell, propositions to which 
truth is internal may occur as the logical subject of a proposition. If so, we should be 
prepared to admit that truth is a constituent term of that proposition. Our difficulty here is 
that because the assertive force of any proposition must be withdrawn once it is made a 
logical subject, we cannot hold that truth is internally related to that proposition. We have 
now, because of this fact, witnessed how, in Russell’s view, the “ultimate notion of 
assertion, given by the verb …is lost as soon as we substitute a verbal noun.” (PoM) In 
respect of the number of terms of the two complexes, ‘Caesar died’ and ‘the death of 
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Caesar’ would appear to be distinct. This follows given that the complex expressed by the 
verbal noun, ‘the death of Caesar’, lacks the constituent term possessed by the 
proposition proper – viz. the term that is given by the finite form of the verb. Although 
the difference in its grammatical rendering is quite plain, Russell, somewhat casually, 
instructs us to disregard it (PofM, p.48). The reason for this, which remains somewhat 
inexplicit in these passages, would seem to be that a proposition occurring as a logical 
subject need not be rendered grammatically as the verbal noun, and so should not be so 
rendered. Whether the motivation springs from this observation or not, such a move, 
which I attempt to explain in more detail in what follows, signals a radical departure from 
the Begriffsschriftt. 
On Russell’s view, we may have an unasserted proposition of which a truth-value 
is a constituent – viz. where the declarative form figures in truth-functional contexts and 
in certain more complex propositions.32 The requirement that such a proposition is 
unasserted, and so distinct from an asserted proposition of which a truth-value is also a 
constituent, combines with still another requirement that ultimately leads to Russell’s 
difficulties in providing a satisfactory account of assertion. The latter requirement is that 
one and the same proposition must occur in the antecedent of a conditional statement as 
that which occurs in the second premise of modus ponens. The mistake here is to assume 
that we cannot grammatically represent the proposition qua logical subject of a 
proposition as a verbal noun. But we have found the difference – the alleged unasserted 
proposition is not truly unasserted, and to explain this we need only recognize that the 
difference lies in what is expressed by the grammatical form of a declarative sentence.33  
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 Let us consider an earlier assumption of Russell’s from PofM, namely that the 
distinguishing feature of a complex is that it is the type of entity that may bear a truth-
value and of which we may predicate ‘is true’ or ‘is false’. Because all propositions are, 
on Russell’s theory, complexes, propositions are bearers of truth in this sense. When we 
come to consider ‘the death of Caesar’, however, we are reluctant to say that it could 
have a truth-value, even though the verbal construct denotes a complex on Russell’s 
view. The proposition ‘Caesar died’ plainly does have a truth-value but it is also a 
complex to which truth or falsity may be predicated. As the distinction between internal 
and external relations here intimates, there is reason prima facie to distinguish between 
two kinds of truth attribution in addition to distinguishing two types of complex. Russell, 
however, does not pursue the suggestion further. Aside from the fact that we are reluctant 
to say that ‘the death of Caesar’ is the kind of entity that could have a truth-value, we 
have reason to believe, as Griffin notes, that both ‘Caesar died’ and ‘the death of Caesar’ 
are the same complex on Russell’s view.  
If we suppose that the proposition containing the finite form of the principal verb, 
e.g. that expressed by the sentence ‘Caesar died’, differs from the same proposition in 
which the verbal noun is substituted for the finite verb, then we effectively render modus 
ponens invalid. 
 We have then at least three inter-related problems that stem from the double-
aspect problem, according to Griffin: (a) How can an unasserted proposition contain a 
truth-value (externally or otherwise), (b) How can an unasserted proposition ever be the 
logical subject of a proposition, i.e. a term, and (c) the problem of preserving the validity 
of the inference schema modus ponens. Recurring in Russell’s analysis is what appears to 
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be the often inexplicit claim that we are prohibited from representing the logical subject 
of a proposition as a verbal noun or in some comparable grammatical form. For instance, 
in section 52, it is said that “by transforming the verb, as it occurs in a proposition, into a 
verbal noun, the whole proposition can be turned into a single logical subject, no longer 
asserted, and no longer containing in itself truth of falsehood. The “death of Caesar” 
seems to be what is asserted in “Caesar died.” In which case, the reasoning goes, “it is the 
death of Caesar which is true or false; and yet neither truth nor falsity belongs to a mere 
logical subject.” Because truth does not belong to a logical subject, it must be related to it 
in some way, and this is what Russell means when he claims that truth has an external 
relation to it. Similarly, since truth (or falsity) does “belong” to the proposition “Caesar 
died,” it is said that truth has an internal relation to the proposition. The problem, as 
Russell sees it, is that “[there] appears to be an ultimate notion of assertion, given by the 
verb, which is lost as soon as we substitute a verbal noun, and is lost when the 
proposition in question is made the subject of some other proposition.” This has the 
consequence of making it impossible to refer to propositional concepts (as opposed to 
propositions proper) as unasserted. What motivates Russell to make this claim is the 
assumption that, insofar as his theory of complexes is concerned, (i) ⊢ A (‘Caesar died’) 
and (ii) —A (‘The death of Caesar’) differ in respect of the verb, ‘to die’, and so differ in 
respect of a term. Therefore, (i) and (ii) denote distinct complexes. This is why we cannot 
say that they are the same; but then, as Russell explains the matter, it is difficult to see 
precisely how they differ. The problem leads us, in turn, into difficulties with respect to 
justifying modus ponens.   
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But certain insights concerning the nature of these difficulties are afforded us if 
we suppose that (i) and (ii) do not differ in respect of a term. Here, we stand to profit in 
following W. E. Johnson (1921)34 and K. Wiredu (1975) in construing the verbal noun 
(ii), ‘The death of Caesar’35,  to have the same grammatical standing as the participial 
form,  (ii)′  —A   (‘Caesar’s being dead’), wherein lies what Johnson calls a “latent 
formal element” (Logic, 1921)36. In such a case the verbal element is a constituent in both 
asserted and unasserted propositions, but the verb contained in (i) is fully inflected, 
whereas it is in its non-finite form in (ii)′. We should therefore expect to find a 
corresponding difference in the proposition where there is a difference in the form of the 
verb. What unites the substantive and adjective is, in Johnson’s terminology, the 
“characterizing tie.” The occurrence of the principal verb in its finite form (the finite 
form of ‘to be’) – ‘is’ signifies the presence of another relation, which Johnson calls the 
“assertive tie.” This marks the addition of assertive force, but it is clear that the force is 
added to the already existing characterizing relation.  
  Herein, then, lies the crucial difference with respect to Russell’s view of assertion: 
corresponding to this added syntactic element is the determination of a truth-value.37 This 
determination is primary in the sense that any assertion – any claim of what is so – 
possesses a truth-value (of either True or False). If we suppose that the syntactic element 
possesses no propositional correlate, then not only do we end up with a theory of 
propositions bereft of an account of that difference (otherwise accounted for by the 
assertive tie), our foundering again upon the double-aspect problem becomes inevitable. 
Let us note that because the verbal element is a constituent of both propositions (i) and 
(ii), we should not conclude that ‘⊢ A’ and  ‘—A’ are therefore logically or semantically 
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equivalent. This was the point of registering the addition of the assertive tie. We may say 
that the propositional content (the ‘judgeable content’ in the language of Begriffsschrifft) 
is identical in each case, but to glibly regard the whole expressions ‘Caesar died’ and 
‘Caesar’s being dead’ themselves as identical is to violate the Fregean tenet to avoid (at 
all costs) confusing the act of assertion with what is asserted.  
 The problem seems to be that any attempt to escape such a violation comes at the 
price of compromising the viability of modus ponens: the occurrence of the second 
premise contains an element (that supplied by the assertive tie) not contained in the 
occurrence of ‘Caesar died’ in the hypothetical proposition ‘If Caesar died, then he died 
on the Ides of March’, since the occurrence of the proposition ‘Caesar died’ in a 
hypothetical proposition is unasserted, and so a distinct complex from the proposition 
‘Caesar died’ as it occurs alone in the second premise. But this is a mistake, as we are 
misled along the way, out of neglect of the earlier syntactical distinction, into thinking 
that ‘Caesar died’ as it occurs alone in the context of an argument schema must possess 
the element (constituent) supplied by the judgment-stroke.  
 Inasmuch as a proposition may be said to possess unity, a formal relation obtains 
between its terms. In our example, ‘Caesar’s being dead’, the infinitive form of the verb 
constitutes the latent formal element. It is in virtue of this relation that the proposition 
should be seen to be essentially unasserted rather than asserted. The infinitive verb that is 
supposed to express this formal relation, then, ought not to have counted as a constituent 
term in Russell’s analysis. Only the principal verb in its finite form can count as a term. 
So we may assume that ‘Caesar died’ as it occurs in the conditional premise of modus 
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ponens is, formally speaking, more properly represented by the participial ‘Caesar’s 
being dead’.  
We might speculate that such a rendering of the proposition was seen by Russell, 
to be unnecessary, or redundant, given that the assertive force belonging to the sentence 
‘Caesar died’ is suspended in both truth-functional contexts and where it occurs in 
subordinate clauses. This observation led Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, to eliminate the 
assertion sign altogether. In fact, assertive force is suspended in these contexts, but, 
crucially, no device was ever employed to mark the transformation.  
Provided that these remarks are accurate in describing how Russell viewed the 
matter, he cannot be said to have been consistent: any occurrence of ‘Caesar died’ – 
where the finite form of the principal verb signifies the presence of the assertive tie – is 
an asserted proposition; which is to say that it expresses an assertion that occurs, as does 
any intentional act, at a specific time and place. It occurs as an episode in the cognitive 
history of a unique individual. Presumably, Russell did not wish to suggest that in 
speaking of modus ponens as an inference schema we ordinarily refer to the sentences 
which constitute its premises as particular dateable speech-acts, perhaps then relativized 
to specific speakers and contexts. We may say that ‘Caesar died’, as it occurs in the 
second premise of modus ponens is more properly construed as a proposition in 
Johnson’s sense, to be rendered as ‘Caesar’s being dead’, so as to make it a judgeable 
content. That content plainly corresponds to a proposition whose unity is only formally 
specified by means of the ‘characterizing tie’. Symbolically, modus ponens is written as 
follows38:    
   ⊢ p → q 
   ⊢ p 
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   _____  
⊢ Therefore, q 
 
To bring out the participial character of the propositional variable, we may symbolize the 
schema as follows, inserting the horizontal to show that it goes with the variable:  
 
 
 
⊢(—p → —q)  
    
⊢(—p) 
    ____ 
⊢ Therefore, q 
 
In any instance of this schema, the antecedent of the conditional premise must be 
identical to the proposition that occurs alone in the second premise, otherwise the 
inference does not carry. Russell sees this to be the main obstacle to resolving the 
dilemma. In the scheme above, p in the first premise is identical to its occurrence in the 
second premise. Both occurrences may be rendered as ‘—p’, to which the vertical may 
then be added in order to supply assertive force. Thus, when given a statement like ‘If the 
conversations are monitored, Nixon knows about it’, it should be expressed using the 
more logically perspicuous phraseology, ‘The conversations being monitored’ implies 
‘Nixon’s knowing about it’. Given this interpretation, the propositional variables may be 
seen to be identical and so we avoid Russell’s difficulties with modus ponens. Rather 
than construe p of the conditional premise as an asserted proposition (in this instance, 
‘Conversations were monitored’), it should be construed as a participial form; the same 
holds for the p of the second premise. Russell’s view renders p as ‘Conversations are 
monitored’ even where it occurs in a hypothetical statement. In such contexts and in 
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truth-functional contexts generally, assertive force is suspended. Ordinarily we do not 
take the proposition to have a participial form when it occurs as the antecedent of a 
hypothetical proposition, let alone as a premise that stands alone. This is unfortunate, as it 
gives the appearance that the proposition possesses a constituent term – that which 
Russell noted is supplied by the finite form of the verb – which it may only be said to 
possess with the addition of the judgment-stroke. Otherwise the proposition does not 
possess the term. On account of this appearance, a propositional variable may be seen to 
represent, at once, both a proposition as asserted, viz. in the form of the declarative 
sentence – ‘Conversations are monitored’ – and a proposition whose assertive force has 
been withdrawn. The suspension of assertive force of a proposition is made possible in 
virtue of its role in more complex propositions. It seems that direct inspection of how we 
use hypothetical statements confirms this fact. But here, the double aspect issue arises. 
Russell’s remarks may be seen to be especially problematic when we consider 
propositional variables that stand alone. A proposition that stands alone (e.g. in the 
second premise of modus ponens) is, on Russell’s view, one that possesses assertive 
force. Not only do we wish to be able to assert that p, we also wish to say ‘p’ is of the 
form of an assertion (of a declarative form). But in following Russell even this far we 
have effectively undermined modus ponens: just as assertive force has been supplied to 
the second premise, the assertive force is withdrawn from the antecedent of the 
conditional premise, and thus we no longer have identical propositions. The difficulty 
vanishes, however, if we construe p as it occurs alone as a participial construction. 
We have so far neglected the other side of Russell’s dilemma (Griffin’s third 
problem, (c); Griffin 1993, 51), but I think that it will be seen that this side of the 
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dilemma is less central to the discussion’s concerns. I will nonetheless go on to make a 
few remarks about it, as it had exercised Russell considerably in the passages of PofM we 
have been considering. There are difficulties involved in assuming the two occurrences of 
the proposition p to be identical39: if we take the two occurrences of p in the two-premise 
account of modus ponens to be identical, we should have to admit that  
   (i) ⊢p; ⊢ (p → q); therefore, q 
could be expressed as the conditional, 
   (ii) [p ∧ (p → q)] → q 
Russell, as Lewis Carroll did before him, recognized that (i) is logically basic: any 
attempt to establish the validity of the inference schema on the basis of appealing to the 
conditional, p → q, is vitiated by the infinite regress famously described in ‘What the 
Tortoise said to Achilles’. Russell’s assumption is that the principle according to which 
“if the hypothesis in an implication is true, it may be dropped, and the consequent 
asserted” is indemonstrable; but it is nevertheless “quite vital to any kind of 
demonstration.” (PofM, p. 35) This gives rise to the following problem. Provided that we 
may be permitted to conditionalize the argument schema in the manner above (ii), then 
from the truth of p and the premise, p → q, we should expect to be able to prove q – i.e. 
assert that q. But the threat of Carroll’s regress is generated, together with Russell’s 
conflation of asserted propositions and “complex concepts,” on the assumption that if we 
take the conditional (p → q) as a license to the inference (of q from p), then, with the 
truth of p, we may detach to get the conclusion. But we have no reason to believe that we 
have satisfied the student who, although he can come to recognize the truth of the 
conclusion and p → q still cannot manage to draw the inference to q.  The temptation is 
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then to suggest that the conjunction of these two premises, p ∧ (p → q), licenses the 
inference from p to q. But here we come upon the regress. As Carroll has shown, and as 
Gilbert Ryle40 later reminded us, we are mistaken to think that a conditional form which 
justifies the inference is something that we could ever obtain. All that we have done so 
far is replace one conditional premise with a more complex conditional premise; and all 
that we could further do is repeat that procedure indefinitely in such a way as to get 
increasingly complex conditional propositions as premises.  
The suggestion that modus ponens is vitiated by regress arguments of this kind, 
given the assumption that the antecedent term of the first premise and the term of the 
second premise are identical, does not amount to the insurmountable difficulty it is 
thought to have amounted to. The solution is most easily seen given the following 
considerations, which have been brought to my attention by K. Wiredu (1960)41: modus 
ponens is a valid inference schema because we may justify the inference (when pressed 
to) by appeal to the conditional [p ∧ (p → q)] → q as the principle of the argument. This 
is a sufficient license for inferring q from p, for the conditional premise is now a 
tautology (and p → q is not). It would be inconsistent to question the validity of [p ∧ (p 
→ q)] → q because it is logically true. Thus, what appears to us at first to be the start of 
an infinite regress may be seen to stop at the conditional, [p ∧ (p → q)] → q.     
I had earlier remarked that if we must speak in terms of complexes we should 
have recognized what Russell did not – that an element (or term) is supplied by the finite 
form of the verb. Though it is somewhat a matter of historical speculation why Russell 
did not recognize the significance of this point, I suspect that one reason for this is that it 
was thought that a proposition occurring as a logical subject need not be rendered 
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grammatically as a verbal noun or a participial construction. It would seem that this belief 
was a consequence of the fact that a proposition which reflects the structure of a 
declarative sentence can do double duty for a proposition that goes either asserted or 
unasserted. It may be further supposed that the most plausible explanation for this 
phenomenon and the double aspect problems to which it has given rise is that the notion 
of assertion was, for Russell, primarily a psychological one. On the premises of Russell’s 
early realism, a proposition cannot be true merely by our taking it to be true. Either it is 
the case that Caesar died or not. This seems to be the primary impetus for distinguishing 
between the psychological and logical sense of assertion in the way that Russell (in 
various periods) and the later Frege did. As it has been suggested in the foregoing 
reflections, what they perhaps should have said is that the ‘judgeable content’ cannot be 
true merely by our thinking that it is.   
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Chapter IV: Theories of Truth 
 
Russell on the Nature of Truth and Falsehood 
 The primary aim of this discussion will be to give some indication of the 
plausibility of an account of truth that I attempt to explicate, in its essentials, more fully 
in §2 of Chapter V. A feature of this account which distinguishes it from several others is 
its similarity to deflationary theories, specifically in its repudiation of the notion of fact 
qua truth-maker. The notion of fact in Russell’s relational theory of judgment, it should 
become apparent, introduces a further element to Russell’s analysis, thus further 
complicating the epistemological dimensions of the theory. Rather than attempt to purge 
these entities from his theory, Russell endeavors, later in his analysis of judgment, to 
explain away the need for a single ‘Objective’ in favor of another type of objective. The 
new theory of judgment (henceforth, the multiple-relation theory) now requires a kind of 
objective that may be split up into constituent terms, which are then capable of standing 
in several relations to the mind. The theory is not without its difficulties, several of which 
are well documented and have even been argued to be irremediable.42 On the account of 
judgment outlined in the present chapter, whose fuller explication appears later, it seems 
that we can do away Russellian facts – viz. complexes of terms and their interrelations – 
altogether and the difficulties that attend them. Escaping the implications of Russellian 
facts would seem prima facie to be evidence against the very idea of facts construed as 
entities whose semantic function are to serve as truth-makers. It is from this 
consideration, in part, that the proposed account may be seen to derive some plausibility. 
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Further, given a conception of judgment that duly accounts for the significance of the 
syntactical function of the “characterizing tie,” we could avoid the traditional difficulties 
associated with the problem of propositional unity.43 This is a problem which, as 
Davidson44, plagues Russell’s multiple-relation theory just as it did the theory of 
propositions of his earlier realist period. 
 According to Russell, a relation is ‘multiple’ “if the simplest propositions in 
which it occurs are propositions involving more than two terms (not counting the 
relation).” (Russell 1910, 155) Events may be construed to be the correspondents of true 
judgments.45 However, that there are no events corresponding to false judgments may 
lead one to the false conclusion that “when we judge falsely there is nothing that we are 
judging.” (Russell 1910, 155)   
It might have been suspected that such a consideration would have likely forced 
Russell in 1910 to abandon talk of true and false objectives, but this was not in fact the 
case. The argument that Russell marshals against his earlier theory of propositions does 
not, strictly speaking, amount to a repudiation of the notion of an objective altogether but 
rather forces Russell to scout around for a more suitable candidate for the role of 
objective – something that would effectively do the work of true and false objectives 
while affording a way out of the earlier difficulties. Russell never abandons the notion. 
Even with the more epistemologically sophisticated multiple-relations theory, Russell 
speaks of there being an “objective ground” with respect to which judgments are 
determined to be true or false. It is, rather, the Meinongian notion of objectives that he 
abandons. A Meinongian objective is a single structured entity to which a judgment is 
related. And act of judging then involves the relation of a judgment to the object of the 
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judgment – i.e. what the judgment is about. To take Russell’s example, we may say that 
‘Charles I’s death in his bed’ is just another way of saying that Charles I died in his bed, 
and therefore the complex ‘Charles I’s death in his bed’ cannot be the objective. 
Curiously, Russell seems not to be tempted to say that ‘Charles I’s death on the scaffold’ 
is just another way of saying that Charles I died in his bed. This is because, so we are left 
to assume, Charles I’s death on the scaffold was an event that actually occurred, and so 
accordingly the form of words ‘Charles I’s death on the scaffold’ names that event. 
A notable feature of this discussion in “The Nature of Truth and Falsehood” is 
that the central line of argument begins with Russell stressing what must have appeared 
to him to be a truism, namely, that the “first point on which it is important to be clear is 
the relation of truth and falsehood to the mind.” (Russell 1910) When we see the sun 
shining, Russell writes, “the sun itself is not ‘true’, but the judgment ‘the sun is shining’ 
is true”. Although we may regard such a remark to be so obvious as to be beyond dispute, 
in stating this observation Russell obscures a point which might otherwise not have 
escaped his notice had the point been stated differently. This is something that is brought 
to light when he later claims that the truth or falsehood of statements “can be defined in 
terms of the truth or falsehood of beliefs.” Further, Russell claims, “A statement is true 
when a person who believes it believes truly, and false when he believes falsely.”46 
Hence, the truth and falsehood of statements is “derivative” of the truth and falsehood of 
beliefs. These remarks may lead us to attribute to Russell the view that belief has some 
kind of constitutive relation to truth, but this would be mistaken. The realistic notion of 
correspondence is introduced when Russell later claims that judging truly or falsely (as 
the case may be) requires some fact of the matter – some “objective ground” – in addition 
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to the judging mind.  If the way in which this passage is worded is true to Russell’s 
meaning, it is difficult to see how this could be his actual analysis, even in a preliminary 
sense. The claim in question is this: when a person believes a true statement, he believes 
it truly; and when a person believes a false statement, he believes it falsely. I have 
reversed the order of the wording in restating Russell’s claim (above) because I think that 
this paraphrase – rather than obscure what is said – has the advantage of showing that 
what is stated is, strictly speaking, inconsistent with the claim that the truth and falsehood 
of statements is derivative of the truth and falsehood of beliefs.  
 In fact, examining this particular passage reveals what we might be inclined to 
argue is a deep-seated commitment to the opposite view, namely, that the truth and 
falsehood of beliefs are derivative of the truth and falsehood of statements. That this is 
likely to be Russell’s view in “NT&F” is due to the following implication, which the 
earlier paraphrase of Russell’s claim was intended to clarify. In saying that a statement is 
true when a person who believes it believes truly, there is the suggestion that what the 
mind is related to is something that is itself true – and thus something that is apprehended 
as true. Here it is assumed that this something is given as true independently of anyone’s 
coming to have the belief expressed by the statement – i.e. concerning the content of the 
belief. Attending even the more sophisticated multiple-relation theory is the idea, which 
is all-pervasive throughout Russell’s philosophy (post-PofM) is the idea that something 
makes a statement true. The assumption that something is true (sentence, belief, 
proposition) is true independently of our believing it true combines frequently with the 
notion of correspondence. In what follows, I will suggest that this notion of 
correspondence does not in itself lead to a view which would force one to admit truth-
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makers. In fact, a serviceable notion of correspondence may be easily accommodated in 
an epistemic theory of truth, as may be seen in the logical views of John Dewey.    
 
Truth and Judgment: The Frege-Dewey Connection 
       The debate on the nature of truth between Russell and Dewey was published in a 
series of articles between 1939 and 40. It grew out of earlier work by both philosophers. 
Russell’s view developed early on out of the The Problems of Philosophy (1912) and 
from even earlier work in logic and the foundations of mathematics. Dewey’s views 
were, in large part, developed from1909 – the year in which he wrote A Short Catechism 
Concerning Truth  to 1938, the year in which he wrote his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. 
My discussion will focus primarily on an article entitled ‘Propositions, Warranted-
Assertibility, and Truth’, first published in 1941 in The Journal of Philosophy. This 
article was a response to Russell’s criticism of 1940, much of which appears in his article 
“Dewey’s New Logic”.47 
 Russell speaks of the difference between his and Dewey’s views as consisting of 
the former’s concern with assertions about particular matters of fact, and the latter as 
concerned with hypotheses and theories.48 This is, in fact, a distortion of Dewey’s view; 
it is an idea, not an assertion or sentence, that is the basic unit in terms of which truth is 
defined. Dewey’s use of the term ‘idea’ is intended to draw our attention to an aspect of 
ideas which the anti-psychologistic bias of early analytic philosophy has at times 
obscured; that is, the idea construed as a “possible significance.” This is not merely a 
psychological significance, but an epistemological – and we may assume – even a 
semantical one. An idea thus conceived is a basic element in terms of which we arrive at 
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a warranted assertion, the latter being applicable to both assertions about particular 
matters of fact and hypotheses and theories. Dewey holds that the “presence of an idea be 
by way of an existential operation,” and that this distinct “presence” is what distinguishes 
his theory from other theories of truth. Though the claim is most likely correct (leaving 
aside the precise meaning of “existential operations”), there is a further point that 
distinguishes Dewey’s theory from the others, and this may be called semantical. That 
difference reveals, in part, the source of both their disagreement about truth and the 
nature of propositions, and what I will later argue is an error on Russell’s part. The error 
is a consequence of what Russell takes to be the correspondence relation and its terms. 
His theory introduces a view of correspondence according to which when a particular 
linguistic entity – a sentence – is true, it is in some way related to a particular extra-
linguistic entity, namely, a fact. The correspondence of a judgment, or derivatively, a 
sentence, to the world is more complicated when the sentence is false, but we need not 
enter into these details at this point. The virtues of this view are further discussed later, as 
well as what I consider to be its shortcomings. I wish now to give only a rough 
characterization of Russell’s view for the purposes of contrasting it with Dewey’s 
conception of truth, a view that might be regarded as a correspondence theory of truth of 
a radically different kind in essentials. Dewey’s view is one of correspondence insofar as 
the relation (of correspondence) obtains, not between sentence (or proposition) and fact, 
but between idea and fact. The relation between the mind and the world is thus one that 
relates, on the one hand, the basic conceptual components of judgment and the cognitive 
operations by which judgments are formed to the ‘existential’ conditions, and which, on 
the other hand, gives rise to them. I do not think it is necessary to adhere too closely to 
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Dewey’s terminology in order to elucidate the contrast between his view and Russell’s in 
this specific connection; but it will be necessary to proceed with caution.  
Dewey was correct to say (Dewey 1941, 168) that he and Russell “cannot 
understand each other unless important differences between [them] are brought out and 
borne in mind.”49 I believe that these differences are most easily brought to light by first 
comparing aspects of Dewey’s epistemology to those of Frege’s early logical writings. 
Specifically, I have in mind their rather curiously similar conceptions of propositions as 
they appear, respectively, in the above cited work and the Begriffsschrift (1879). Once we 
have ascertained precisely what Dewey means by the term ‘proposition’, then we are in a 
position, so I argue, to see wherein precisely lay the disagreement between Russell and 
Dewey as concerns the nature of truth.50 
 Frege first makes the distinction between grasping a thought and judging a 
thought to be true in his article ‘On Sense and Reference’51, though the source of the 
distinction may be found in the earlier Begriffsschrift.52 In the later article, Frege 
describes judging a thought to be true as a transition from thought to judgment whereby 
one “advances from the thought to the truth-value.” What the truth-value is, ontologically 
speaking, is not a question I wish to pursue here. For the purpose of comparison it will do 
merely to note that Frege took truth to be a primitive concept. This difference has no 
bearing on the specific comparison I wish to draw. In fact, it is perhaps fair to say that in 
this specific connection, Frege and Dewey were separated more by differences of 
terminology than of substance. Dewey, it may be argued, recognized in his Logic what is 
tantamount to Frege’s distinction insofar as there he stresses the necessity of observing a 
fundamental logical distinction between a proposition and an assertion. This is a 
65 
 
distinction that is made somewhat in much of Russell’s work53 which we find either 
neglected or altogether absent from the writings of several students of Frege’s philosophy 
of language.54 The point, however, is more fully explicated in Dewey’s “Propositions, 
Warranted-Assertibility &Truth” of 1941. This distinction is the basis on which Dewey is 
able to maintain the connection between truth and inquiry – twin notions that are 
divorced in the often platonistically oriented views of both Russell and Frege. The 
concept of truth is thus primarily epistemic on Dewey’s view. Deductive inference is one 
among several operations of the mind whose essential function is to further rational 
inquiry. The notion of inquiry alluded to here is considerably broader than what Russell 
or Frege may mean by that term. In fact, Dewey often speaks of the logic of inquiry – a 
locution apt to baffle most analytic philosophers and logicians (including Frege). 
However, as concerns the analysis of the structure of judgment, it would seem that Frege 
and Dewey have joined together in an ‘unholy alliance’ against Russell.55   
 We may turn now to Frege’s account of supposition in order to make the 
comparison explicit. Suppositions, as well as thoughts, figure into a stage of inquiry at 
which ‘propositions’ figure for Dewey, given the sense Dewey accords to the term. 
Propositions, for Dewey are what I earlier referred to as ‘the components of judgments’, 
and, as such, are categorially distinct from judgments in the same way, e.g., an individual 
is distinct from a sentence in classical truth-functional logic. They are introduced and 
combined in accordance with certain operations to construct judgments, and are therefore 
useful insofar as they figure into judgments whose aim is to be warrantedly assertible. 
When we turn to Frege’s analysis of thoughts (Gedanken) – specifically, with a view to 
their role as suppositions – we see the formal resemblance. The transition from thought to 
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judgment wherein, as Frege states, one “advances from the thought to the truth-value” 
(Frege 1892, 31) is the very transition described by Dewey when he claims that the 
proposition56 occupies a functional role in the construction of a judgment – that is, prior 
to its being discharged as an assertion. If we bear in mind that a truth-value for Frege is 
possessed, not by a thought in transition, but rather by a judgment as completed, then the 
aspect under which the thought may be seen as a component of judgment should become 
clear. Dewey sometimes refers to propositions as “instrumentalities,” sometimes as 
“ideas.” In an idea’s functional role in the process which leads to the end of scientific 
inquiry, they are said to have the property of efficacy. This is liable to be misinterpreted – 
and has been, along with Dewey’s distinctly pragmatic remark that “the only alternative 
to ascribing to some propositions self-sufficient, self-possessed, and self-evident truth is a 
theory which finds the test and mark of truth in consequences of some sort…”57 The 
misinterpretation is evident in almost all of Russell’s discussions of Dewey’s 
epistemology.58 
 Having indicated some points of convergence between Frege and Dewey, we may 
now turn to the debate between Russell and Dewey. Dewey attributes a view to Russell 
that, to quote Dewey, “seems to me to be the most adequate foundation yet provided for 
complete skepticism.”59 The view under consideration holds generally that atomic 
propositions afford a kind of epistemic ground for the complex propositions of which 
they are constituents in a way not unlike the way in which Hume’s ‘impressions of sense’ 
serve to ground ideas60 of varying complexity. Empirical knowledge, for Russell, then 
consists of justified, true belief as based on (true) propositions, where the truth of 
complex propositions is determined on the basis of their constituent (atomic) propositions 
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in accordance with the truth-functional rules of formation. However, the conditions under 
which the truth of the basic, atomic propositions is determined are mysterious. As Dewey 
points out, basic (atomic) propositions, taken as the objects of empirical belief, are 
determined to be true by virtue of their correspondence to certain facts. But these basic 
propositions are also said to be the causal effects of particular “causal antecedents”, i.e., 
particular worldly events. Thus, if Dewey is correct, Russell holds that basic propositions 
are somehow caused; yet, these propositions are also capable of being used to refer to the 
events which cause them. But as it was earlier mentioned, empirical knowledge consists 
of true, justified belief where truth is defined as correspondence with the fact(s). Thus, 
Russell’s view assumes that, if the cause is a fact, or set of facts, the cause of a 
proposition, then, is identical to its truth-maker.61  
On Dewey’s view, this conception might be amended in a way that gives it at 
least an appearance of plausibility; he might argue that there may be a way in which we 
obtain knowledge by experimental means given this conception of propositions. This 
would proceed by testing the truth of propositions by supplementing a given set of 
propositions (in Russell’s sense) with other propositions. But such an accretion of 
propositions becomes regular and systematic on Dewey’s view since they are given, or 
produced, by controlled observation. Which propositions are accepted and which are 
rejected depends on what Dewey calls the “cooperation of inferential and observational 
subject-matters”62 and, perhaps, on various constraints that determine which propositions 
cohere with an existing set of propositions. But such a method of ‘testing’ amounts to a 
criterion by which truth is determined by “consequences of some sort,” and as such must 
have appeared to Russell to compound the difficulties associated with traditional 
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coherence theories with those associated with James’ criterion, viz. the thesis according 
to which beliefs are true insofar as they are useful. It may be noted here that Russell 
simply substitutes proposition for belief in discussing Dewey’s view.  
Returning to Russell’s assumption that a proposition is identical to its truth-
maker63, if we follow Russell in rejecting Dewey’s pragmatic criterion, we are forced to 
believe that Russell is proposing what Dewey calls a semantic version of the “doctrine of 
pre-established harmony.” This is “the epistemological miracle … for the doctrine states 
that a proposition is true when it conforms to that which is not known save through 
itself.”64 The alternative to this discredited view is, of course, skepticism – a consequence 
of any theory of truth which defines truth as an epistemically inscrutable relation. 
 This notion of “pre-established harmony” which Dewey believes underlies 
Russell’s view is, in fact, a consequence of Russell’s definition of the correspondence 
relation – a “Relation at Large” Such a relation, Dewey claims, is a relation “without 
specification or analysis.”65 Dewey’s remark here, and elsewhere, may be understood in 
light of remarks made in my earlier discussion comparing Dewey’s epistemology with 
Frege’s early logical views. Dewey’s pragmatic criterion suggests, in part, a way out of 
traditional forms of skepticism as well as a way of properly identifying the terms of the 
correspondence relation.66 It is the “idea,” or equivalently, the “proposition” in Dewey’s 
sense, that corresponds and has the essential causal relation to events in the world. These 
events, however, are not facts in the sense that they are entities or states of affairs 
pictured by sentences or beliefs, or by, e.g., the structured propositions of Russell’s 
logical atomism. Rather, they are merely environmental factors which enter into complex 
causal relations with what Dewey calls “human factors.” The proposition, conceived as 
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an instrumental agency, may be said to correspond with some extra-mental event, and it 
is by means of this correspondence that a warranted assertion is formed.67 In setting up 
the correspondence relation between an assertion and an extra-mental event, Russell 
thereby (simultaneously) establishes an ontology of facts. This is a consequence, in large 
part, of attempting to fit sentences onto the world. Such an attempt, it should be 
recognized, makes the logical error of assuming that the correspondence of propositions 
(in Dewey’s sense – or ‘thoughts’ in Frege’s sense) to extra-mental reality is something 
that again corresponds with reality – with the facts. On this point, I think Dewey’s remark 
is instructive: “the pragmatist …begins with a theory about judgments and meanings of 
which the theory of truth is a corollary.”68     
 This mind-independent entity, as is evident from what Russell states elsewhere 
(Russell 1910, 1918) is sometimes identified with a Meinong’s notion of objective. The 
various problems attending the role of objectives in Russell’s earlier theory of judgment 
deserves fuller treatment than can be given here; but the point that I wish to make 
presently is that Russell appears in the passage quoted to have construed statements as 
having the same, or nearly the same, ontological standing as objectives.69 Witness 
Russell: “[It] is difficult to abandon the view that, in some way, the truth or falsehood of 
a judgment depends upon the presence or absence of a ‘corresponding entity of some 
sort” (Russell 1910, 152) We might compare this with his later view of 1940: “When we 
embark upon an inquiry we assume that the propositions about which we are inquiring 
are either true or false” (Russell 1940, 403) Ontological considerations notwithstanding, 
the implication of having identified facts and objectives with statements in this way 
should be recognized to be logical in nature. That this is in fact a piece of confusion is a 
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point that may be brought to light in considering more closely, not so much the question 
of the mind’s relation to truth, but the question of what sort of thing, or things, bear the 
properties of truth and falsehood. In pursuing this question, however, it will be necessary 
to disambiguate what is commonly taken to fall under the meaning of the term 
“statement”; and this is perhaps best achieved by first inquiring into the question of what 
it is that we believe when we believe a statement or proposition to be true. Russell, we 
shall see, is not always sensitive to this question. Let us consider the following claim: 
“When, for example we see the sun shining, the sun itself is not ‘true’, but the judgment 
‘the sun is shining’ is true”70 (Russell 1910, 148) Russell explains in a footnote that the 
words ‘belief’ and ‘judgment’ are used here synonymously, but the reader is left with 
little clue as to what precisely Russell understands the relation between ‘judgment’ and 
‘statement’ to be.    
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Chapter V: Austin and Strawson, and the Vagaries of Correspondence 
 
 
 The redundancy view of truth states generally that the truth-predicate ‘is true’ 
does not express an analyzable semantic property; and therefore it is semantically 
superfluous. To say, then, that a sentence or proposition is true is, in a certain sense, to 
assert nothing other than the sentence itself. According to Austin (1950) this is incorrect. 
The predicate ‘is true’ is not redundant, if for no other reason than that it is analyzable – 
not as expressing a property of sentences, but as expressing a property of their use, i.e. 
insofar as indicative sentences are used to refer to a “historical situation.” We “approach 
the term,” in Austin’s phrase, “cap and categories in hand.”   
 In what follows I argue that Austin’s view is deficient in a way that Strawson’s 
‘performative-redundancy’ view is not; that the semantic categories with which we 
approach the truth-predicate are inadequate for an analysis of the concept of truth. I argue 
further that the defects in Austin’s view are a consequence of failing to distinguish 
between two concepts of truth. This distinction becomes clear once another, closely 
related distinction is made, namely, that which lies specifically between the logical (and 
syntactic) character of assertion and the semantic character of declarative sentences, or 
sentence-uses. 
 In predicating ‘is true’ of a sentence or speech-episode, we do not quite assert 
what is already asserted in the way Austin envisages. Austin does, in fact, claim that we 
“refer” to a given state of affairs in predicating ‘is true’ of a given sentence, conceding 
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that this referring itself produces another sentence, which then, as asserted, involves 
producing a truth-value on grounds distinct from those on which the initial assertion itself 
is judged true. While Austin is correct in saying that we make another, numerically 
distinct, statement (taken as a speech-episode) in this way, and in doing so assert another 
truth, he does not explain that the process by which this happens is a consequence of the 
application of the two (aforementioned) concepts of truth.  A clarification of this 
distinction, and what it amounts to, is attempted later. 
Austin’s semantic theory of truth is intended to vindicate the correspondence 
theory of truth.  An outline of the semantic aspect of his definition appears before the 
definition when he states that there are primarily two kinds of semantic convention in any 
form of referential discourse:  
 
(i) Demonstrative conventions under which certain linguistic expressions are 
related to “historic situations.” 
(ii) Descriptive conventions under which certain linguistic expressions are related 
to types of situations. 
 
The definition is as follows: 
A statement is said to be true when the historic state of 
affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative 
conventions (the one to which it ‘refers’) is of a type with 
which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the 
descriptive conventions. 
 
There is, I think, considerable merit to Austin’s view, a fact that is not always explicitly 
recognized by his opponents.71 There is, for example, something obviously correct about 
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Austin’s notion that “a statement is made and its making is an historical event,” and that, 
construed as such, a statement is something like a primary truth-bearer.72 Less obvious is 
the contention that the idea of a primary truth-bearer implies a primary/secondary 
distinction. Something like this distinction, which often takes sentence-tokens and 
assertive utterances to be ‘secondary’ truth-bearers, is a commonplace in the philosophy 
of language. Given this, it is commonly taken for granted that the concept of truth 
appertaining to the distinction of truth-bearers is the same concept. It is seldom held that 
to this primary/secondary distinction there is a corresponding distinction between 
concepts of truth. In the second half of the paper I indicate why I think such a further 
distinction is needed. In light of this distinction, which is explained more fully in the 
second half of the discussion, we shall see that the connection between assertion and the 
concept of truth applicable to assertive utterances goes unappreciated by Austin and his 
critics. However, the programmatic aim of his analysis – of providing a “purified” 
correspondence relation – may readily accommodate this explanatory amendment.  
There is a special context in which sentences may make use of the truth-
predicate.73 Austin gives the following examples as perfectly legitimate uses:  
 
(a) “The third sentence on p.5 of his speech is quite false.” 
(b) “His closing words were very true.” 
 
In (a), ‘sentence’, and in (b), ‘words’, refer not to a proposition, fact, or truth-value, but 
to “the sentence as used by a certain person on a certain occasion.”74  
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Austin’s definition of the correspondence relation naturally requires a truth-
maker, as any correspondence view must. He is somewhat wary of the implications of 
this demand, the effect of which is the erecting of a realm of facts (qua truth-makers) – 
“populating the world with linguistic Doppleganger.” (Strawson 1950) However, while 
conceding the need to designate an historic state of affairs as the truth-maker for a 
statement, Austin is cautious not to lose sight of the important, if not truisitic, point that 
“we can only describe that state of affairs in words.”75 It becomes evident soon that 
Austin did not exercise sufficient caution in this respect, for he goes on to say: 
 
It takes two to make a truth. Hence (obviously) there can be 
no criterion of truth in the sense of some feature detectable 
in the statement itself which will reveal whether it is true or 
false. Hence, too, a statement cannot without absurdity 
refer to itself.”76 (my emphasis) 
 
As an elementary criticism of traditional coherentist theories of truth, this has sometimes 
been, and perhaps ought to be, taken in philosophical seriousness. However, it would 
seem that Austin, and several other correspondence theorists, have taken the criticism so 
seriously as to let it obscure the significance of the observation that we can only describe 
a state of affairs in words. The kind of view recommended by this observation, on the one 
hand, and the sort of view implied by the quoted passage, on the other, are ordinarily 
taken by truth-theorists to be antithetical. Unlike Strawson, Austin sometimes fluctuates 
between them. Thus, once he articulates an insight which we may rightly consider to be 
the touchstone of any deflationary theory of truth he then moves back toward a 
correspondence view. How, then, Austin asks, is ‘the statement that S is true’ (read: 
TstST) different from ‘the statement that S’ (read: tstS)? Suppose that, 
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If Mr. Q writes on a notice board ‘Mr. W is a burglar’, then 
a trial is held to decide whether Mr. Q’s published 
statement that Mr. W is  a burglar is a libel: finding Mr. Q’s 
published statement was true (in substance and in fact). 
Thereupon a second trial is held, to decide whether Mr. W 
is a burglar, in which Mr. Q’s statement is no longer under 
consideration.77 
 
Austin goes on to claim that a second trial is necessary to decide the separate issue of Mr. 
W’s guilt or non-guilt. A redundancy theorist such as Strawson would believe that such a 
trial is in fact unnecessary, for the evidence leading to the verdict of the one trial is the 
same evidence as that in the other. Strawson, presumably, would then wish to argue that 
the point of the example generalizes so as to apply to the descriptive predicate, ‘is true’: 
thus the grounds for the semantic verdict for TstST are the same as that for tst. More 
precisely, the truth or falsehood of the one implies, and is implied by, that of the other. 
This piece of reasoning, Austin believes, is the consequence of confusing identity 
conditions of propositions (as synonymous with sentence meanings) with those sentences 
themselves.  
The alleged confusion over sentential and propositional identity attends a related 
misconception concerning assertion. This misconception is merely hinted at in Austin’s 
paper, in which he claims that the meaning of the sentence ‘that Fa is false’ is often 
confused with that of the negation of ‘Fa’. Both negation and assertion refer “directly to 
the world” not to “statements about the world;” they are, he avers, “on a level.” This 
remark is at once odd and instructive, for the assertion and negation (denial) are seen not 
to be “on a level” the moment we consider how the truth or falsity of a statement arises in 
the first place. In illustrating his point, Austin asks: how are the assertions ‘He is not at 
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home’ and ‘It is false that he is home’ the same in a context in which “no one has said he 
is at home?”78  Interestingly, it is this consideration that leads Strawson to depart from the 
earlier proto-redundancy view of Ramsey (1927) and to assign a performatory function to 
the various predicative uses of ‘is true’ – e.g., ‘it is true that’ (preceding a statement), 
‘that is true’ (referring to what is said), and so on. Thus, the semantically superfluous 
predicate ‘is true’ is not completely superfluous, as it does something over and above its 
semantic role. It may confirm (in certain substantival phrases), assent, grant, or concede 
(in proleptic uses).  
Austin’s principal objection to all of this is that the performative interpretation of 
the truth predicate stresses a significant aspect of linguistic meaning to such an extent as 
to almost ignore the significance of the semantic content of the predicate. This, Austin 
claims, amounts to ignoring the fact that the performative aspect is merely one aspect 
among others. “To say that you are a cuckold may be to insult you,” Austin remarks, “but 
it is also and at the same time to make a statement which is true or false.”79 
There is, however, one aspect of statement making whose importance must have 
been ignored altogether by Austin and to some extent Strawson, namely, the assertoric 
function of statements. It is in respect of this aspect of linguistic meaning that the 
significance of the logical concept of truth alluded to earlier is brought to light. I 
suggested that the logical concept is distinct from the semantic concept; but if Austin has 
somehow given a vague impression that this is so, it can only be by failing to observe that 
distinction in the first place. Witness Austin: “There can be no criterion of truth in the 
sense of some feature detectable in the statement itself which will reveal whether it is true 
or false. Hence, too, a statement cannot without absurdity refer to itself.” (Austin 1950, 
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31) Here, one cannot be blamed for suspecting that it is Austin’s undue fixation on a 
statement’s referring capacity and the associated demonstrative conventions of the act of 
referring that prevents him from recognizing that a sentence may say of itself that it is 
true. I go on later to argue that it must. As it stands, the notion that a statement may be 
‘saying of itself’ awaits further clarification.80 It is worth noting that one would be 
mistaken to claim that Austin never entertained the suggestion that a statement can say of 
itself that it is true. In fact, we see some groping for an explanation of a similar point 
when Austin asks of sentence-uses “whether there is not some use of ‘is true’ that is 
primary, or some generic name for that which at bottom we are always saying ‘is true’”81. 
Which, if any, of these expressions is to be taken “au pied de la lettre?”82 Austin then 
quips, “[In] philosophy the foot of the letter is the foot of the ladder.” His question leads 
to some more fruitful speculation about the concept of truth, but it is not pursued in the 
manner in which Strawson – I believe, rightly – pursues it. The result of Austin’s efforts 
is thus a study of the demonstrative conventions by which statements refer, betraying a 
somewhat fruitless preoccupation with the strictly semantic import of the truth predicate. 
It is in Strawson’s discussion of the nature of facts where the redundancy theory 
prevails. The suggestion is that the words “‘fact’, ‘situation’, and ‘state of affairs’ have, 
like the words ‘statement’ and ‘true’ themselves, a certain type of word-world-relating 
discourse (the informative) built in to them.”83 Thus “it would be futile” to elucidate any 
segment of referential discourse in which these several terms naturally occur by 
analyzing the terms themselves, or in terms of one another, for they “contain the problem, 
not its solution.”84  
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Implicit in these remarks may be the key to understanding precisely why Austin’s 
view must be found to be untenable85. The point is reflected in Austin’s telling remark 
that “it may further be questioned whether every ‘statement’ does aim to be true at all.”86 
Though it may make no sense to say that statements really aim to be true, statements may 
be said, in a sense, to be true solely in virtue of their normal assertoric function (what 
Frege refers to as force)87. The linguistic conventions governing assertion are not wholly 
semantic; there is also a logical and syntactical dimension to which we have paid little 
attention in this discussion up to now.88   
  We may now wish to understand precisely what Strawson means by the claim 
“that facts and statements have a type of “word-world-relating discourse (the 
informative) built in to them.”89  Why do Austin and Strawson both make the point that 
‘p’ and ‘p is true’ do not mean the same, and that this difference emerges once one 
considers the conditions under which the question of truth and falsity arise? What if no 
one asserted ‘that p’? Are we to believe that ‘p is true’ means ‘that p’ in a context in 
which the assertion that p was never made, or is unlikely to ever be made? Both are in 
agreement that such questions reveal something defective in the redundancy conception, 
for which they offer their respective remedies. We may attempt to elucidate the nature of 
the problem by appealing to Strawson’s insights. The terms ‘statement’ and ‘fact’ contain 
the problem. It is worth noting that Ramsey (1927) came near to making the same point 
earlier with his suggestion that ‘truth’ is not a problem that could not be dissolved 
through a proper analysis of the internal structure of judgment. We may understand 
Ramsey’s remark by attending to the logico-syntactical point concerning standard cases 
of assertion discussed below.    
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To assert that a is F is, of course, to make a claim. It is to say this is thus so. A 
statement of the form a is F is true in the sense that it contains in its making the truth-
value ‘True’. A truth-value is, in a special sense, thereby conferred upon any judgment or 
statement that states this is so. This is a consequence of the declarative statement’s 
logical form. The grammatical rendering of such a judgment typically links subject and 
predicate terms by means of introducing a finite verb – in this case, ‘is’. Thus, the 
function of ‘is’ in ‘is F’ reflects an act of judgment, viz., of judging something to be the 
case. By ‘subtracting’ from the sentence ‘a is F’ the finite verb ‘is’, we suspend what W. 
E. Johnson90 calls the ‘assertive-tie’ of judgment, and so we are left with an expression 
syntactically unlike the statement ‘a is F’ and unlike the corresponding judgment. The 
result of this suspension is a form of words that may be expressed grammatically in 
participial form, <a’s being F>. Note, then, that when a truth-value is conferred upon this  
form (the declarative form of a sentence represents the formed judgment) the result – a 
statement – does not name or refer to a ‘state of affairs’ or ‘fact’ in the way the resulting 
sentence is alleged to name or refer.91 In recognition of this distinction, we may say that 
such a statement is an instantiation of a concept of truth92 in virtue of its form – in virtue 
of what I have called, after Wiredu (1975), an occurrence of truth in its primary sense. 
We might say, to be more precise, that such a statement contains an occurrence of a 
primary concept of truth.  
None of this is to deny the obvious truth that situations in the world often give rise 
to judgments, as they obviously do. The mistake, rather, is to think that the truth of a 
resulting judgment obtains in virtue of a relation that obtains ex post facto between it and 
a given fact, or state of affairs. Frege, nearly sixty years earlier, suggested that there are 
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problems with the idea of taking facts to be truth-makers of judgments. It is worth noting 
that the mistake is supported by the widespread belief that (1) there is no primary sense of 
truth-value for statements to have, and (2) when we inquire as to the truth of a statement 
we thereby inquire not into <a’s being F> but into the truth expressed by the declarative 
sentence ‘a is F.’ If, however, we hold an Austin-style correspondence theory, we 
commit a category mistake in supposing that a sentence corresponds to a state of 
affairs.93 We have already seen that there are good reasons on intuitive grounds not to 
suppose that sentences, as logically and syntactically complete expressions, name, refer, 
or correspond, to anything whatsoever. In the primary sense, a statement asserted just is 
true insofar as it possesses a truth value (of True or False).   
 I wish now to consider a potential objection to the idea that assertions contain a 
claim to truth, or possess what I have called a primary truth-value. The objection might 
go as follows: “On your view even a sentence like ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is true in virtue of its 
merely being asserted. Surely, you do not wish to say that.”94  That is, if a statement is 
true in the primary sense, in virtue of its syntactical form as you have explained it, then 
you must admit that any falsehood is also true in virtue of its being asserted, which is 
absurd. The force of the objection seems to rest on the mistake of confusing mention with 
use in the following way. When one presents the falsehood ‘2 + 2 = 5’, as a clear counter-
example to the present view, it is not clear what exactly it is that one is presenting as 
false. Is one presenting for our consideration ‘2 + 2 = 5’ as a sentence i.e., as a claim, or 
is one presenting the judgeable content of that sentence? In any case, it is plain that ‘2 + 2 
= 5’, however construed, is being proposed as an obvious falsehood; but presumably the 
one who proposes it as such knows this in advance. If this is the case, however, then one 
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is in an important sense mentioning the statement that ‘2 + 2 = 5 is true’ as a falsehood – 
as a statement (in Austin’s sense, a speech-episode) which one has already determined to 
be false after having evaluated its content from a previous point of view. There is now 
under consideration a point of view which has already been determined to be false. This 
fact is obscured in part because the intended counter-example takes the grammatical form 
of a question – viz. “Is the statement ‘2 + 2 =5’ true on the present view?” The covert 
judgment may be more easily detected in the question, “Are you prepared to admit that ‘2 
+ 2 = 5’ is true?” But the claim has been, somewhat covertly, evaluated from some 
previous point of view. 
Let us suppose that our opponent does not know in advance that ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is 
false, but rather is asking the question in all sincerity. It would sound odd were she to say, 
‘Could you really mean to say that ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is in some sense true?’, as if to ask, ‘Are 
you sure that you wish to commit yourself to claiming something so absurd?’ If one did 
not know in advance that ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is a falsehood (and did not mean to suggest that in 
being offered as a kind of counter-example to the present view we would then have to 
countenance the absurdity that “‘2 + 2 = 5’ is true”), then, of course, one would not have 
raised the question in the first place. The question arises with something non-declarative 
in form. It is incorrect to think that when one asks the question ‘Is 2 + 2 = 5 true (or 
false)?’, one would first present the idea that 2 + 2 = 5 is true as if it were false – let alone 
as a claim – then proceed to ask whether it is true. Rather, what one actually does first is 
to consider whether 2 + 2 = 5, and in doing so one considers not ‘2 + 2 = 5’ as a 
statement but as a question. What is truth-evaluable in the primary sense is a content that 
has yet to receive a truth-value and therefore non-declarative in form. But the question 
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thus arises: if this accurately reflects linguistic practice, why would the grammatical form 
of the expression not correspond to the appropriate mood of entertainment – i.e. of its 
being a question?  Such an act of consideration does, in fact, involve a content for whose 
expression a specific syntactical construction is to be used. For this consideration the 
proper formulation of the initial question, then, is ‘Does 2 + 2 = 5?’ – or, equivalently, 
‘two and two’s being five’. In the context of inquiry this is what is in question. 
Accordingly, it is determined to be the case that two and two is not five, in which case the 
resulting (primary) truth-value is ‘False’. Note that this would expressed by the 
declarative sentence ‘2 + 2 ≠ 5’, whereas the sentence “‘2 + 2 = 5’ is false” contains two 
truth-values, one of which is primary the other which is secondary.   
These reflections may put several of Austin’s earlier remarks into perspective. It 
was mentioned earlier that Austin believes that we “refer” to a given state of affairs in 
predicating ‘is true’ to a given sentence. It is by now perhaps more clear why this cannot 
be the case. The difference that ‘is true’ makes to a plain assertion is, in part, what 
Strawson takes it to be – a performative one; but it is not merely performative, a fact to 
which Austin is sensitive in a way Strawson is not. Austin’s observation is that the act of 
‘referring’ to another speech-episode itself entails another statement which, as asserted, 
receives a truth-value on grounds distinct from those by which we judge true the initial 
assertion. What is wrong with this is not only the idea that we somehow refer to other 
statements (though it is true that we may be said to concur, or agree, with them), but the 
idea that a bare assertion obtains a secondary truth-value in the construction of a 
judgment. We do not, in fact, form judgments in the way that Austin suggests. If we did, 
we should expect that we normally go about fitting judgments onto the world. It is then a 
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small step to the doctrine that the truth of a judgment is an epistemically inscrutable 
relation that obtains between it and a given state of affairs. But what Austin seems to be 
right about given all this – and what Strawson is perhaps mistaken about – is that we do, 
in fact, arrive at another judgment in the act of predicating ‘is true’ to a statement.95 That 
judgment, itself a result of applying the truth predicate, is a comment upon a prior 
judgment wherein occurs the primary concept of truth. We do not arrive at another 
judgment, however, by fitting it onto the historical situation which is supposed to make it 
true. Rather, in cases of empirical belief, we “fit” a concept onto the world, where this 
concept in part constitutes our judgment.  
 It may be noted that a judgment, in terms of the concept of truth, because it is the 
product of a concept discharging its referring function, is never strictly identical with 
another judgment. This applies also to statements, speech-episodes, and propositions. 
Thus, if statements do not refer to states of affairs and cannot refer to themselves (given 
restrictions on identity), then a statement p as assented to by someone must be accounted 
for in a way that makes reference to the conditions under which p was initially made.96 
The details of such an operation cannot be discussed here. The point I wish to make bears 
on the debate between Austin and Strawson somewhat obliquely, but it is worth stating. 
When Austin says that the act of ‘referring’ to another speech-episode itself entails 
another statement, which, as asserted, receives a truth-value on grounds separate from 
those by which we judge true the initial assertion, he is only partially correct. Were his 
view amended in such a way as to incorporate the distinction between primary and 
secondary concepts of truth, it would have perhaps forestalled objections from 
deflationary quarters while still respecting our correspondence intuitions.   
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 I wish now to consider a potential objection to the view that truth is an epistemic 
property, an objection that might be made to the idea, in particular, that assertions contain 
a claim to truth (in some non-psychological sense) or a primary truth-attribution. The 
objection might go as follows: “On your view a sentence like ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is true in virtue 
of its merely being asserted. Surely, you do not wish to say that.” That is, if a statement is 
true in the primary sense, in virtue of its syntactical form, then we must admit that any 
falsehood is true in virtue of its being asserted, which is absurd. Or, the objection may be 
put as follows: if your view is correct, then anything may be said to be true “in virtue of 
using a declarative sentence (e.g. ‘2 + 2 = 5’).” On the present view, we have deviated 
from orthodoxy in maintaining that a declarative sentence cannot be used non-assertively 
in any legitimate sense. The force of the objection seems to depend on the mistake of 
reading into the epistemic view a kind of realist notion of correspondence of truth. This 
reading is accomplished by confusing mention with use. When one presents to us the 
falsehood, say, ‘2 + 2 = 5’, as a clear counter-example to the present view, I think that we 
are entitled to ask what is it exactly that one is proposing, thereby elucidating what is 
intended by the critic to be taken as the primary truth-bearer. That is, we are entitled to 
ask whether one is presenting for our consideration ‘2 + 2 = 5’ as a sentence, that is, as a 
claim which is expressed in the indicative mood. It is plain that ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is being 
proposed as an obvious falsehood, and presumably the one who proposes it as such 
knows in advance that it is a falsehood; but if this is the case, then the one who is 
presenting the objection is, in a sense, mentioning ‘2 + 2 = 5 is true’ as a falsehood.  
 Suppose that the critic who is offering ‘2 + 2 = 5’ for our consideration does not 
know in advance that it is false, but is asking the question in all sincerity. It would sound 
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odd were one to say, ‘Could you really mean to say that ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is in some sense 
true?’ (as if to ask, ‘Are you sure that you wish to commit yourself to claiming something 
so absurd?’ while asking the question sincerely). Of course, if one did not know in 
advance that ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is a falsehood, then one would not have known to raise the 
question in the first place. This is because one would not know the sentence ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is 
a counterexample. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which someone who asks the 
question sincerely would  first present the idea that 2 + 2 = 5 is true as if it were false – 
that is declaratively – then proceed to ask the question ‘Is it true that 2 + 2 = 5’? This is, 
of course, very unlikely, for we normally ask whether something is true or false by 
presenting questions, where the propositional contents of questions occur in the 
interrogative mood rather than the indicative. That is, what one actually does first in 
contexts of inquiry is to consider whether 2 + 2 = 5, and in doing so one considers not ‘2 
+ 2 = 5’ as a statement but as a question, or perhaps even as a kind of hypothesis. The use 
of ‘whether’, and generally expressions of indirect discourse, signifies the asking of a 
question. The question thus arises: if this is what one normally does in the context of 
inquiry, then why would one not use an expression like “whether p”97, or even express p 
in the interrogative mood? We have already seen that there is an appropriate grammatical 
expression corresponding to the act of considering. Such an act of consideration involves 
a judgeable content for whose expression we have employed a specific syntactical 
construction. If this is the appropriate consideration, the proper formulation of the 
proponent’s initial question, then, is ‘Does 2 + 2 = 5?’ – or, when considered as a truth-
apt propositional content – ‘two and two’s being five’. This is what is in question in 
normal contexts of inquiry. Thus it is determined to be the case that two and two is not 
86 
 
five, and thus determined to be the case that ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is false. We may again look to 
Frege’s early conceptual notation to express all this in a more perspicuous manner:  
 
(i)  ‘two and two’s being five’  [― 2 +2 = 5]                
(ii) ‘two and two is five’ [⊢2 + 2 = 5]; or, in the case of a negative judgment: 
  ‘<two and two is five> is false’ [⊢┱ 2 + 2 = 5] 
 
The objection, therefore, depends upon omitting the transition from (i) to (ii) and upon 
the assumption that in considering whether ‘2 + 2 = 5’, one starts with (ii), 
 One may reply to the initial objection by pointing out that, on the present view, 
one does not omit the transition from (i) to (ii) – an omission of which the critic herself is 
guilty. But if one does argue against the present view in the manner we are now 
considering, then one is in effect eliding over this transition. The critic’s reasoning may 
be represented similarly as follows: 
(2) ‘two and two is five’                        ⊢2 + 2 = 5 
(3) ‘<two and two is five> is true’       ⊢‘2 + 2 = 5’ is true 
 
 
In this instance what one starts with is the claim ‘2 + 2 = 5’, which implies that one ipso 
facto admits to having asserted that 2 + 2 = 5. But if this is the case, then we have 
already committed to the absurdity that we were alleged to have committed at the outset 
when presented with the initial objection. There is yet another error committed by the 
here by the critic: one has not only omitted the transition from (i) to (ii), but in so doing  
erroneously takes the epistemic view in question to be doing the same. But if we hold the 
critic to observe the necessary distinction and the transition from (i) to (ii) which depends 
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on it, then she will see that we are no more committed than she is to holding true the 
sentence ‘2 + 2 = 5’. 
 
 We may appeal to the distinction between ‘use’ and ‘mention’ thus construed in 
order to show more precisely at what point the confusion sets in with respect to the 
potential objection raised a few pages back (p.43). The point of the objection is to force 
the epistemic theorist of truth to admit that 2 + 2 = 5 is true, thereby showing the 
epistemic view to be in error. The argument implicit in the objection is a reductio. But, as 
is obvious given the needed distinctions, the admitted absurdity is of the form [T2(T1p)] 
which must be taken as a mention of the previous assertion, an instantiation of (T1p). 
 The present view does not commit one to having to admit as true ‘2 + 2 = 5’ 
unless one is committed asserting ‘2 + 2 = 5’, as the former depends essentially on the 
first. But what reason do we have to expect another to bed committed to asserting ‘2 + 2 
= 5’? If one asserts that 2 + 2 = 5, then, of course, one is committed to countenancing 
such an absurdity; but in such a case one already has evaluated ‘2 and 2’s being 5’ as 
true, insofar as there is a primary occurrence of truth. But in this case, even an opponent 
to the present view has, by the same token, committed to the same absurdity – for we 
should wish to say simply that the sum of 2 and 2 is not 5. Presumably this is not how 
one the objection is really intended to be taken. Rather what one means to say is 
something like this: according to the epistemic view under consideration, are you 
claiming that 2 +2 = 5? – to which the epistemic theorist may respond with propriety, 
‘no’. Our adversary then concludes that I am not claiming that ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is true. But as 
was seen, talking in this way implies that one is using ‘is true’ as predicative of a 
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sentence, and this involves, on the present view, a secondary occurrence of truth. 
Although this is what the standard use of the truth predicate implies, presumably this is 
not what one really means in asking whether 2 + 2 = 5 is true.  
 What is now becoming clear is that one is here confusing primary and secondary 
occurrences, as if they are one and the same, or as if they may occur in any context 
(saving meaning). The primary occurrence of truth consists the making of an assertion, 
which consists, as has already been shown, in the instituting of the assertive tie given the 
judgeable content as the primary truth bearer. This is, given a simple syntactical 
consideration, not identical to the secondary occurrence of truth so-called because its 
corresponding truth-bearer is not a judgeable content, but rather a complete thought as 
expressed by a sentence – i.e. as a (complete) thought. Thus, to the question: ‘Are you 
claiming that the sentence ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is true?’ the answer is ‘no’, for I have not asserted 
‘2 + 2 = 5’ as a sentence. Because I have not asserted ‘2 + 2 = 5’, and thus do not have 
before me a complete thought to which the truth predicate can be applied, the question of 
whether the sentence ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is true or false simply does not arise. We might imagine 
the initial objection to be reformulated as follows. Suppose, then, that you have asserted 
that 2 + 2 = 5; on your own view, you have no choice but to admit that this (the 
hypothesized assertion) is true given that you have asserted the sentence, and here the 
kind of epistemic view that you are advocating must admit that the question as to its truth 
or falsehood does arise. 
 But the response would be that the question as to its truth or falsehood arises 
given that I have been forced to assert that the sentence ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is now false. But here, 
as the critic will be quick to point out, in declaring the sentence to be false I have 
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contradicted my own view. In this instance, what would have escaped him is that there is 
no reason to make such an assertion, insofar as it is admitted as something for which the 
question of truth and falsity arises at all. Of course, in normal contexts, there is no reason 
for anyone to make such an assertion. One may proceed to say of it (i.e. the sentence 
itself) that it is false, which would enjoin applying the truth predicate to a sentence, 
where the sentence is now the truth-bearer – not the propositional content carried by it. 
Thus the predicating of ‘is true’ to the sentence as a truth-bearer necessarily involves a 
secondary occurrence of truth; and it may be seen from this instance that every secondary 
occurrence depends, in a logical sense, upon a primary occurrence of truth. That this 
relation is logical may be seen by considering examples in which the use of the truth 
predicate in its primary role, i.e. where ‘is true’ is predicated of something syntactically 
incomplete, e.g. That p is true, where the occurrence of ‘that’ transforms ‘p’ to a 
judgeable content, or, in cases relevant to semantic ascent, ‘what she said is true’. But 
this is not how one need answer the objections. Rather, at this point, it is to be observed 
that that the critic of the epistemic view has committed the error of identifying the 
primary with the secondary occurrence of truth. Given the distinctions set out, this 
identification necessarily commits her to further conflating the truth-bearers appropriate 
to each occurrence. Once this has been brought to the attention of the critic, she may 
again try to reformulate her question in order that this dual conflation may be avoided. In 
doing this, however, the initial objection is rendered powerless. She would have to resort 
to asking: ‘Given the distinction we have raised, I am asking: does not your view of 
assertion commit you to admitting that 2 + 2 = 5 is true by virtue of its simply being 
asserted, as if I am asking you ‘Is it the case that 2 + 2 = 5?  In other words, does this 
90 
 
view commit one to asserting ‘2 + 2 = 5’ (which we have expressed more formally as 
(T1p))? The response would be, again, ‘no’; for although I may consider the idea that 2 + 
2 = 5 – of two and two’s being five – I have still not asserted ‘2 + 2 = 5’. In so 
considering a judgeable content I am no more required to assert 2 + 2 = 5 – where ‘=’ 
carries with it the assertoric force of the finite form, ‘is’ – than is a rational person who 
denies all that we have said so far in support of the view under consideration or 
subscribes to a radically different theory of truth. Of course, the sentence has been 
presented to me for my consideration, but this does not thereby make the claim ‘2 + 2 = 
5’ mine in the sense that I am rationally committed to what is asserted by having asserted 
it. 
  At this point it would be helpful to introduce a distinction closely allied to, and 
entailed by, the one discussed thus far. This concerns differences in point of view.             
What is typically said to be either true or false is a sentence or statement. However, it is a 
truth-evaluable content that receives a truth-value, and this content is not itself a sentence 
or a statement, since a sentence or statement is what one ends up with once the content 
receives a truth-value. The point of this remark, and much of the previous discussion, is 
to show that truth is applicable to two different things. It remains to be shown that to 
these two kinds of expression there correspond two concepts of truth-value. It should 
become clear that my employment of the use/mention distinction, in the way that I wish 
to construe it, derives from the distinction between primary and secondary concepts of 
truth-value. In the present chapter I attempt an elucidation of this connection. First, it 
would be useful to see exactly how the primary/secondary distinction applies to different 
kinds of linguistic expression and how it may be appealed to in order to address the 
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potential objection raised a few pages back. I wish to consider how, in particular, the 
distinction applies to certain forms of indirect discourse. The sentence “Snow is white” 
contains an occurrence of the primary concept of truth (what I have been calling, simply, 
a primary occurrence of truth). The expression “Snow’s being white” cannot be said to be 
true (or false) since it is not a claim. It may be made into a claim, however. For it to be 
made into a claim, it must be supplied with assertoric force (see figure on p.45). The 
addition of assertoric force here leads to the syntactical (and logical) transformation of a 
judgeable content (which is incomplete) to an assertion, or judgment (which is complete). 
Thus, not only do we have complete and incomplete expressions, the kind of truth-value 
assignable to incomplete expressions is distinct from the kind of truth-value assignable to 
complete expressions. What is incomplete is appropriately expressed by the participial 
form of a sentence, whereas what is complete is expressed by a declarative sentence.  
 We may get at what is peculiarly epistemic about this transformation by 
considering what assertoric force adds to an unsaturated judgeable content in the context 
of rational inquiry. It is clear that supplying assertoric force amounts to nothing other 
than the supplying of a claim from the point of view of the assertor. This point was made 
by Frege when he defined assertion as an “advancing toward the True.” What appears not 
to have overly concerned Frege in this definition of assertion is the implication that a 
claim is something that results from what someone does. Claims are, of course, not 
advanced ex nihilo. It would be even more to the point to say that advancing claims is 
something that people do. Moreover, to the extent that people act on, and otherwise 
depend in various ways on the claims of others, we typically understand people to be 
involved in undertaking various commitments when making claims. In making any claim, 
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one normally undertakes a commitment, e.g. to withdraw a claim when it is shown to be 
untrue, to justify a claim when the claim is justly questioned, or to be held responsible 
when a claim is not withdrawn and it is shown to be untrue. We may take a claim to 
involve any of these normative commitments to constitute, in large part, a commitment to 
truth.  
 We may now return to the question of what assertoric force adds to judgeable 
contents of propositions. We may think of an act of assertion under normal circumstances 
as involving commitment to these judgeable contents. Assertoric force, in particular, is 
what contributes this commitment. The sense of “proposition” here may be clarified in 
the following way: a proposition is a structured entity that does not differ essentially from 
a sentence. We may think of it some sense as what is expressed by a sentence so long as 
what is expressed is not regarded as that which carries meaning independently of the 
sentence which expresses it. It is assumed that sentences are not mere concatenations of 
signs to which propositions (as expressed by those sentences) are then thought somehow 
to supply meaning.  Propositions, in this sense, may be taken as being synonymous with 
statements – as essentially complete expressions.   
 It is perhaps difficult to understand commitment at the level of abstraction at 
which we have been discussing the issue so far. Commitment to something being true is a 
normative phenomenon that must be understood relative to an individual or a group of 
individuals whose linguistic behavior is rule-governed in a variety of complex ways. To 
maintain that commitment to the truth of a particular judgeable content of a proposition is 
what assertoric force adds to that content is to maintain that someone has committed to it 
and that someone has supplied the requisite assertoric force. 
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 A further implication that I wish to draw out is that, in terms of what has been 
explained so far (see discussion on Austin and Strawson) corresponding to the 
commitment to the judgeable contents of a proposition – to, let us say, the idea of 
something – is a primary occurrence of truth; in fact, there may be reason to think that 
truth is partially definable in terms of commitment.98 Since we typically speak of 
someone being committed to something, we should therefore take into account that the 
act of commitment is what someone within some particular epistemic (and linguistic 
context) does; that is, an act of commitment is relative in a particular way to a person in 
an epistemic context. A person may, of course, be committed to holding a proposition 
(thereby being committed to its truth) over her lifetime.99 A person may be committed to 
a proposition for a relatively short period of time. Because of this – i.e. because 
commitments are allowed to vary during the course of a person’s lifetime – it is necessary 
not to identify a point of view with a person. It would be more accurate to say that 
although commitment the truth may vary over a period of time, it cannot vary over a 
single point of view, as a point of view just is an act of committing to the truth of some 
proposition.100 A commitment to truth may then be taken to be in a certain narrow sense 
relative to a point of view in a way to be distinguished from a commitment’s being 
relative to a person. A point of view is something that a person may have at time t0 but 
does not have at t1 ; or may have at time t0, not have at t1 and have again at t2. This 
variability of points of view (relative to a person) is a basic feature of discursive 
reasoning, in general, and is reflected in our practice of assertion at every level of social 
discourse. Nonetheless, commitment to truth amidst this potential plurality (and 
variablility) of points of view is possible.  
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 The concept of point of view arises out of the primary/secondary distinction in the 
following way. Given that commitment is relative to point of view in the way just 
explained, it is crucial to recognize that, except in cases in which one mentions a claim 
made by another, the making of a claim necessarily implies cotemporaneous commitment 
to it, and this cannot be completely divorced from its truth. Therefore when we say that 
truth is a warranted assertion we mean that it is a claim from (or relative to) a point of 
view that carries a commitment cotemporaneous to the context of the sincere utterance of 
the assertion.101  
  
 We may get in another way at what is peculiarly epistemic about the 
transformation by returning to some points previously made about other philosophers’ 
views on assertion. In an important respect, philosophers’ understanding of the nature of 
assertion depends on certain conceptions of objectivity, or certain conceptions that have 
been formed on the basis of common-sensical notions of objectivity. These notions 
manifest themselves in more sophisticated philosophical analysis as one form or another 
of realism. We may bring such manifestations into focus in considering some traditional 
ways assertion has been thought to be related to the notion of the proposition. The 
connection between these notions and assertion comes into focus in considering a 
commonly made distinction between proposition and assertion: a proposition is said to 
have the structure of the sentence which expresses it, and an assertion is the act of 
sincerely uttering the sentence. It has been suggested that this sort of view has certain 
difficulties, and that a view that construes a proposition to have the structure of 
something incomplete has certain advantages.102  
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 On such a view, given that the truth-value of a proposition remains what it is 
whether or not anyone happens to be asserting it, it is either true or untrue. We may be 
said to apprehend its truth or falsity, or said to be acquainted with it, in which case, if we 
sincerely utter the sentence that expresses it, we may be said to have asserted a true 
sentence. But, as is well known, even if one were to consciously believe and have 
justification for believing the proposition expressed by any given sentence, one may still 
not have its truth (where the truth of a proposition is justified inferentially). The problems 
with this are well documented, especially as concerns traditional definitions of truth in 
terms of warranted assertibility. On a realist theory of propositions, the tendency in some 
quarters has been to simply resign to skepticism and to maintain that the traditional model 
of knowledge does not model what we actually do as epistemic agents. There just is no 
principled means by which it can be determined that one can say she is in possession of a 
true proposition, whether or not the justification condition is satisfied. Because certain 
strong forms of skepticism imply the impossibility of knowledge, at least as it has been 
traditionally defined, for this reason skepticism is thought to amount to a kind of 
refutation of the traditional model. Of course, others have concluded from this 
implication that skepticism (in the strong, global form) is thereby refuted, not the 
traditional model. But it would seem that the philosophers who do come to this (latter) 
conclusion, do not fully recognize what it means: the implications of recognizing that a 
skeptical strategy is itself self-refuting are such that no theory of knowledge according to 
which truth is defined as a mind-independent semantic property that outruns our 
cognitive capacities is really possible. The idea is this: so long as truth is taken to be an 
evidence-transcendent property of propositions, yet it is taken to be a necessary condition 
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of any claim to knowledge, there will always be cases of justified belief that are possibly 
false. The innumerable elaborations on, and modifications of, the traditional Justified, 
True Belief, analysis of knowledge that followed after Edmund Gettier’s article, “Is 
Knowledge Justified True Belief?” attests to this fact and to the vague sense one gets of 
their futility. But this would seem avoidable if the distinction between kinds of truth-
bearer were consistently maintained in current theorizing about truth. However, a 
consistent application of the distinction is necessary, though not sufficient for an account 
of truth that provides a fuller analysis of the conceptual relations between truth and 
judgment. This brings us to the epistemological point: the advancing of a claim (what is 
the same as advancing toward the True for Frege) is necessarily an occurrence of a 
primary truth-value. As it was mentioned a few pages back, such a claim is a point of 
view within some context. Therefore, an occurrence of a primary truth-value is a point of 
view.103   
 The suggestion is this: because we have made the logical (syntactical) distinction 
between primary and secondary concepts of truth-value, and because an occurrence of a 
secondary truth-value is necessarily distinct from an occurrence of a primary truth-value 
(assuming the judgeable content is identical in both occurrences), there is necessarily a 
corresponding difference in point of view – the idea being that every unique assertion 
entails a unique point of view. 
 A vertical stroke is added to ― p so that we have ⊢ p, an occurrence of a primary 
concept of truth. A point of view attaches to the primary occurrence, and we may indicate 
this occurrence by writing ‘T’ for the value ‘true’ and by using a subscript to indicate 
identity of point of view – ‘T1’.  
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 Note that, in accordance with Frege’s concept script, we may symbolize the truth-
function of negation as ‘┱’ in such a way that does not involve asserting anything. In 
this way it is clear that the negation stroke is a functional element in Frege’s system, 
whereas the assertion sign is not. The addition of the vertical-stroke to the content-stroke 
supplies the assertoric force (which was earlier characterized as the ‘assertive tie’) to the 
judgeable content, p, converting the content to an assertion. It is useful to observe that, in 
Frege’s notation, it is not clear how one could add the vertical-stroke to an assertion once 
it has been formed out of both the content and vertical stroke, although there is a certain 
sense in which the supplying of assertoric force to an assertion is a commonplace in the 
context of normal linguistic practice. Cases in which we supply assertoric force to an 
assertion just are statements like “’Snow is white’ is true,” or “It is true that snow is 
white.” Here, the assertoric force occurs twice over, as is indicated by the fact that “is” 
occurs twice: we are saying that the assertion or judgment, “Snow is white” is, in fact, 
true. In recognizing, then, that assertoric force occurs twice over in this way, we are 
simply admitting that the concept of truth is being predicated of a truth-bearer that is not 
incomplete. This concept is what we have been calling the secondary concept. Though 
Frege’s symbolism does not display how it is possible to supply assertoric force to an 
assertion. Also, in terms of Frege’s notation, the secondary concept cannot be expressed: 
― p becomes ⊢ p with the addition of assertoric force, but it is difficult to see how we 
may symbolize adding assertoric force to the expression, ⊢ p. This would be redundant 
in Frege’s system and it is not surprising that we would run into difficulties were we to 
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articifially produce a device within that system that would express the idea of a secondary 
concept of truth. 
 Just as there are two distinct expressions to which truth is applicable, there are 
two concepts of truth-value. And the relevance of the distinction to grammatical 
constructions in general is that an occurrence of the secondary concept is predicative in a 
way that an occurrence of a primary truth-value is not.  
  It is apparent that if we admit that every truth comes in the in the form of a truth-
claim, and that every truth-claim entails someone’s making a claim, then we are in the 
position of also having to admit that there are necessarily two different points of view 
involved. For example, there are two points of view in “’Snow is white’ is true”, or “It is 
true that Snow is white,” as there are two different occurrences of truth in “It is true that 
Snow is white” (as there are in “What he said is true.” The one that occurs in the sentence 
“Snow is white,” which is primary, and the one that occurs in “It is true that snow is 
white,” which is secondary. Having observed this, to deny that there are necessarily two 
different points of view involved in “It is true that snow is white” would be to deny that 
any truth must come in the form of a truth-claim. Even realists do not deny this. What 
they do deny is the idea that truth could ever be an epistemic property, a denial which, in 
turn, implies the denial that any claim to truth could ever actually be true. For certain 
realists this idea must be reconciled ultimately with the idea, which is usually accepted, 
that it is people who make judgments and who therefore construct and use sentences for 
the task of making judgments. A concept of truth that does not contain the idea of its 
desirability in these terms would seem to be empty. 
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Chapter VI: Judgment and Propositions: some traditional problems revisited 
 
 
 Having indicated that Russell’s theory remains unsatisfactory on account of 
having left the problem of predication unresolved, I endeavor now to spell out more 
clearly the reasons why I think this is so. The following is a more detailed statement of 
Russell’s multiple relations theory: 
The theory of judgment which I am advocating is, that 
judgment is not a dual relation of the mind to a single 
objective, but a multiple relation of the mind to the various 
other terms with which the judgment is concerned. Thus if I 
judge that A loves B, that is not a relation of me to ‘A’s 
love for B’ but a relation between me and A and love and 
B. If it were a relation of me to ‘A’s love for B’, it would 
be impossible unless there were such a thing as ‘A’s love 
for B’, i.e. unless A loved B, i.e. unless the judgment were 
true; but in fact false judgments are possible. When the 
judgment is taken as a relation between A and love and B, 
the mere fact that the judgment occurs does not involve any 
relation between its objects A and love and B; thus the 
possibility of false judgment is fully allowed for. When the 
judgment is true, A loves B; thus in this case there is a 
relation between the objects of the judgment. (Russell 
1910, 155) 
 
One is tempted perhaps to say that there just is no thing called Desdemona’s 
infidelity. The implication seems to be that the statement ‘Othello believes that 
Desdemona is unfaithful’ has been made but has been later determined to be false. Given 
this determination, it must therefore be a fact that Desdemona is not unfaithful. This 
seems to describe one tendency in our ordinary ways of thinking about facts and fact-
stating discourse. If is an accurate description, then it is natural to think that it is 
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ultimately responsible for the hypostasization propositions. This seems to be, in large 
part, a consequence of eliding the role contributed by the primary truth-attribution in the 
construction of a proposition. On Russell’s multiple-relation theory, the issue that 
concerns us in the case of ‘Othello believes in the unfaithfulness of Desdemona’ is that 
there can be no relation of the mind to the proposition as designated by the noun phrase 
‘that Desdemona is unfaithful’. This follows because there is no such thing as 
Desdemona’s infidelity. But the analysis may be seen to be incorrect insofar as Russell is 
taking the judgment ‘Othello believes that Desdemona is unfaithful’ to be in possession 
of a secondary truth-attribution.104  
We should now examine the reasons in support of the traditional conception of 
propositions – a conception that we may fairly assume includes Russell’s multiple-
relation theory.105 To escape the difficulty earlier mentioned, Russell proposes that in the 
case of false beliefs, the mind is not related to a fact (qua truth-maker) but rather to the 
constituents of what would have been the proposition were it true. In Russell’s example, 
Othello’s belief relates Othello to Desdemona and infidelity. On Russell’s analysis, it 
becomes possible to distinguish between the truth and falsehood of judgments, which is 
an improvement over the views contained in PofM. As A. N. Prior notes, however, the 
move to paraphrase away ‘Othello believes Desdemona is unfaithful’ to get instead 
‘Othello ascribes infidelity to Desdemona’ amounts to a false economy. (Prior 1971) 
Only a “too one-eyed concentration” could make plausible an analysis which explains 
away the abstract object expressed by the noun phrase ‘that Desdemona is unfaithful’ in 
order that we are left instead with the uninstantiated abstract object ‘Infidelity’.106 
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 Nicholas Griffin, in a recent study, writes that Russell “sought several different 
solutions to what is called “the problem of complexes” but the solutions had the 
unwelcome consequence of producing problems elsewhere. There is a slight irony in 
Griffin’s discussion of the dialectical background out of which the problem of complexes 
emerged. The revolt against monism, which sought to place in its stead a pluralist 
metaphysics, involved its own difficulties. Yet Russell could not whole-heartedly 
embrace monism for the reason that it would inter alia “preclude the possibility of 
judgment.” (Griffin 2001, 161) Griffin notes that the multiple-relation theory of judgment 
purports to explain away propositions, just as the theory of descriptions purports to 
explain away non-existent entities referred to by certain denoting phrases referents of 
denoting phrases. The virtue of the multiple-relation theory consists in its elimination of 
the chief difficulty for a theory of propositions conceived from the realist’s point of view, 
namely, the possibility of false propositions. But it would seem that whatever virtues we 
find in the technique leading to these solutions is mitigated by that technique’s failure to 
provide a satisfactory solution to the double-aspect problem in its various and sometimes 
subtle manifestations.107 It is clear that the double-aspect problem still arises for the 
multiple-relation theory as it had for Russell’s earlier theory of propositions of 1903. 
Following an objection raised in Geach (1957) and more recently Davidson (2001), 
Griffin observes that the distinction between relations qua meanings and relations qua 
terms becomes all the more necessary on the new theory. The distinction between 
relations parallels that concerning concepts, generally: ‘one’ .e.g. is a concept as meaning 
when it occurs as an adjective; ‘one’ is a concept as term when occurring as a 
substantive. Russell seems to believe that the distinction is applicable on the assumption 
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that relations are a kind of concept. Whether the distinction is any more needed on the 
new theory, we may note that it is not sufficient (as will become more clear in due 
course) to explain how Russell could have provided a theory of propositions that would 
not have led to equally deep and vexing problems in the articulation of a satisfactory 
theory of judgment. 
 In the judgment, e.g., ‘Charles I died in his bed’, a person stands in the relation of 
belief to Charles I, his bed, and dying. Where the constituent terms of the judgment are 
related in the right way, inter se, they form a complex in virtue of which the judgment is 
made true. But since there is no complex in this instance – for the terms are not so related 
– there is nothing to make the judgment true. But in the case of the belief that ‘Charles I 
died on the scaffold’ the constituent terms are related to one another as expressed by the 
judgment that Charles I died on the scaffold. There is the complex that we would name 
‘The death of Charles I on the scaffold’, and so the judgment is true. The mind stands, as 
it does in the case of false judgments, in relation to each of the constituent terms, but 
unlike the false judgment that Charles I died in his bed, Charles I and the scaffold are, in 
fact, related to the term ‘dying’ in such a way as to form a complex. A point raised by 
several of Russell’s critics is that on this account the mind must stand in relation to both 
the concept as term and the concept as meaning (i.e. the relation as relating); and 
although the need for this distinction does not arise with respect to propositions, since 
they are gone, it nevertheless arises now with respect to complexes. In his critical 
discussion of Russell, Davidson (2001) admits that there may be some deep truth in the 
‘Wittgensteinian thought’ that is motivating Russell’s new theory.108 Since there just are 
no propositions, the problem of propositional unity – viz. of explaining what gives a 
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proposition its unity – disappears. But the effect of this move is that now the same 
problem, or something very much like it, reappears under a new guise, under the domain 
of the mind: there is a shift in emphasis from an analysis of propositions conceived as 
mind-independent entities to an analysis of judgment as a mental act109. But such a shift 
signals a significant step toward a solution to the problem of propositional unity. 
Whatever difficulties we may have multiplied in the process, we may credit Russell with 
having relocated the problem to its proper domain.  
 Davidson takes the new theory to have the further implication that if what unifies 
a sentence is “no part or aspect” of the sentence itself (satz an sich), then we must be 
committed to a conception of propositions according to which sentences amount merely 
to “strings of names,” and therefore must deny the predicative role of verbs. However, as 
it is suggested in Chapter 1, there is no reason to think that relegating the problem of 
propositional unity,110 as it has been traditionally conceived, to a theory of judgment 
entails this denial. However, the multiple-relation theory, which had been seen as a 
solution to the problem of propositional unity, fails insofar as it encounters the double-
aspect problem in a new form. The repeated confrontation with the double-aspect 
problem, from about 1903 to 1912, and up to the final version of the multiple-relation 
theory as it appears in Theory of Knowledge (1914), should give some indication that 
only a conception of assertion as primarily logical can afford an escape from potential 
double-aspect problems. This is a claim that both Davidson and Griffin seem to come 
close to making, but neither goes so far as to attribute the source of double-aspect 
problems to Russell’s not possessing such a conception of assertion.111  
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 Griffin provides an account of one of Russell’s earlier attempts to come to terms 
with the double-aspect problem, locating the solution in an unpublished paper entitled 
“On Functions” (1904). 112 On the treatment given there, complexes were definable in 
terms of constituents – the concept of which was taken as primitive – and a mode of 
combination by which constituents form complexes. But the mode of combination is “not 
itself one of the constituents of the complex” (Russell 1904); otherwise it would count as 
a constituent to be combined with other constituents of the complex, and we would then 
have to specify a mode of combination which would combine the first mode of 
combination with the constituents of the complex, and so on ad infinitum. The mode of 
combination, then, while an entity, is not an entity belonging to the complex which it 
forms. Thus, Russell appears to have avoided both the threat of a Bradley-type regress 
argument on one hand (as concerns modes of combination), and on the other, the self-
contradiction that would have otherwise come about in not taking a mode of combination 
to be an entity. It is not clear exactly what ontological significance a mode of 
combination is accorded on this view. But it is clear that introducing the idea was 
important to avoid both difficulties. A mode of combination must be capable of being 
made the logical subject of some other proposition, for in denying that it could be a 
logical subject, one thereby implies that it is. This difficulty is thus parallel to those 
Russell encountered in 1903.113 In the case of functions, Russell saw the need to account 
for the contradiction generally as follows: given a function /ƒ’/ it must be allowed that 
/ƒ/ may be referred to as a constituent of a proposition, /ƒ’х/. Here we are to take /х 
satisfies the function  /ƒ’// as the mode of combination. Russell’s difficulties now 
consist in accounting for how it is a mode of combination can sometimes be a constituent 
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of a complex and sometimes an entity not occurring in the complex of which it is the 
mode.114 With respect to the manner in which the double-aspect problem pertains to 
verbs, Russell is led to entertain a curious solution. In PofM, Russell considers the 
predicate ‘differs from’ and its corresponding singular term ‘difference’ and arrives at the 
following conclusion: 
Yet these constituents, thus placed side by side, do not 
reconstitute the proposition. The difference which occurs in 
the proposition actually relates A and B, whereas the 
difference after analysis is a notion which has no 
connection with A and B …The verb, when used as a verb, 
embodies the unity of the proposition, and is thus 
distinguishable from the verb considered as a term, though 
I do not know how to give a precise account of the nature 
of the distinction (Russell 1903, 49) 
   
 Griffin notes that Russell’s solution to this problem involves construing the 
satisfaction relation as a concept that “changes with the function satisfied”. (Russell 
1904) 
  We have briefly discussed several aspects of Russell’s philosophy that tend in 
one way or another to run afoul of double-aspect problems, but it is his later multiple-
relations theory of judgment that I wish to discuss in more detail, as the double-aspect 
problem reappears there in a subtler form. It would also appear that an understanding of 
how that problem is manifested in the theory would give us sufficient reason to question 
certain of Russell’s assumptions as to the nature of the relation between truth and 
judgment. We must therefore return to and further elaborate on the central point of the 
previous chapter.  
Let us recall that, on Russell’s earlier theory of propositions, if we are to ask what 
is asserted in the proposition ‘Caesar died’, we would have to say that it is the ‘The death 
106 
 
of Caesar is asserted’, or simply, ‘Caesar’s death’. Thus it would seem obvious that 
‘Caesar’s death’ is here what is capable of being true or false; but it is equally obvious 
that truth and falsity cannot belong to a logical subject. As it was earlier suggested, we 
are entitled to ask how Russell arrives at the conclusion that ‘Caesar’s death’ is true. Let 
us recall the distinction raised earlier in “Frege and Russell on Assertion”: 
 
(3) ‘Caesar’s being dead’ (or, what is the same, ‘Caesar’s death’) 
and 
(4) ‘Caesar died’ 
 
If we take the logical subject to be an incomplete entity, duly registering the difference 
corresponding to the grammatical distinction, then we ought to conclude that ‘Caesar’s 
death’ is not the sort of thing that could be true or false. I suggest that what warrants the 
claim that ‘Caesar’s death’ is true is also what supports the claim on the later multiple-
relation theory that the mind cannot ex hypothesi bear any relation to ‘false complexes’, 
and is therefore what ultimately motivated Russell to introduce the multiple-relations 
theory. The element that I refer to is obscured, in part, by the ease with which we 
sometimes use participial forms and noun phrases interchangeably. There is nothing 
problematic in doing this from a strictly grammatical point of view. But the transition 
from, e.g. ‘Desdemona’s being unfaithful’ to ‘Desdemona’s infidelity’ is perhaps liable to 
confer upon the latter expression a semblance of its having an assertive element that it 
does not in fact possess. For Russell, the sentence ‘Desdemona is unfaithful’ is given as 
an example of a judgment expressing a falsehood; but there is no such thing as the 
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complex to which the judgment refers. Russell’s solution is, as we have seen, to explain 
away the fictitious complex by maintaining that the mind is related not to any single 
‘objective’ as had been previously supposed, but to the several constituents of the 
judgment. Of course, there is no such thing as ‘Desdemona’s infidelity’, but there is a 
strong temptation to forget that this is itself a claim that is either being advanced 
presently or (presumably) had been advanced at an earlier time. I think an interesting 
question suggests itself, viz. whence does such a temptation originate? Precisely what 
about Russell’s later theory is responsible for it?  
 The answer to this question seems to be that the temptation arises out of assuming 
that the judgment in question is in possession of a truth-value as given by a secondary 
truth-attribution (or truth-valuation). This assumption is made, however, without 
Russell’s first having acknowledged that such a judgment as ‘Desdemona is unfaithful’ 
must have first received a primary truth-attribution in its construction as a judgment, and 
this truth-attribution must have involved a transformation from a judgeable content to a 
judgment. Assuming the judgment to be in possession of a secondary truth-attribution 
without acknowledgement of the role contributed by the primary truth-attribution in the 
formation of the judgment, moreover, presents the act of judgment as destitute of any 
element of subjectivity.115 The presentation of such a judgment (as expressing a fact) thus 
reinforces the idea that the truth of the judgment obtains independently of the person 
making the judgment; but more problematically, it reinforces at the same time the idea 
that the person judging has no cognitive access at all to the truth of the judgment. The 
latter is a consequence of the former, and though this may be seen as undesirable, even 
for the semantic realist – for it introduces truth-skepticism – denying the consequence 
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would come at too high cost – viz. of denying that the truth of a judgment obtains 
independently of our thinking it true. This would be, therefore, to trade off skepticism for 
a deep form of subjectivism. We are led to the conclusion by way of a faulty inference, 
however. Because Russell has elided the role contributed by the primary truth-attribution 
in the judgment ‘Desdemona is unfaithful’, the judgment is accorded whatever semantic 
significance the secondary truth-attribution might surreptitiously afford it. And therefore, 
Russell wishes to say now, as this move has now justified him, that it must simply be a 
fact (qua truth-maker) that Desdemona is not unfaithful. The appeal to the notion of fact 
here arises out of the assumption that it is the case that ‘Desdemona is unfaithful’ 
independent of anyone having judged it to be so, where ‘independent of’ has the sense of, 
conceptually, an perhaps temporally, ‘prior to’. From the standpoint of an epistemic 
conception of truth (e.g. a theory that defines truth as warranted assertibility), the notion 
of fact arises out of a realist tendency in our thinking; but for such a conception the 
assumption is unwarranted, as we have no recourse to facts as Russell conceives them. 
On a view of truth as warranted assertibility, we may explain the realist tendency in our 
thinking as follows: by the very use of the words ‘there is no such thing as ‘Desdemona’s 
infidelity’ we assume the truth of the judgment ‘Desdemona is not unfaithful’ is as if the 
judgment has already been made, and this is understandable given that the role that is 
otherwise contributed by the primary truth-attribution is not discharged. This role is never 
discharged is simply because there is no such role to be played in the case of a true 
judgment; and the reason why there is no role for true judgments is that, for Russell, to 
admit otherwise would be to admit that the truth of a judgment, and derivatively that of a 
sentence, does not obtain given the way the world is: 
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….[It] is plain, also, that the truth or falsehood of a given 
judgment depends in no way upon the person judging, but 
solely upon the facts about which he judges (Russell 1910, 
149) 
Of course, we may insist that epistemic accounts along these lines are incorrect and so, 
given the extent to which it is entrenched in our intuitions, there is no good reason to 
forfeit the realist notion of a fact. But, I will suggest, that the insistence on the idea that 
we must preserve the independence of mind from world seems to be the mechanism 
which operates very strongly in Russell’s correspondence theory and the mechanism by 
which the theory of meaning is insulated from epistemological analysis. As Michael 
Dummett has said in this connection, “Although we no longer accept the correspondence 
theory, we remain realist au fond; we retain in our thinking a fundamentally realist 
conception of truth.” (Dummett 1959, 14) Although this only applies partly to Russell 
(Russell had remained a correspondence theorist throughout his life too), it accurately 
characterizes the source of many difficulties that arise in association with realism and its 
relation to judgment.  
 We ought to recognize that this is a mechanism that is at work in the earliest 
phase of Russell’s development and is one which is in large part responsible for the 
double-aspect problems which we’ve discussed. As Griffin notes, Russell was led, in 
response to these problems, to distinguish between a proposition and a propositional 
concept, where the former designates the complex /Caesar died/ and the latter designates 
the complex /the death of Caesar/. But the distinction cannot get us out of double-aspect 
problems, since, as Griffin notes, a propositional concept may be the logical subject of 
another proposition; but it remains that a proposition proper may also be the logical 
subject of another proposition, and this has been shown to follow on pain of self-
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contradiction. But as Griffin further points out, propositions are generally of interest to 
logicians; and we should be permitted to say, borrowing Griffin’s example, 
 
/Caesar died/ and /Caesar was assassinated/ are both 
subjects of the proposition //Caesar was assassinated/ 
implies /Caesar died//.116 
 
 As observed in the previous chapter, there is a difficulty with such a formulation as the 
one above. It was remarked that no grammatical transformation occurs precisely where it 
is needed. It should be stressed that the absence of the needed grammatical 
transformation conceals a point of logical significance, signaling the presence of a certain 
confusion. We may also note that Russell’s introduction of the notion of a propositional 
concept in the attempt to explain the difference between what is expressed by /Caesar 
died/ and /the death of Caesar/ runs into Bradley-type regress argument. No matter how 
many new terms are introduced, the question remains: in virtue of what does a concept 
possess its dual aspect? If there is nothing about the nature of the concept itself that can 
reconcile the idea that a complex may differ with respect to having radically different 
properties with the idea that they express the same thing, then no device will be able to do 
so.  
 Mark Sainsbury’s view117 of Russell’s difficulties is less charitable than Griffin’s., 
the difference with respect to verbs led Russell “to characterize the predicative role as 
one which suffices for truth”, and “plainly this is absurd.” (Sainsbury 1979, 21) 
Sainsbury goes on to claim: “the temptation is responsible for his saying, in PofM, that in 
a logical sense ‘only true propositions are asserted’ and for his holding that what is 
puzzling about belief is how there can be false belief.” At this point we may credit 
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Russell with at least having been tempted in the right direction. It is understandable to 
think absurd Russell’s claim that the predicative role of the verb suffices for truth, but the 
claim is perhaps not as absurd as Sainsbury believes it to be. But instead of pursue the 
question of what an account of assertion in its logical sense should be, Russell struggles 
in various ways (from 1903-1914) to reconcile a conception of assertion with a theory of 
meaning, subordinating the development of a full account of assertion to his realist 
commitments. 
 When asked what is asserted in /Caesar died/ it is /Caesar’s death/, but from the 
standpoint of judgment, the former is asserted in virtue of its declarative form; it is the 
judging mind itself that supplies the logical subject /Caesar’s death/ with another term. 
There should therefore be no puzzle as to finding the point of difference between these 
two forms if Russell had recognized the logical significance of the transformation, since 
the “predicative role” of the finite verb in /Caesar died/ contributes the added constituent 
by which the two forms may be distinguished. But in considering, as Russell does, the 
complex /Caesar’s death/ – “where it is true” – it would seem to be implied that there is 
per impossible a kind of coalescence of language with the world. Yet in quite a different 
sense of the phrase “/Caesar’s death/, where it is true, seems to imply that the form of 
words expressing the singular term /Caesar’s death/ also expresses a proposition in the 
realist’s sense – what may be entertained as something that is true without anyone taking 
it to be true. This is a notion that is consistent with, if not a requirement of, Russell’s 
early realism.     
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Chapter VII: A Semantic Treatment of Relative Truth 
 
 
Epistemological questions have traditionally been segregated from those which 
have been declared to be the province of natural language semantics. It would seem from 
a survey of the philosophical literature that some of the most extensive work being 
written in what is called the ‘theory of truth’ is confined to solving the problem of truth in 
those terms in which it has been, and continues to be, formulated by philosophers of 
language, viz. as a problem of semantics. This should be seen as a phenomenon that has 
fostered certain insular prejudices among those presently working within the discipline. 
Among many of these theorists, it seems not to have been recognized that without a 
sufficiently developed theoretical framework within which the problem of truth may be 
usefully analyzed, the manner in which the two dimensions intersect remains somewhat 
obscure. A suitably developed framework would, ideally, comprehend not only the study 
of indexical languages – what is now called ‘epistemology of language’ – but also a 
wider range of pragmatic phenomena than has been investigated. With due recognition of 
this fact, the frustrations engendered by the traditional semantic approaches would 
emerge in a clearer light. Absent this recognition, it seems, such frustrations will continue 
to multiply, as may be seen, e.g., in recent writing on the interfaces among  various 
subdisciplines –  between formal and natural language semantics, semantics and 
pragmatics, and epistemology and semantics. The problem is that, since we expect a 
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solution to be given in the terms in which the problem has been formulated, we are bound 
to be dissatisfied even once a solution is proposed.  
 The following is an attempt to explain certain features of the proposed epistemic 
view of truth (as discussed in the first two chapters) by means of contrasting this view 
with what has been called a relativistic view of truth by John MacFarlane (2005) and 
which is given, borrowing some ideas from Kaplan (1983), a semantic treatment. The 
details of the contrast between the two views are discussed below. I will preface the 
discussion by first summarizing several theses concerning the concept of truth and 
assertion so far presented in earlier chapters. I then attempt to explain the key theses 
within the semantic framework suggested by MacFarlane118: the strategy is to explicate 
the concept of truth (rather than define it) by examining its role within an account of 
assertion. Then it will be seen whether we stand to gain by further elucidating this 
account assertion by appeal to the notion of context. 
 It was seen in earlier chapters that the use of “is true” in indicative sentences in 
ordinary English, carries with it certain logical implications. The structure which results 
from applying the truth-predicate to a sentence consists of a juxtaposition of two verbal 
expressions wherein two judgments are expressed: a judgment, on one hand, and what we 
might think of as a performative judgment on the antecedent judgment. There is, strictly 
speaking, a performative element in the act of any judgment or predication. But the 
construction that results from a (performative) judgment on the antecedent judgment is, 
logically, more complex than it is apt to seem in calling the act, by which the construction 
is produced, performative119 The logical complexity of a judgment on an antecedent 
judgment owes to the fact that the expression involves an occurrence of both primary and 
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secondary truth-values.120 For this reason, it is understandable that another point 
concerning the concept of truth is liable to go unnoticed: that point, which is crucial to 
grasping the epistemological significance underlying the application of the truth-
predicate, is that, in terms of our ordinary practice of assertion, the construction arises 
from the juxtaposition of two judgments which are made within a primary context121. A 
primary context may be taken as a function from a judgeable content to a primary truth-
value122 and consists of a situation in which one is evaluating either  
(1) A statement, P, (expressed by, and possessing the structure 
of, a declarative sentence), or 
(2) A judgeable content (propositional content), p, which is 
expressed in natural discourse, as a participial construction or 
that-clause.123  
  
Let us call (1) and (2) situations in which the truth-predicate may be applied to a 
statement or judgeable content124, respectively. Philosophers who talk of the truth-
predicate in connection with the theory of truth usually have in mind (1), wherein P is 
taken to be the object to which the predicate is applied. In various (epistemological) 
contexts in which “is true” is predicated of P, P normally occurs antecedently to a truth-
evaluation of p, although there are certain exceptions. As Strawson notes in his (1950) 
article, “Truth”, one may “anticipatorily” concede the truth of P “in order to neutralize a 
possible objection.” The use of “true”, Strawson remarks, “always glances backwards or 
forwards to the actual or envisaged making of a statement by someone.” While I think 
Strawson’s remark brings to light something important concerning the epistemological 
dimension of predication, the point on which I wish to lay stress is a logical one: in 
situation (1) the outcome of the use of the truth-predicate – that is, the resulting 
construction, is ‘P is true’, whereas in situation (2) the outcome is simply‘P’. Here, it is 
115 
 
not enough to notice simply that the outcomes differ, although this difference is 
important. It should be noted that the juxtaposition of P and “is true” involves one kind of 
predication.125 We might say, to be more precise, that this juxtaposition involves two 
instances of one kind of predication. 
 In order to bring out its epistemological significance, Wiredu (1981) has 
expressed the point as follows: “Initiating an inquiry into P automatically…converts it 
into a question ‘P?’ So to answer the question of truth we have to answer this 
question.”126 As concerns the concept of truth, the broader epistemological dimension – 
in terms of which we understand how the question of truth arises – intersects with the 
semantical dimension, in terms of which the problem of truth is customarily articulated. I 
maintain that the problem is soluble by appeal to this epistemological dimension in some 
way or another. This is an argument both the plausibility and implications of which I 
have been so far exploring.  
 We may distinguish between two concepts of truth value by approaching the 
analysis of assertion from another direction: rather than focus on the aim of assertion, we 
might focus on the sorts of commitment typically undertaken in the assertion of some 
(non-evaluative) declarative sentence. We often think of a sincere assertion as 
committing one to the truth (relative to some context) to what is asserted, but 
commitment to truth may in turn be explicated, in part, in terms of the normative 
consequences of a speech-act of sincere assertion. This is an approach that John 
MacFarlane (2003, 2005) has taken in an attempt to exhibit various grades of truth-
relativity that could obtain – at least in principle – in a natural language such as English. 
For the purposes of understanding how MacFarlane’s own brand of truth-relativism may 
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be related to the notion of point of view, it will be useful to incorporate the concept of 
point of view into his semantic framework, which I will explain in what follows. We 
might think of the point-of-view associated with an occurrence of the primary concept of 
truth-value as constituting part of the context of use of a sentence, S.127  Similarly, we 
may think of the point-of-view associated with the occurrence of the secondary concept 
of truth-value as constituting the context of assessment of S. According to MacFarlane’s 
view, a context of assessment is “a concrete situation in which the use of a sentence is 
being assessed” – which is to say, a truth-evaluation of S relative to context CA. A context 
of use, CU, is a situation in which the “circumstances of the context” are fixed.128 The 
context of use plays a dual role in determining the truth-value of a sentence: at the initial 
stage the context of use determines which proposition S expresses, whereas at the second 
stage it determines the truth value of the proposition expressed by S, once propositional 
content is fixed at the initial stage. As MacFarlane explains, in recognizing the 
significance of this dual role it becomes clear why we should distinguish between 
context-sensitivity and context-indexicality. But it is on the question of how this is done, 
that I differ from MacFarlane’s approach. Context-sensitivity is nonetheless the salient 
notion in terms of which the idea of truth-as-relative to a point of view is to be explained. 
Incorporating this notion of context into an account of assertion which stresses the 
“normative consequences” of a speech-act of assertion, MacFarlane suggests the 
following preliminary characterization: 
To assert a sentence S (at a context U) is (inter alia) to 
commit oneself to providing adequate grounds for the truth 
of S (relative to U and one’s current context of assessment) 
in response to any appropriate challenge, or (when 
appropriate) to defer this responsibility to another asserter 
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on whose testimony one is relying by withdrawing the 
assertion.” (MacFarlane 2003, p. 20) 
  
 Contexts of use and assessment play a role in a language in which utterance truth 
is to be relative in an “untame” way. A typical manifestation of “untame” truth-relativism 
is the (prima facie) incoherent idea that what is true for one person may not be true for 
another in some absolute sense, i.e. where reference to a feature of an inividual’s 
situation is essential to the concept of truth and where that feature cannot be said to have 
any normative or law-like relation to truth. This is not the sense of relativity that I hold to 
be relevant to the concept of truth. The kind of relativity that is relevant to the proposed 
view is benign (or tame) and requires elucidation with respect to the notion of 
justification; what is necessary to point out is that it is not what is meant by “untamed.”  
 Given a role for contexts of both use and assessment the semantics for truth in 
MacFarlane’s framework allows us to provided us with a recursive definition of truth. 
The semantics for which truth is defined recursively is to be taken as an “input” for what 
is called “postsemantics”129 The truth value of contingent sentences may vary over 
worlds and counterfactual contexts; therefore, in addition to use-sensitivity, the notion of 
assessment-sensitivity is needed to account for contingently true (or false) sentences in 
such a way that we may track variation of truth-value in sentences across counterfactual 
contexts. The kind of language that MacFarlane describes is one in which the 
“absoluteness of utterance truth” may be rendered doubtful and the idea that an assertion 
being “true for Joe but not for Sally” is intelligible. This language, which would exhibit 
what MacFarlane refers to as a third-grade of truth relativity – a form of relativity that 
has not been explored in previous work on relativism with respect to truth – is brought to 
light by employing the doubly-contextualized truth-predicate: “true relative to context of 
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use and to context of assessment.” What the point of such a language would be is 
arguable, although it is argued in “Future Contingents and Relative Truth” that such a 
language contains the semantic resources to account for our evaluating future contingent 
propositions without assuming absolute truth-values for utterances. It seems that 
MacFarlane succeeds in providing a kind of description of such a language. We may 
question whether we have a use for, or even know what it means to use, such a language. 
MacFarlane’s answer lay in his appeal to a speech-act analysis of assertion which would 
accommodate the semantic characterization of truth. On this analysis, the concept of truth 
is to be explicated in terms of assertoric commitment: to assert that p is to be committed 
to the truth of p To be committed to the truth of some proposition is to be inter alia be 
obligated to withdraw the commitment to, or provide justification for, the assertion that p 
under the appropriate circumstances relative to the context of use. Justifying one’s 
assertion relative to Cu, for example, means providing grounds for the truth of the 
sentence asserted. It is at this point, namely that of spelling out exactly what justification 
is to consist in that MacFarlane seems to smuggle into his theory the notion of 
justification the “absoluteness” that was to be avoided with respect to truth.      
 The idea of assessment-sensitivity, MacFarlane explains, should not be confused 
with assessment-indexicality. The truth-value of an assessment-sensitive proposition 
varies with context, whereas in speaking of an indexical, what is meant is that 
propositional content itself (as opposed to sentence-content) varies with context.  
 A context may contain several “parameters.”130 These may include world, time, 
and place of utterance; but it may also include speaker. Propositions exhibit context-
sensitivity with respect to a single speaker, S (perduring over time) when, e.g., S 
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evaluates p as true at t0 and p as false at a later time, t1. A simple example of this is the 
proposition ‘I believed that p but p is false’, where the part containing the belief clause 
marks one truth-evaluation and the clause containing “is false” marks another.131 Here, 
context sensitivity occurs over time but may be invariant with respect to any class of 
speakers, S1, S 2, S 3 . Similarly, a proposition’s truth may vary with respect to a class of 
several speakers, S1, S 2 , S 3 …etc., simultaneously, at time t. As far as the proposed view 
is concerned, however, it is important to note that the “variance” of a proposition’s truth 
with respect to a class of speakers is a slightly misleading way of saying that S1 and S2 
disagree as to what the truth value of p is. To say that the truth-value “varies” in this case 
is to say, rather, that one agrees with S1. For example, S1 may evaluate p at t0 as true, 
while S 2 may evaluate p as false at t0. The latter kind of sensitivity is liable to strike some 
as more controversial than the former kind, but I will argue in what follows that, logically 
speaking, context sensitivity in the speaker’s sense is really no more problematic than 
context sensitivity in the temporal sense just described. In fact, context-sensitivity of this 
kind is essential to the view I am advocating. 
 The context of use, CU, may be allowed to diverge from the context of assessment, 
CA for any truth-evaluable sentence. This is so because the doubly-contextualized 
predicate, “true at CU and CA”, may involve a primary as well as a secondary truth-value. 
That is, CU may contain the primary truth-value and CA the secondary truth-value. As was 
noted earlier, these two truth-values can differ: for example, “The Dodo is extinct in 
2008,” and “It is false that the Dodo is extinct in 2008” – different truth-values for 
different contexts. Perhaps it is prudent to insert a word of caution here. A truth-
evaluation is not being claimed to be relative in the sense that the individual truth-value 
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determined at CU or CA will depend on either CU or CA. That a truth-evaluable content, p, 
or truth-evaluable proposition, P, may vary in truth-value over contexts depends not on 
context but on whether such a content or proposition is warrantedly-assertible at a 
context. It may be objected that in my having spoken of warranted-assertibility at this 
level of generality, I have neglected to specify any criterion or standard of warrant, or 
justification. I have deliberately left this question in abeyance for several reasons. One is 
that, for the purposes of distinguishing the present view of truth from relativism, it is 
more important to see how such a standard could be included in a context with the other 
parameters (w, s, t, p), and how such a standard would be treated in the context as a 
constant parameter. Were propositions and propositional contents not truth-evaluable 
relative to a fixed standard of justification, a more controversial and untamed relativism 
would likely result132. It is just such a relativism that is thought to be implied whenever 
an agent (or speaker) is taken to be a context parameter along with world, time, and 
place. But this, I suggest, is not an implication what it means to relativize the concept of 
truth-value to points of view, as I shall argue shortly. In order to distinguish the senses of 
relativity involved, we may say that a propositional content is truth-evaluable in 
reference to CU whenever “is true” (or false) is predicated of a sentence.  
 To make the distinction more precise, however, it will be necessary to identify 
certain aspects of MacFarlane’s semantic framework with which the concept of point of 
view is compatible, as I have explained it, and those with which it is not. The sense of 
‘context’ which I would like to adopt allows for the expression of the idea that use-
sensitivity may diverge from assessment-sensitivity in a significant way. There are 
several ways in which this can happen: the truth-evaluation of a proposition at CU may 
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occasion the use of ‘is true’, as a speaker at CA is not in such a case merely determining 
an issue – i.e., either affirmatively of negatively – but is “commenting133” on an existing 
judgment made at CU. A speaker, then, thereby recognizes how the secondary concept of 
truth-value is instantiated. Following terminology introduced in the last chapter, let us 
call such an instantiation an “occurrence”. It should be clear that an occurrence of the 
secondary truth-concept entails the divergence of CU and CA since the use of the truth-
predicate, as I have just characterized it, entails that CU ≠ CA .   
 Critics of the epistemic conception sometimes point out that if truth is to be taken 
to mean nothing more than warranted-assertibility, then one must admit that a belief 
which was formerly held to be false may now be true. What had once been warrantedly-
assertible may no longer be so in light of newly available evidence. Such an epistemic 
theory of truth of the kind just described, the objection goes, must somehow violate the 
law of non-contradiction. As it concerns the role that point of view plays in a context, this 
objection confuses CU with CA. The confusion is brought to light in first recognizing that 
a truth-evaluation of a “belief” is tantamount to (inter alia) a truth-evaluation of a 
propositional content (as the object of a belief). It should be clear that since any 
determination of truth must be in the form of a claim to truth. It is also clear that since a 
truth-claim is itself a judgment, one’s commitment to another point of view  – i.e. to 
holding another claim as true – can only issue in the form of another commitment that is 
cotemporaneous with the present. Thus, any agreement with a former point of view 
implies a judgment to that effect from a new and distinct point of view. This alone does 
not preclude one from agreeing or disagreeing with a previous point of view at CU. The 
two things that are cotemporaneous are (1) the reference – in this case, reference to an 
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earlier point of view, P, at world W, and (2) the commitment to the truth of the judgeable 
content contained in the assertion of the earlier point of view, at world, W. What is 
precluded is the possibility of being in possession of a truth that is point of view-
transcendent.  
 The outcome of a truth-evaluation may be either affirmative or negative 
(assuming the principle of bivalence). Thus, with respect to contexts of use and 
assessment, a proposition’s truth is invariant when the truth-value of p at CU and CA is the 
same. For example, it is the same whenever at CU the determination is affirmative and at 
CA it is also affirmative. It varies if, for example, at CU the determination is affirmative 
and at CA it is negative. With respect to the former case we may say that there is a kind of 
congruence of points of view. In the latter (where truth-value varies) there is an 
incongruence. But it is, nonetheless, crucial to recognize that just as the points of view 
are numerically distinct in the latter case they are also distinct in the former and that, in 
the case of incongruence of points of view, the points of view themselves vary – not 
strictly speaking the truth-value. I argue in what follows that this numerical distinctness 
of points of view implies a kind of context-sensitivity without implying relativism.  
 Before commenting on how the notion of point of view may be related to the kind 
of truth-relativism that MacFarlane advocates, it may be useful to summarize the main 
objectives of his exposition. MacFarlane’s aim is to challenge the orthodox view of truth-
relativism as a view that is plainly absurd by presenting a “clear counterexample to the 
absoluteness of utterance truth.”134 According to the orthodox view, utterance truth is 
absolute, whereas propositional truth is relative to a context of use. According to 
MacFarlane ordinary talk of the term ‘utterance’ is often ambiguous. An utterance may 
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be taken in one sense as a speech-act (as an uttering) or in another sense as the object of 
an act of uttering – what, e.g., MacFarlane takes as a particular inscription or “acoustic 
blast.” Given MacFarlane’s semantic characterization, there is a way to understand 
propositional relativism with respect to truth. For MacFarlance, this involves recognizing 
simply that at least some propositions are assessment-sensitive. According to 
MacFarlane,  
[Sentence] S is true at a context of use CU and context of 
assessment CA iff there is a proposition p such that (a) S 
expresses p at CU, and (b) p is true at the world of CU and 
CA.135   
 It is not entirely clear whether MacFarlane has articulated a form of truth-
relativism that is really intelligible, as he claims to have done. In what follows, I contend 
is that that conception fails to be applicable to the formulation of point of view on the 
proposed account of the concept of truth. Crucial to maintaining this position are several 
ideas. One is that the idea of a point of view should not be taken as something on which 
truth-values depend in any “controversial” sense. Such a controversial sense of ‘relative’ 
is what MacFarlane – following Max Kolbel – attempts to articulate. The semantic 
framework that he provides fails to apply to the following point: a proposition may be 
context-sensitive in a given language without implying the “untame” truth-relativism that 
MacFarlane wishes to vindicate. This is the case where p is assessment-sensitive at a 
world, W, of CA, while the standard of justification, j, remains fixed at both CU and CA . 
Just as the truth-value of the proposition “The glass is full” at a given context depends on 
the world in which the sentence is used, the truth-value of the proposition depends on the 
world in which it is being assessed.136 A proposition is said to be assessment-sensitive if 
its truth-value varies with CA while CU remains fixed.  
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Here, it is useful to point out, amending the previous definition, that a sentence S is true 
at CU  and CA  iff 
 (1) S expresses p at CU 
 (2) p is true at the world of CU and the standard of justification, j, of the assessor 
 at CA.     
A proposition is true at CU and CA iff p is true at a circumstance of evaluation determined 
by CU and CA , where the circumstance of evaluation is composed of the world of CU and 
standard of justification of assessor at CA . 
 I would suggest the following point about the Kaplanian notion of context as it 
concerns a view according to which truth is explicated in terms of warranted-assertibility. 
If a standard of justification is included as one of the parameters in a context, then a 
circumstance of evaluation would then be composed of CU and CA (w,t,s,j). But in this 
case the justification parameter would have to be construed as the ‘One correct standard 
of justification’. In stressing the specific logical role played here by the standard of 
justification we are allowed to distinguish the epistemic conception of truth with other 
untame forms of truth-relativism. The role of justification figures crucially in this 
epistemic conception. It is necessary also to stress the following point concerning 
judgment as it relates to any standard of justification: in the context of inquiry the 
judgments which constitute points of view are, as Wiredu has claimed, “in accordance 
with the canons of rational justification.” (Wiredu, 1980) Wiredu further lays stress on 
this point by clarifying the intended sense of the term ‘relative’, the use of which in 
philosophical discourse is often shrouded in obscurity. “Truth is not relative to point of 
view,” Wiredu claims, “[It] is, in one sense, a point of view. But it is a point of view born 
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out of rational inquiry, and the canons of rational inquiry have a human application.” In 
light of this remark, let us rewrite (2) as follows: 
 
(3) p is true at the world of CU and the ‘One correct standard of justification’ at CA.137  
 
While this does not allow for one feature of context, namely standard of justification, to 
vary, it does allow for the other features of context to vary.  Parameters, as they are 
defined in MacFarlane and Kaplan’s framework, may be varied independently. Therefore, 
a proposition’s truth-value may, in a sense, vary accordingly.138 Thus, the truth-value of p 
at a world, W, of CU may differ from the truth-value of p at W of CA. Since there may be 
indefinitely many contexts of assessment, a distinct context of assessment for, as 
MacFarlane points out, for Joe, for Jim and for Sally. The truth-value may ‘vary’ among 
those contexts in the way just described. This is a kind of assessment-sensitivity. It 
amounts to the recognition that there is a plurality of truth-values that come in the form of 
points of view.  We might agree with MacFarlane in wanting to preserve this notion of 
sensitivity: 
  CU   ‘The glass is full’ 
  CA  ‘The glass is full’ 
While incorporating the concept of point of view and standard of justification as 
parameters into the context, we should allow for the possibility that the world of CA will 
not be the same as that of CU. But, while we would like to suppose that a refutation of p 
given by a challenger at CA, where the asserter (speaker) may evaluate the putative 
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refutation, we would also need to allow for a world of CU in which the glass is full and 
another world, of CA, in which the glass is empty. Similarly, it should be possible that 
there is a world of CA(1) in which the glass is full and a world of CA(2) in which the glass is 
empty. Therefore, there is nothing incoherent in allowing the truth-value of p to vary with 
the context of assessment (while the context of use remains fixed). However, it is 
important to recognize that a proposition may be assessment-sensitive in at least two 
ways, one of which leads to untame relativism, and one of which that does not. That is, 
assessment-sensitivity may be due either to not fixing the standard of justification at the 
relevant CA or not fixing the world of the speaker.139 Only the first kind amounts to 
untame relativism with respect to truth.     
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Chapter VIII: Moore’s Paradox and the Logic of Assertion 
 
 
 ‘Moorean sentences’, i.e. sentences of the form ‘p but I do not believe that p’ or ‘I 
believe that p but it is not the case that p’, appear to be paradoxical because the 
propositions they express are inconsistent with what they pragmatically convey. Many 
philosophers readily acknowledge the oddity of these sentences, attempting to explain 
away the oddity on the basis of recasting the distinction between ‘standard meaning’ 
(descriptive content) and pragmatic effect. I argue that this approach is mistaken. I 
suggest that the pragmatic/semantic distinction, despite recent attempts to ‘stabilize’ it, 
obscures a deeper problem which, once sufficiently analyzed, reveals that the various 
appeals to the distinction cannot afford a solution to Moore’s paradox. One reason for 
this is that the problem is both a logical and syntactical one. Because of this, I suggest 
that a solution to Moore’s paradox should not exploit the pragmatic/semantic distinction 
in the manner that has now become customary. Rather, I show that the paradox arises 
from the failure of standard semantic analyses to account for the role of the concept of 
truth in the practice of assertion. The concept of point of view, which is central to 
understanding this role of the concept of truth, affords us with an explanation as to why 
we are tempted to think that Moorean sentences are (possibly) true. Once the role of the 
concept of truth is properly understood, it becomes clear how Moorean sentences are 
analyzable simply as logical contradictions. 
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 Moorean sentences are sentences such as the following: 
 
(1) ‘I don’t believe it’s raining, but as a matter of fact it is’. 
(2) ‘Oysters are edible but I don’t think they are’.140  
 
Such sentences would seem not to be amenable to the kind of treatment which the 
garden-variety semantic paradox receives, the reason being that neither appears to be in 
any way self-contradictory, as neither could be said to be used to assert two contradictory 
propositions.  In asserting a sentence of the form ‘p but I do not believe that p’ we at least 
standardly assert that p is the case and imply its negation. There has been, however, little 
agreement among philosophers as to precisely how this sense of ‘imply’ is to be properly 
analyzed. 
The component sentences possess the dual function of assertion and belief 
conveyance (Figure 5):  
  What is said; 
       what it implies  
                               Oysters are edible, but I don’t believe it.                      
   
                                                                                    What is said; implying  
        the negation of what is said.  
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It may be said that an assertion implies that the corresponding belief is true, but an 
analysis that rests on this assumption would appear to fail to meet what Roy Sorensen 
and Jane Heal identify as adequacy conditions for any satisfactory solution of Moore’s 
paradox. Following Heal and Sorensen, I assume the burden of having to meet these 
conditions: 
(C1)      Moorean sentences must be shown to be reducible to contradictions 
 
(C2) An explanation must be given as to why we are tempted to say that   
Moorean sentences can be true even if they cannot be rationally 
believed.141  
 
We may see the difference between a fairly standard view (E. H. Wolgast) and the 
one that I propose, using (S1) to represent the former, (S2) to represent the latter, and 
brackets to highlight the different in emphasis142 (Figure 6):  
                   
              (S1) The meaning implies (in some unspecified sense) that this is the speaker’s belief;  
                                         paradox results from conflicting beliefs  
 
    
    
                It is raining, but I do not believe it’  
                                                               
      
     (S2) The expression of this belief commits  
 the speaker to the truth of what is believed – either “It is not        
raining” or “I have no attitude toward the proposition ‘that it is  
raining’” 
      
One consequence of (S2) is that what is seen to be paradoxical about the sentence results 
from a conflict between believing ‘It is raining’ and ‘It is not raining’. I suggest that the 
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failure to realize the possibility that each conjunct contains an assertion from a different 
point of view obscures an otherwise a flagrant inconsistency.143   
Supposing that, in some sense, 
 
 (a) ‘I believe it is raining, but I do not believe it’ 
 
 is a defensible interpretation of  Moorean sentences, on S1 the second conjunct would 
remain ambiguous, and would thereby present several difficulties into which we need not 
enter here. But if we suppose, on the other hand, that ‘It is raining but I do not believe it’ 
is analyzable straightforwardly as a contradiction, 
 
  (b) ‘It is raining, but it is not raining’  
 
, then (b) would appear to satisfy our first condition. S1 and S2 may be further explicated 
in accordance with the following principles:  
 
 (P1) An assertion (standardly) expresses a belief. 
 
 (P2) Articulating a belief standardly expresses an assertion; and stating, or  
 asserting a belief in the first-person, thus from the first-person point of view, 
 commits one to the truth of what is believed 
 
On the Wolgast and Black view, the expression of a given belief, according to (P1), is 
central to the meaning of the sentence which is used to express the corresponding belief. I 
do not wish to dispute this claim, but it would seem that a lingering difficulty with such a 
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view (represented somewhat crudely in S1) is that it leaves the source of Moore’s 
paradox unexplained. Specifically, the demands on such a view would be to show that the 
‘paradox’ amounts to a contradiction, and S1 does not allow this to be done absent a 
detailed analysis as to how declarative sentences are to be “doxastically contexted.” 
These details are spelled out carefully in various treatments of Moorean sentences (e.g. in 
recent work by Uriah Kriegel), but much of that work would seem unnecessary if we can 
meet those demands yet forgo the complications attending views along the lines of S1.   
The question then remains as to how Moorean sentences are analyzable as 
contradictions in accordance with S2 – the answer to which I suggest points in the 
direction of a simpler analysis of Moorean sentences. I suggest that the reducibility of 
Moorean sentences to assertions may be permitted, assuming such sentences are seen to 
issue from the first-person point of view. Further, I suggest that this strategy may be 
extended so as to include belief reports generally. 
The suggestion plainly fails for the sentence ‘p, but she does not believe it’, since 
what is asserted in the first conjunct is from a point of view that is distinct from the point 
of view involved in what is believed in the second. In the second conjunct something is 
believed from another point of view, such that what is asserted is that someone other than 
the speaker does not believe what is asserted in the first. We may see that differences in 
point of view also arise in connection with tense. Thus, not surprisingly, we find no 
Moorean element in sentences such as ‘It is raining, but I did not believe it’. The reason 
is that, in saying ‘I did not believe it’, I am speaking about a point of view that I once 
held but no longer consciously hold. Thus, the suggestion is that in cases of believing that 
p from two numerically distinct points of view, one may not derive a logical 
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contradiction; rather, to do this one must assert that p and ~p from one and the same point 
of view. 
We may observe that in Moorean contexts the semantic content of ‘I’ is reflexive, 
and so is determined at any given time by the point of view associated with the speaker at 
the time of utterance. It is in virtue of the fact that I am sincerely uttering that p that I am 
thereby expressing the conscious belief that p. But I should like to suggest that a sincere 
utterance of ‘p and I do not believe p’ is not a pragmatic inconsistency, for the 
inconsistency lies between what is asserted in both conjuncts. Appeals to conversational 
implicature seem misguided here.  
On the view that is indicated here, the first conjunct contains an implicit free 
variable whose value is determined by the point of view associated with the occurrence of 
the first-person pronoun. A point of view is represented by the token-reflexive ‘I’ and the 
surface grammar of a sentence in which it occurs would appear to allow for its 
elimination. It would seem that most, if not all, declarative sentences possess this 
grammar. But here, as elsewhere in philosophy, surface grammar is misleading as to 
logical grammar, and a sentence in which the token-reflexive character of a given point 
of view is implicit awaits further analysis. Such an analysis would supply the sentence 
with an index to which the truth of a given token of the sentence may be relativized. 
From the standpoint of the pragmatics of a point of view, a speaker’s present point of 
view and understood by reference to several factors which constitute the narrow context 
of an utterance. It may not be immediately clear how, as regards the particulars, a more 
thorough account along these lines may be given, but the following considerations would 
appear to lead to a presumption in its favor.  
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 In taking Moore’s original example, ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I 
don’t believe that I did’, we are told that “what is asserted is something which is perfectly 
possible logically” (Moore, 1944). The sentence, ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but 
do not believe that I did’, is absurd when asserted, but this is because an assertion from a 
given point of view entails a commitment to its truth (P2); and, it may be further added 
that an assertion is necessarily from a point of view. What makes it ‘perfectly possible’ is 
that I am able to imagine someone else presently entertaining the same proposition (thus 
suspending commitment to truth) with respect to myself. Similarly, another person saying 
of me that J. Kelly went to the pictures but that J. Kelly does not believe it, may be 
correct, but this is because the entire sentence issues from another point of view. The 
notion of ‘what is asserted’ is indispensable to rational discourse, since without it we 
should not be able to explain how it is possible to consider what it is that a sentence 
expresses; we should not be able to explain how the accusatives of thought are possible. 
Such considerations, however, issue from different points of view; and while they do not 
enjoin commitment to truth – for such a commitment is suspended in our merely 
considering some proposition – we should avoid the temptation to believe then that we 
may maintain the suspension of commitment when we sincerely assert a sentence. Given 
this, to have before us a Moorean sentence, a declarative sentence whose assertive force 
is reflected in its syntactical structure, and then go on to ask ‘How is it possible that this 
is true?’ is to yield to this very temptation. The sentence ‘I went to the pictures but do not 
believe it’ is possibly true only insofar as I am able to refer to myself having gone to the 
pictures at an earlier time, i.e. from another point of view. This could be any given 
hypothetical point of view; and it would seem that the possibility – of entertaining a 
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hypothetical point of view – explains why it is we want to say that Moorean sentences, 
despite their absurdity, may nonetheless be true. The temptation to regard Moorean 
sentences as possibly true would thus appear to be a consequence of confusing two 
distinct points of view – viz. the point of view associated with the (absurd) 1st- person 
assertion of a Moorean sentence and the point of view associated with the 3rd-person 
assertion of the Moorean sentence, which, of course, may be true. In both cases, we have 
the same proposition, taking a broadly Fregean view of propositions. It may then be seen 
to follow that if any interpretation of Moorean sentences as being possibly true or false is 
born of such confusion, so would consequent intimations of paradox. 
 As asserted from a first-person point of view, a Moorean assertion is absurd, 
whereas from a third-person point of view such an assertion is either true or false. Thus, 
someone other than myself may say truly of me that I went to the pictures but that I do 
not believe it, or, on a possible-worlds model, it may be true in some possible world other 
than the one that I inhabit. I may come to the same conclusion as that of the person in that 
world, but if I do so it is only in virtue of inhabiting some other possible world. The 
plausibility of the possible-worlds model, in connection with the concept of point of 
view, depends on clarifying a syntactic distinction between propositions in the sense 
given to them here and declarative sentences.   
Insofar as I may be tempted to regard both parts of 
 
  (i) ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I do not believe it’ 
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as possibly true, I must effectively dissociate the assertion of the sentence from my 
present point of view so as to imagine the entire sentence being true of me at an earlier 
time. As I already mentioned, what gives one the sense that the sentence could 
nonetheless be true must be that, given any assertive utterance of (i), (i) is surreptitiously 
converted to an assertion from another distinct point of view. As is the case with speech 
acts in general, a point of view is episodic in nature. This fact, however, is not reflected 
in the logical grammar of (i). Similarly, I may imagine what is said being uttered by 
someone else, or someone else may say of me  
 
(ii) ‘He went to the pictures last Tuesday but he does not believe it.’ 
  
In either case I divorce the propositional content of the assertion from the assertion itself 
and go on to make an assertion; but in doing so I adopt someone else’s point of view, in 
which case, the sentence should read: 
 
(iii) ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but did not believe it.’ 
 
 Therefore, if it is to be true of anyone, there is necessarily a commitment to its truth by 
its speaker, and to this commitment there necessarily corresponds, by (P2), a unique point 
of view. In believing (or asserting) that ‘what is asserted’ is ‘possible’ I thereby no longer 
consider the assertion from the same point of view, as I am not truly considering an 
assertion – unless commenting upon it. Entertaining some proposition that p is thus 
possible without being committed to the truth of that proposition, and in this way, p 
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appears to be point-of-view-less. But here we are misguided into believing that from a 
proposition presented under one mood (of entertainment) as point-of-viewless, we may 
infer that a proposition under any mood (e.g. the mood of assertion) is also point-of-
viewless: being wedded to a point of view does not necessarily commit one to the truth of 
any proposition, but in asserting any proposition to be true, one thereby commits oneself 
to a point of view. (More on what this commitment amounts to (e.g. normative 
consequences)) 
Moorean sentences are therefore unique insofar as they are signal manifestations 
of a failure to realize the implications of commitment to truth that is involved in any act 
of assertion. We might suspect, given the foregoing reflections, that it is to this 
uniqueness that Wittgenstein refers when he famously said in the Philosophical 
Investigations, that Moorean sentences reveal something important about “the logic of 
assertion.”  We may think of this commitment as what an assertion adds to a bare 
proposition. If I am inclined to think that I might consider the assertion of a Moorean 
sentence from one and the same point of view in such a way that it appears to be 
simultaneously absurd and possibly true, I need only attend to the tense of the principal 
verb of the second conjunct to see that an absurdity could result – insofar as I am 
considering the sentence as asserted. ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but do not 
believe it’ is absurd, yet the proposition as a judgeable content is possibly true when I 
conceive of a state of affairs in which I went to the movies and later did not remember it. 
But to do this is not to conceive of the same state of affairs referred to by the proposition 
expressed by that sentence. It is quite a different thing to say to oneself ‘I went to the 
movies and later did not remember going’. The further rider may then be added: ‘But I 
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remember now’. It should be clear that this is another assertion and that the assertion is a 
conversion of the judgeable contents, (expressed as two separate noun-phrases) ‘my 
having gone to the pictures last Tuesday’ and ‘my not believing that I went to the pictures 
last Tuesday’, to a declarative sentence which is both assertible and possibly true.  Thus, 
the sentence ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe it.’ asserted from 
another point of view may be regarded as another sentence altogether.  
    
138 
 
 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 R. S. Wells, “Frege’s Ontology” p. 16 
2 Ibid. 
3 See Grundgesetze (ed. M. Furth, 1964), section 2, for a nearly parallel discussion. 
4 Though we find, for example, a discussion of a function being doubly incomplete 
(Grundgesetze), Frege 
5 The “syntactical” distinctions appealed to are in keeping more with e.g. W.E. Johnson’s 
employment of the term “syntactical” than, e.g., Carnap’s (The Logical Syntax of 
Language (London; 1937)), the latter of which pertains exclusively to the study of signs. 
6 Sometimes called ‘propositional sign’, e.g. in ‘Function and Concept’ (1891) 
7 “Frege’s Ontology,” The Philosophical Review; 1960 
8 Dudman 
9 Here Dudman also cites Russell’s complaint in a similar connection in Principles of 
Mathematics: “Asserted propositions have no indication.” (PoM) 2nd ed. 1937, p. 504 
10 See p. iii of the introduction.   
11 Dudman (1975) 
12 See p. 24. 
13 See, e.g., Geach, 1975. 
14 Here we find echoes of Church’s view. 
15 Or, to use Russell’s example, ‘Caesar is dead’ 
16 Let us recall that Frege is alleged to have overlooked the fact that assertoric force is 
withdrawn in truth-functional contexts and so the use of a definite description to 
exemplify ‘—A’ was unnecessary. 
17 In fact, this is Dummett’s understanding of the matter. Frege: The Philosophy of 
Language (Harvard; 1980) 
18 See p. 31 
19  See Dudman, p. 157. 
20 See Grundgesetze pp.6f 
21 I repeat and earlier quotation from Ch II, p. 22. (M. Furth (trans.), Berkeley, 1964) 
22 See “Truth as a Logical Constant; with an application to the principle of excluded 
middle” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 101 (Oct., 1975), 
23 Frege's Theory of Judgement, David Andrew Bell, Oxford: Clarendon Press: Oxford 
University Press, I979 
 
24 Russell often speaks of this construction as the verbal noun. 
 
 
25 Principles of Mathematics, New York: Norton (1931) p.48  
29 George Pitcher has expressed some apprehension that a kind of schizophrenia here 
begins to set in to the theory of truth in this connection. Given that what I’ve said so far 
139 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
implies the possibility of two kinds of truth-bearers, Pitcher is perhaps right. However, 
what I shall argue is that this “schizophrenia” is virtuous from the point of view of an 
analysis of the role that truth plays in the practice of assertion. In the pages that follow I 
distinguish between primary and secondary forms of truth-attribution and argue that it is 
sentences relative to contexts, not utterances, that are bearers of secondary truth-
attribution. However, for the purpose of distinguishing between primary and secondary it 
is not necessary to distinguish here between sentences and their use. See Pitcher (ed.), 
Truth, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964. See also Bar-Hillel, ‘Primary Truth-
Bearers’, Dialectica (1973) 
 
30 Griffin, Nicholas. 1993. “Terms, Relations, Complexes’ in Eds. Irvine and Wedeking 
Russell and Analytic Philosophy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
31 This is distinguished from what Russell calls a ‘propositional concept’, which is 
expressed typically by a noun phrase – or verbal noun. 
32 This is Griffin’s observation. That Russell did not wish to assert this is perhaps 
arguable, but it seems to be an unlikely possibility. 
 
 
34 W. E. Johnson. 1921. Logic  
35 This phrase would appear to denote a datable event, whereas ii′ seems less apt to do 
denote the same datable event. This is merely an appearance, however. Strictly speaking, 
noun phrases do not denote anything. Strawson’s remark regarding this matter in “On 
Referring” seems to show us why this is so: a phrase in itself does not denote anything. A 
phrase is something a person may use to denote something. The added qualification is 
then necessary: in the referring act, a noun phrase may denote something (in this case, an 
event). This is only possible, however, given the addition of the ‘assertive tie’, whereby 
the unsaturated expression (e.g. a noun phrase) becomes saturated. This is a 
transformation of the jugeable content to a judgement. By virtue of this transformation, 
an act of denoting just is a claim – i.e., a judgment. For this reason, it would seem that we 
must use a declarative sentence, not a noun phrase, to express the idea of a phrase having 
a denotation.      
36 By grammatical sameness of the definite description and the participial phrase I mean 
that both are unsaturated expressions. 
37 Wiredu (1975) distinguishes between this kind of determination (of truth-value) and 
that involved in the sort of attribution of truth by which the truth predicate is employed. 
     
 
39 This has also been discussed and recognized to be a real difficulty by Russell (1903), 
Geach (1975) and Dudman (1975) 
40 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XLVI, 1946 
41 ‘Knowledge, Truth and Reason’, Dissertation, Oxford (1960) 
42 See Davidson (2001) 
43 See Ch. II for a discussion of the “characterizing tie.” 
44 Geach (1957), Griffin (2001)  
45 Meinong’s “Objectives” 
140 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 “On the Nature of Truth,” in Philosophical Essays 1966, p.149 
47 This was published later in The Philosophy of John Dewey; The  Library of Living 
Philosophers, vol. 1, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (Open Court, 1990)  
48 This is stated in Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, (Allen and Unwin Ltd.; London) 
1948, p.148; hereafter IMT. 
49 This comment was made in response to Russell’s remark (IM&T) that “there is an 
important difference between his (Dewey’s) views and mine, which will not be elicited 
unless we can understand each other.” (p.401) 
50 The connection between Russell’s conception of propositions and the nature of truth is 
well documented in a discussion dating back to Russell’s Principles of Mathematics 
(1903) in which Russell struggles, famously, to distinguish between logical subjects with 
respect to which truth is said to be external, and assertions with respect to which truth is 
said to be internal. 
51 “On Sense and Meaning”, trans. M. Black, (Basil Blackwell, 1952) 
52 Begriffsschrift, trans. P. T. Geach, (Basil Blackwell, 1952)  
53 See, e.g., §§ 51-53, Principles of Mathematics (W. W. Norton, 1996)  
54 I have in mind, e.g., Alonzo Church (1956), Peter Geach (1965), Max Black (1964), 
Michael Dummett (1993), and V T. Dudman (1970). I do not mention Wittgenstein 
because he did, of course, treat the assertion sign of Frege in the Tractatus. Though the 
details of this treatment are quite significant with respect to the development of the 
philosophy of language in general, they fall outside the scope of our discussion.    
55 C. I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation; 1946) joins their company in 
this respect. 
56 For Frege, these propositions are the bearers of thoughts. 
57 PWAT, p.172 
58 Both my criticism of Russell’s correspondence theory and my interpretation of Dewey 
here and throughout derive from the views of K. Wiredu’s, to be found in several 
discussions on these subjects. See, for example, “Truth: The Correspondence Theory of 
Judgment," (TCTJ) African Philosophical Inquiry (January 1987). 
59 PWA&T. p.171. 
60 The use of idea here is not to be understood in Dewey’s sense, but rather in a 
(classical) empiricist – i.e. as implying some primitive datum of experience whose 
function is to represent the object it is (in some sense) about.  
61 See p. 178 of PWA&T 
62 Ibid. 
63 This is what Dewey calls a proposition’s “sufficient verifier”63 
64 Ibid., p.179 
65  SCCT p. 158 
66 I refer here to a form of truth-skepticism arising out of certain correspondence views 
that carry the implication that the truth-maker relation is asymmetrical and therefore 
cognititvely inaccessible.   
67 My attention was drawn to these observations by K. Wiredu, TCTJ (1987). 
68  SCCT, p. 165 
141 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
69 See p. 65 
70 The point here is made later in Russell’s lectures on the Philosophy of Logical 
Atomism. 
71 I include, in addition to Strawson (1950), two notable truth-theorists, J. L. Mackie 
(1973) and Kwasi Wiredu (1973) 
72 Ibid. 
73 This a context to which Frege was sensitive early on despite exhibiting a strongly 
deflationary bias. See Frege (1879) 
74 Ibid. p.20; Strawson, more frequently than Austin himself, uses the synonymous term, 
‘speech-episode’. 
75 Ibid., p.23. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., p. 26 
78 Ibid., p.27 
79 Ibid., p. 31 
11 It is worth noting that Moore seems to have detected the sense of a sentence ‘saying of 
itself that it is true that I wish to explain. On this score, however, it is evident that Austin 
did not follow Moore’s lead. 
81 My emphasis. 
82 Ibid., p. 19 
83 Strawson, ‘Truth,’ (1950). Subsequent citations refer to the G. Pitcher, ed. Truth 
(Prentice Hall, NJ, 1964) pp. 32-53.   
84 Ibid., p. 42 
85 This may apply also to Russell’s correspondence view of 1912. See his Problems of 
Philosophy. 
86 Ibid., p. 29 
87 Caution must be taken here to distinguish Frege’s early concept of force of his 
Begriffschrifft (1879) from the later concept as it appears, e.g., in Grundgesetze (1891), as 
the differences between them, though subtle, lead to radically different interpretations. I 
refer here to the former. The critical literature on Frege from Russell to D. M. Armstrong 
would suggest that these differences in interpretations lead, in turn, to different 
ontologies.  
88 It is not possible to discuss this aspect of assertion satisfactorily here; it is an aspect 
which, as I mentioned earlier, makes essential reference to ‘point of view,’ a significant 
although somewhat technical term of art. The idea of point of view, insofar as it bears on 
the logic of assertion, is discussed fully in Wiredu’s “Truth as a Logical Constant with an 
application to the principle of excluded middle” (1975). Many of the views contained in 
the present discussion are applications of the main ideas advanced in that paper.   
89 Ibid., p. 41. 
90 Logic (Cambridge: University Press, 1921) 
91 I was first made aware of the primary and secondary distinction in reading K. Wiredu’s  
“Truth as a Logical Constant, with an Application to the Principle of Excluded Middle,” 
(1975); see also his “Deducibility and Inferability” Mind (1973).  
92 I.e., has a primary value of ‘True’ 
142 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
93 This is what Strawson means, as I understand him, when he remarks that it is a 
“logically fundamental type-mistake” to suppose that there is something in the world to 
which a statement can be related (or be “about”) other than that to which the referring 
part of the statement refers and that to which the describing part “fits or fails to fit.” To 
understand how these functions are discharged in normal cases of assertion is to see 
precisely what it is a statement is about. Cf. Strawson, §2 of ‘Truth’ (1950). 
94 Or we might say ‘in virtue of using a declarative sentence ‘2 + 2 = 5’. I have deviated 
from orthodoxy in maintaining that a declarative sentence cannot be used non-assertively 
(e.g. as a complex name).   
95 I should point out here not just the difference between primary and secondary concepts 
but that the secondary concept is derivative of the primary. This point is developed 
clearly in both K. Wiredu (1975) and K. Wiredu’s “Truth: The Correspondence Theory 
of Judgment,” (1987) 
96 The idea presented here, which I do not develop, may be found in Kwasi Wiredu, op. 
cit., (1973), and Philosophy and an African Culture (1980).  
 
97 Where ‘p’ stands for a declarative sentence.   
98 I pursue this idea in a later discussion on the idea of relative truth. 
99 We may suppose that a commitment remains in force unless or until a person 
withdraws the assertion that carries it.  
100 This point will have implications for a later discussion of relativism. 
101 See Wiredu, 1975 
102 For clarification of what these advantages are, see my previous discussion of assertion 
in Ch. II, p. 50 
103 Precisely in what way a truth-value is identified with a point of view is explained on 
the next page.  
104 See Chapter V,  p.114 
105 A. N. Prior Objects of Thought 
106 Ibid. 
107 See Chapter II. 
108 Truth and Predication (2001) 
109 In the context of Russell’s later philosophy of mind, judgment so conceived was 
referred to as a ‘propositional action’.  
110 Griffin suggests that such a relegation would demand an account of the “propositional 
action” of the mind (Terms, Relations, Complexes). 
111 There is good evidence that suggests Davidson’s one views fail to recognize this 
point. Davidson’s theory of truth does not, e.g., account for the logical aspect of assertion 
for reasons having to do with the fact that Davidson intends his theory of truth to serve 
also as a theory of meaning in a unique way. In light of the role that interpretation plays 
in this theory of meaning, the theory of truth then is supposed to describe the “critical 
core of speakers’ actual and potential linguistic behavior – in effect how the speaker 
intends his utterances to be interpreted.” (Davidson, 2001). Davidson further claims: 
“There is one intention not touched on by a theory of truth which a speaker must intend 
an interpreter to perceive: the force of an utterance.” (emphasis added). Here, Davidson 
understands, as Russell did before him, assertoric force to be primarily psychological. I 
143 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
have argued in “Frege an Russell on Assertion” how this construal is liable to error. 
Davidson later claims, “An interpreter must, if he is to understand a speaker, be able to 
tell whether an utterance is intended as a joke, an assertion, an order, a question, and so 
forth. I do not believe there are rules or conventions that govern this essential aspect of 
language. It is something that language users ca n convey to hearers and hearers can often 
enough detect…” He therefore concludes: “I believe there are sound reasons for thinking 
that nothing like a serious theory is possible concerning this dimension of language.”    
112 I refer to Griffin’s article, ‘Terms, Relations, Complexes’, in which he discusses the 
views of Russell’s unpublished manuscript. 
 
 
113The act of passing judgment in the case described here would yield a judgment that 
fails to fall, in C. I. Lewis’s phrase, under a “mood of entertainment.” (Analysis of 
Knowledge and Valuation)  
114 Griffin, 2001. 
117Russell (London: Routledge, 1979) 
118 MacFarlane, “Making Sense of Relative Truth” (2005) 
119 It is performative in something like the sense in which Strawson understood the uses 
of the words “is true,” but it is not redundant. 
120 I follow the analysis given in Wiredu’s “The Correspondence Theory of Judgment” 
(1981). The structure of the expression may be represented as follows: T<Tp>, in the 
case that “is true” is predicated of a (complete) proposition; F<Tp> in the case that “is 
false” is predicated of a (complete) proposition.  
121 I borrow the term from Wiredu. See “The Correspondence Theory of Judgment” 
122 The latter being an affirmative or negative determination with respect to a judgeable 
content. See, “The Correspondence Theory of Judgment” 
123 According to Wiredu, a judgeable content (what he calls an “ideational content) may 
be represented more formally as a truth-functional variable in a classical logic. While I 
cannot here discuss the specifics of this suggested interpretation of propositional content, 
I use the upper and lower-case letters as Wiredu does in order to distinguish between 
statement and judgeable content.  
124 I will use ‘judgeable’ content and ‘propositional’ content synonymously throughout.  
125 I say the same “kind” in order to distinguish what Russell calls ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ forms of predication. See Russell (1905); see also Bernard Linsky, Russell’s 
Early Metaphysical Logic 
126 Ibid 
127 We may think of context, e.g., as involving a speaker, world, time and place, which 
we shall refer to as parameters of the context. Further parameters may in principle be 
added to this list, such as a standard of justification) 
128 MacFarlane, “Making Sense of Relative Truth,” p. 326. There are exceptions, as noted 
in F. Recanati’s Perspectival Though: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism (2007) 
129 Ibid. 
130 “Parameter” is MacFarlane’s term and is equivalent to what Kaplan calls the 
“coordinate” of an index. An index may contain a world, time, place, and agent 
coordinate, (i = w, t, p, a…). According to Kaplan, “All these coordinates can be varied, 
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possibly independently, and thus affect the truth-values of statements which have indirect 
references to these coordinates.” David Kaplan, “Demonstratives” (p. 508) Themes from 
Kaplan, Almog, Wettstein, Perry (eds.) 1989 
131 See Chapter VI, “Moore’s Paradox and the Logic of Assertion” 
132 I borrow this term from Max Kolbel. 
133 The idea of an act of asserting as commenting upon an existing assertion may be 
found in K. Wiredu’s “The Correspondence Theory of Judgment” (1980) 
134 See p. 14,  “Three Grades of Truth-Relativity” 
135 I paraphrase this, leaving out “and the aesthetic standards of the assessor at” in (b). 
136 The same would apply context-indexicality at CU and CA . A proposition is said to be 
assessment-sensitive if its truth-value varies with CU  while CA remains fixed.  
137 I borrow the phrase, “The one correct standard” from MacFarlane (2001) 
138 See footnote 9. 
139 On MacFarlane’s view the context of assessment at which the putative refutation is 
evaluated by the asserter is privileged, where the asserter is the same speaker at CU and 
CA139 
140 This example is Max Black’s “Saying and Disbelieving,” Analysis (1952) 
141 Sorensen, R. A., Blindspots, (Oxford University Press/Clarendon Press: 1988). 
Although I find a good deal of Sorensen’s discussion to be instructive, my treatment of 
the paradox diverges significantly at points from his own.  
142 Wolgast, E. H., Paradoxes of Knowledge (Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press, 1977) 
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